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ARE PUBLIC-SECTOR UNIONS
SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICAL PARTIES?
Edwin Vieira, Jr.*
Exclusive representation and compulsory bargaining in the context of government employment present important constitutional
questions, which the United States Supreme Court recently considered in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education. In this Article, Professor Vieira offers a detailed, thought-provoking, and frequently
controversial analysis of the Supreme Court decision and of the
underlying issues relating to the rights of public employees and the
political activities of public-sector unions. He concludes that such
unions as the National Education Association are in fact political
action organizations, posing possible threats to representative government that have received inadequate recognition.

"If this government becomes oppressive," Melancton Smith
prophesied in the New York Convention, "it will be by degrees: it
will aim at its end by disseminating sentiments of government opposite to republicanism, and proceed from step to step in depriving the
people of a share in the government."1 Today, there are disquieting
proofs of Smith's foresight-not the least of which, and the subject of
this Article, is compulsory public-sector collective bargaining. In previous articles, I have demonstrated that exclusive representation and
compulsory bargaining in public-sector employment are repugnant to
the Thirteenth Amendment, as a form of slavery, 2 and to the First
Amendment, on several grounds. 3 This Article continues and elaborates upon the work begun there.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law; Research Director,

Wake Forest Institute for Labor Policy Analysis; A.B., A.M., Ph.D., J.D., Harvard University.
The author acknowledges with gratitude the support of the Earhart Foundation, Ann Arbor,
Michigan, in the preparation of this article. The author extends special thanks to Milton L.
Chappell, Esq., and Susan R. Meisinger for invaluable research assistance.
1. 2 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT
PHILADELPHIA IN 1787 250 (2d ed. 1836).
2. In my monograph Syndicalism, I demonstrated that the system of exclusive representation central to every existing compulsory bargaining scheme in public employment is repugnant
per se to the Thirteenth Amendment, as a violation of dissenting employees' freedom of contractual self-determination. Vieira, Of Syndicalism, Slavery and the Thirteenth Amendment: The
Unconstitutionality of "'Exclusive Representation" in Public-Sector Employment, 12 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 515 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Syndicalism]. For the definition of "dissenting
employees" used herein, see id. at 522-24.
3. In my article Exclusive Representation, I elaborated on a suggestion from Syndicalism
and explained how exclusive representation is also unconstitutional per se under the First
Amendment, as a violation of dissenting public employees' freedom of petition. Vieira, Exclusive
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I shall begin by critically reviewing the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncements on the subject of compulsory public-sector
unionism in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education 4 -pronouncements which implicitly recognize the centrality and controlling nature
of questions I have posed elsewhere to the constitutional debate now
raging around exclusive representation and compulsory bargaining in
public-sector employment. Then, I shall investigate whether public-,
sector unions such as the National Education Association (NEA),
American Federation of Teachers (AFT), and American Federation of
State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) are political-action organizations in fact and law, and whether their participation in
compulsory public-sector collective bargaining through the exclusive
representation device inter alia distinguishes them from other political-action organizations as special interest political parties.
The discussion will follow this plan:
I. Abood and the fundamental constitutional issues of compulsory
public-sector unionism .................................................... 295
A. The agency shop and exclusive representation ................ 297
1. The constitutionality of the agency shop "as such" ..... 298
2. The assumed validity of exclusive representation under
the private-sector analogy ....................................... 307
B. The constitutional implications of the political nature of
public-sector collective bargaining and the political activism of public-sector unions ...................................... 318
1. Recognition of the issues by the Abood Court ........... 318
2. Fundamental questions of fact and law not sufficiently

investigated in A bood ............................................ 321
II. Public-sector unions as political-action organizations in fact and
law .............................................................................. 3 2 1

A. The nature of the problem and the methodology for its solu tio n ...................................................................... 3 2 2
B. The law of political-action organizations ......................... 323
1. The problems of definitions, criteria, and sources ....... 323
2. The logical anatomy of a political-action organization ... 325
3. Activities characteristic of political-action organizations. 332

Representation versus Freedom of Petition for Nonunion Public Employees-A Study in Irreconcilable Constitutional Conflict, 1977 DETROIT COLLEGE L. REv. 499 [hereinafter cited as
Exclusive Representation].
In both places, although without detailed discussion, I further indicated that compulsory
public-sector collective bargaining through the exclusive representation device is inconsistent
with the republican form of government which the Constitution guarantees in Article 4, section
4-at least when militant, politically active unions assume the status and exercise the prerogatives of an exclusive representative. Syndicalism, supra note 2, at 818-26; Exclusive Representation, supra, at 573-74.
4. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
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4. Criteria for and sources of evidence of the substantiality
and essentiality of an organization's political activism... 344

5. The NEA as a typical political-action organization ....... 349
C. The logical necessity for public-sector unions to function as
political-action organizations ........................................ 364
1. The desire of public-sector unions to attain control over
public em ployers ................................................... 364
2. The necessity for political activism if public-sector
unions are to attain control over public employers ..... 367
D. Public-sector unions as special interest political parties .... 376
1. Without respect to their status as exclusive representativ e ..................................................................... 3 76
2. With respect to their status as exclusive representatives
III. C onclu sion .................................................................... 378
I. Abood

AND THE FUNDAMENTAL

CONSTITUTIONAL

ISSUES OF COMPULSORY PUBLIC-SECTOR UNIONISM

Abood involved a challenge by nonunion public school teachers to
an agency shop agreement. The teachers claimed that the agreement
abridged their rights, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
not to associate with the defendant union, a private organization engaged in political and ideological activities to which they were opposed. The trial court dismissed their complaint, 5 and the highest
state court to hear their appeal affirmed. 6 On appeal, the Supreme
Court vacated the judgment on the ground that the teachers could
not be constitutionally required to finance such political activities of the
union as were not germane to collective bargaining. It then remanded
the cause for further proceedings on the issue of what remedy would
be appropriate where the union illegally expended fees collected
under the agency shop arrangement. 7 Over the protests of Justices
Powell and Blackmun, and Chief Justice Burger, however, the rest of
the Court concluded that the agency shop scheme was constitutionally valid insofar as it required the teachers to provide financial support for the union's collective-bargaining activities. 8
Abood is a peculiar and disquieting decision. Not the least confusing aspect of the case is the welter of discordant opinions it produced.
First, a tortuous plurality opinion of Justices Stewart, Brennan,

5. Exclusive Representation, supra note 3, at 610-11.
6. 84 L.R.R.M. 3008 (Wayne County Cir. Ct. 1973), aff'd, 60 Mich. App. 92, 230 N.W.2d
322 (1975). It should be noted that the Michigan Appellate Court reversed and remanded the
case on other grounds. The Supreme Court of Michigan denied review (Sept. 17, 1975).
7. 431 U.S. at 242.
8. Id. at 222-23.
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White, and Marshall held that, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, a state may condition the employment of public
school teachers on their financial support of the collective-bargaining
activities of a union which represents a majority of the employees in
an appropriate bargaining unit-but not on their financial support of
the union's political and ideological activities unrelated to its duties as
exclusive representative. 9 Second, a petulant concurring opinion of
Justice Rehnquist reiterated his personal view-for it finds no support in decisions of the Court-that a state may condition public
employment howsoever it sees fit, without let or hindrance by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. 10 Third, an anxious concurring
opinion of Justice Stevens expressed his doubt that the plurality had
properly addressed the First Amendment issue at all, since its purported remedy for admitted violations of the constitutional liberties of
nonunion teachers might prove to be unworkable." And fourth, an
acerbic concurring opinion of Justices Powell and Blackmun and Chief
Justice Burger in fact dissented on the substantive ground that the
plurality unjustifiably failed to apply the proper strict constitutional
standards to the agency shop. 12 Moreover, if we presume that Justice Rehnquist, having abandoned his notions about the nonbinding
nature of Supreme Court opinions on dissenting Justices, will reaffirm
as a legal judgment his personal agreement with Justice Powell on the
merits of the agency shop issue; 13 and if we presume that, the plurality's purported remedy having proven no remedy at all, Justice Stevens will also join Justice Powell; 14 then we must conclude that,
when the case inevitably returns to the Court for reconsideration, a
majority will declare the agency shop unconstitutional. 15 This makes
Abood an insecurely contingent precedent at best.
The holding of Abood is unclear in another respect. Justice Stewart
said in his opinion that the Court had upheld the constitutionality of
9. 431 U.S. at 211-42. The reports style Justice Stewart's opinion as that of the Court, but
analysis proves this designation to be inaccurate, at least with respect to the constitutional issues
with which we shall be primarily concerned.
10. Id. at 242-44 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist has apparently forgotten that
his "institutional duty is to follow until changed the law as it now is, not as some Members of
the Court might wish it to be." Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976).
11. Id. at 244 (Stevens, J., concurring).
12. Id. at 244-64 (Powell and Blackmun, JJ., and Burger, C.J., concurring).
13. As Justice Rehnquist said, "Had I joined the plurality opinion in Elrod v. Burns, I
would find it virtually impossible to join the Court's [i.e., the plurality's] opinion in this case."
Id. at 242.
14. See note 25 infra.
15. All the Justices agreed on the mediate disposition of the cause: vacation of the lower
court decision and remand for further proceedings on the issue of a proper remedy. Id. at
241-42 (Stewart, J.); 244 (Powell & Blackmun, JJ., and Burger, C.J., concurring).
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the agency shop "as such" against a challenge under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. In contrast, Justice Powell said that the
plurality had not ruled properly on the constitutionality of the agency
shop (having failed to apply the correct standard of review), but had
ruled on the constitutionality of exclusive representation, even though
the lower courts and the litigants never raised the issue. Surely a case
which can provoke such a divergence of views must embody some
remarkable legal concept. Therefore, I shall next investigate what
Abood held with respect to the agency shop and to exclusive representation, illuminating the important, unanswered questions which
some of the Justices perceived, if only "through a glass darkly."
A. The Agency Shop and Exclusive Representation
Exclusive representation and the agency shop are two related but
distinct aspects of compulsory unionism. 16 Exclusive representation
is the system through which a union that numbers among its members a majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit
becomes the unique spokesman for all employees therein with respect to the negotiation of terms and conditions of employment and
the adjustment of grievances with their employer. 17 The agency
shop usually assumes the form of an agreement between an employer
and a majority union which conditions the employment of nonmembers of that union on their payment to it of a fee equivalent either to
full union membership dues or to the costs of collective bargaining
incurred by the union on their behalf.18 Generally, union partisans
rationalize the agency shop on the "free-rider theory": the notion that
performance of the supposedly burdensome duty of representing
nonmembers in collective bargaining establishes an equitable claim in
the majority union to recovery in the nature of quantum meruit
against those employees.' 9 Debate on the constitutional merits of
16. For a review of compulsory unionism which focuses on the several varieties of union
security, see T. HAGGARD, COMPULSORY UNIONISM, THE NLRB, AND THE COURTS: A LEGAL
ANALYSIS OF UNION SECURITY AGREEMENTS (1977), reviewed in 29 S.C.L. Rev. 437 (1978).

17. On exclusive representation in the public sector, see Syndicalism, supra note 2, at
520-21 & nn.7, 11, 526-42.
18. On the types of compulsory union membership devices operative in public-sector
employment, see id. at 520 n.10, 521-22 & nn.12-16.
19. The appellee union and its amici in Abood relied strongly on this argument, although
they did not concede the quantum meruit limitation on the agency fee. Brief for Appellees at
21-23, 29-35; Brief for the National Education Association as Amicus Curiae at 13, 11-16; Brief
for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations and for the
International Union, UAW as Amici Curiae at 45-50, 52 n.33.
At least one state court has recognized the quantum meruit requirement - interestingly
enough, with respect to the very statute challenged in Abood. Central Mich. Univ. Faculty
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the agency shop, then, usually accepts as an irrebuttable premise the
validity of exclusive representation. If it did not, discussion would
immediately shift to the legal merits of that device, to which issue the
whys and wherefores of the agency shop are irrelevant.
This logical and constitutional priority of exclusive representation to
the agency shop largely vitiates the significance of contemporary constitutional litigation on compulsory unionism, the great body of which
(as Abood attests) addresses a merely derivative issue, while necessarily conceding the only question worth asking in the ultimate
analysis. 20 It is possible in cases of this kind, of course, for counsel
to suggest, as they did in Abood, that the court abstract the agency
shop problem from that of exclusive representation. 2 1 But it is unlikely (again, as Abood attests) that any court other than one imbued
with the most sensitive constitutional scruples will bother to do so.
This is especially true because unions and their adherents continuously importune courts, as they did in Abood, to decide the agency
shop question on the basis of essentially ex parte popular notions,
economic misconceptions, and legal myths surrounding exclusive rep22
resen tation.
For these reasons, both the agency shop and exclusive representation figure prominently in Abood. The main concern of this article,
however, is exclusive representation-and, indeed, not even what
the two major opinions in Abood said about it, but what they did not
say. Nonetheless, we must first briefly review those opinions with
respect to the subsidiary agency shop issue.
1. The constitutionality of the agency shop "as such"
Despite all its seemingly expansive language, the plurality opinion
in Abood is extremely narrow. For, at most, it upheld the constituAss'n v. Us, No. 77-1040, slip op. at 2 (Mich. Ct. App. July 29, 1977). The requirement is also
implicit in the case upon which the Abood plurality primarily relied, Railway Employees' Dep't
v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 235, 238 (1956) ("financial support required relates . . . to the work of
the union in the realm of collective bargaining"; "requirement for financial support of the collective-bargaining agency by all who receive the benefits of its work is [constitutional]").
20. Representative agency-shop cases raising First Amendment issues are Jensen v. Department of Educ., No. 75-405 (13. Hawaii, filed Dec. 3, 1975); Hordyk v. Clallam County, No.

51368 (Thurston Cty., Wash., Sup. Ct., filed Nov. 1974); Flood v. Board of Educ., No. 31180
(Waukesha Cty., Wis., Cir. Ct., filed May 24, 1973).
21. See Brief for Appellants at 148, 149; Reply Brief for Appellants at 39.
22. E.g., the unsupportable proposition that judicial opinions have established the constitutionality of exclusive representation in both the public and private sectors. For a particularly
egregious instance of this kind of misrepresentation, see Brief for the National Education Association as Amicns Curiae at 9, 31, 40-41. Even the Abood plurality shrank from lending its
explicit imprimatur to this obvious falsehood.
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tionality only of an empty abstraction: what I shall denote the agency
shop "as such."
The appellants in Abood had argued that the state statute, which
permitted the appellee employer and union to condition the employment of nonunion public school teachers on their payment of agency
fees to the exclusive representative, was repugnant to the First and
Fourteenth Amendments for two reasons. First, since collective bargaining with a public employer is'inherently and inescapably political
in nature, any expenditures of dissenters' funds by a union on such
activity are simultaneously and necessarily expenditures on a form of
political activism, which in effect coerce political conformity among
teachers contrary to the plain teaching of numerous Supreme Court
decisions. 23 Second, since the statute (as authoritatively construed
by the state courts) does not limit the uses to which an exclusive
representative may legally apply agency fees, but instead permits
public-sector unions to expend the fees to finance the partisan political campaigns of candidates for election to public office, the agency
shop scheme is fatally overbroad, whether or not spending for political purposes germane to collective bargaining is constitutional. 2 4 The
plurality agreed that the latter theory stated a constitutional claim for
relief, but then rendered worthless that decision by ruling erroneously that the sole remedy was for the state courts to fashion some
form of restitutionary relief, rather than to enjoin enforcement of the
statute.25
23. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics . . . or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein"). For the complete argument, see Brief for
Appellants at 63-76, 79-99.
24. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963). For the complete argument, see
Brief for Appellants at 76-78, 206-10. In its main brief, the appellee union admitted its intention
to use agency fees for partisan politics. Brief for Appellees at 11 & Appendix B.
25. 431 U.S. at 237-42. Although it is not my intention to perform a complete autopsy of
Abood, two subsidiary points are worthy of an extended footnote, the more obvious one being
the illusory nature of the remedy profferred by the plurality. The plurality suggested that the
lower courts fashion a remedy for the union's admittedly unconstitutional actions by requiring
it, in some undefined way and at some undefined time, to disgorge that portion of the dissenting employees' agency fees which it expended on political activism unrelated to collective bargaining. Yet, at the same time, the plurality conceded that the distinction between political
action related to public-sector collective bargaining and that not so related is "hazy." 431 U.S.
at 236. How, then, will such a remedy work? Rather badly, I submit.
First, the remedy will require that the dissenting employees engage in potentially endless
litigation, at vast expense, to secure constitutional freedoms.
Second, even a full evidentiary record in Abood will not suffice to define the dividing line
between legal and illegal union political activism. Only a lengthy series of cases, minutely exposing the operations of several public-sector unions under various circumstances, can provide
the painstakingly detailed factual background required as a practical matter to establish a
meaningful definition. But the necessity for such litigation will create the very chilling effect
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It rejected the former, more expansive theory, however, on the
ground that "an agency shop provision in a collective-bargaining
agreement covering government employees is, as such, constitutionupon First Amendment liberties which every Justice on the Court, at one time or another, has
condemned as inconsistent with the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., Law Students
Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 194-95 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing numerous other authorities); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 371-79 (1964); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515-16 (1964). In short, the mechanics of achieving
the suggested remedy are foreign to the axiom of constitutional jurisprudence that First
Amendment liberties, above all others, must receive the most expeditious and least burdensome
protection possible. See, e.g., Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139, 141-42 (1968);
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 417-18 (1971).
Third, even if the lower courts could define the difference between union political activism
related to collective bargaining and that not so related, and were to order the union to rebate
agency fees unconstitutionally expended, this would in no way vindicate the employees' First
Amendment freedoms. For it is the spending of the money on political activism, not its mere
retention by the union, which affronts the Bill of Rights. Nonetheless, it is the spending which
the plurality opinion sanctioned, by denying the employees any relief save restitution. No wonder, then, that Justice Stevens expressed concern that the plurality had not "avoid[ed] the risk
that [the agency fees] will be used, even temporarily, to finance ideological activities unrelated
to collective bargaining." 431 U.S. at 244. The plurality did not avoid that risk; they made it a
certainty. Thus, the plurality's remedy is no relief at all. Instead, it is judicial protection and
encouragement of the constitutional wrong, an abdication of judicial responsibility which even
those untrained in the law can descry and decry. See Editorial, Overriding Interest, Wall Street
Journal, June 1, 1977, at 16, cols. 1-2.
The second interesting point relates to the problem of statutory overbreadth which the plurality recognized but refused to address. See 431 U.S. at 232-33. A basic issue in Abood was
whether the agency shop is the least restrictive means of accomplishing a valid state objective.
See Jurisdictional Statement at 6; Brief for Appellants at 4. The appellants, the appellees, the
lower courts, and every Justice in the plurality explicitly agreed that (1) the agency shop, as a
matter of state law, permits the union to expend agency fees on political activism unrelated to
collective bargaining; (2) such spending amounts to a form of coerced political and ideological
conformity which is unconstitutional per se under the First and Fourteenth Amendments; and
therefore (3) the dissenting employees are entitled to an appropriate remedy for the wrong. Yet,
despite this consensus, no member of the Court asked whether the agency shop is thereby
invalid on its face on grounds of overbreadth, although such an inquiry is traditionally mandatory in adjudication involving First Amendment and other fundamental liberties. See, e.g.,
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 712 (1977) (Burger, C.J.); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 363
(1976) (Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ., plurality opinion); Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 83-84 (1916) (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 94-96 (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stewart, JJ., dissenting); Hynes v. Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976) (Burger, C.J.);
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 852-53 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 238-39 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring and dissenting in part); Erzoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1975) (Powell, J.); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 760 (1974)
(Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1973) (Stewart,
J.); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-15 (1973) (White, J.) (collecting cases); id. at
627-28 (Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109,
123-26 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116-17
(1972) (Marshall, J.); Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 909, 912-13 (1972) (Rehnquist and
Blackmun, JJ., and Burger, C.J., dissenting); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522-23 (1972)
(Brennan, J.); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 238 (1970) (Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting and concurring in part); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970) (Stewart,
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ally valid" under the rule enunciated in the Court's earlier privatesector Hanson decision. 26 Moreover, the plurality held that Hanson
controlled not only the result but also the methodology of constitutional adjudication, in a manner unprecedented in First Amendment
27
litigation.
That Hanson in no way compelled such a result is evident. Although dealing with what one might loosely style a First Amendment
issue, Hanson applied only the de minimis "rational basis" test, not
the strict "compelling state interest" and "least restrictive alternative"
standards of judicial review uniformly required in every other modern
case which involved an actual infringement upon fundamental individual freedoms. 28 However, the legal issue addressed in Hanson, a
private-sector case, is easily distinguishable from the problem preJ.); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582 (1968) (Stewart, J.); Cameron v. Johnson, 390
U.S. 611, 616-17 (1968) (Brennan, J.); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (Stewart, J.).
As authoritatively construed by the state courts, the agency shop in Abood is the most, not
the least, restrictive means, since it requires that the aggrieved employees - not the union take expensive and time-consuming action to protect liberties which everyone conceded the
union plans to violate. Obviously the state legislature could have designed a far less restrictive
but equally workable system by explicitly limiting the chargeable agency fees to the proven
costs of collective bargaining and by providing an administrative hearing procedure through
which dissenting employees could challenge the assessment before the union spent those fees
for illegal purposes. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.65, subd. 2 (Supp. 1977). That it did
not do so should have been dispositive of the First Amendment issue and of the remedy. For it
is not the province of the Supreme Court to attempt to remedy a state statute's admitted and
incurable abridgement of fundamental freedoms. That task is for the state legislature. Compare
United States v., Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 368-70 (1971) (White, J.), with
Gooding v.Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-28 (1972). Compare Law Students Civil Rights Research
Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 162-64 (1971) with Erzoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
422 U.S. 205, 216-17 (1975). Consider Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419 (1971) ("it is for
Congress, not this Court, to rewrite the statute"); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 267-68
& n.20 (1967); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 514-16 (1964).
In sum, given the lower courts' authoritative construction of the agency shop in Abood, the
only relief justified by reason, principle, or precedent was an injunction. Yet the plurality eschewed injunctive relief, and instead attempted to cure the admitted overbreadth of the agency
shop by engrafting onto it a patently unworkable scheme for restitution.
26. 431 U.S. at 217 (emphasis added), question presented and answered on the basis of
Railway Employees' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956). Throughout this article, I have
substituted the term "agency shop" for "union shop." These two forms of compulsory unionism
are not equivalent, either in practical operation or in legal implication. See, e.g., Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. at 217 n.10 (Stewart, J.). For our purposes, however, the
differences are not important. Besides, some commentators contend that, at least under federal
law, the agency shop is the most stringent form of compulsory union membership allowed. See
T. HAGGARD, supra note 16, Part II.
27. Before Abood, Justice Powell noted, "it had been well established that when state law
intrudes upon protected speech, the State itself must shoulder the burden of proving that its
action is justified by overriding state interests. . . . The [plurality], for the first time in a First
Amendment case, simply reverse[d] this principle." 431 U.S. at 263.
28. Compare 351 U.S. at 233-35 with Exclusive Representation, supra note 3, at 509-11 &
nn.28-32 and Brief for Appellants at 117-19.
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sented in Abood. Although private employers may, in the absence of
statute, condition employment as they choose, the state and federal
governments, even in the exercise of their internal operations, may
not condition public employment on a waiver or surrender of First or
29
Fourteenth Amendment liberties.
In Hanson, a nonunion employee challenged the provision of the
Railway Labor Act which authorizes railway employers and unions to
negotiate compulsory unionism arrangements. 30 Because this provision of federal law expressly preempts otherwise applicable state
right-to-work laws proscribing compulsory unionism, Hanson argued
that it violated the First and Fifth Amendments. Rejecting this claim,
the Court ruled that "[t]he [agency] shop provision of the Railway
Labor Act is only permissive. Congress has not compelled nor required [railways and unions] to enter into [agency] shop agreements."
Admittedly, the Court continued,
[i]f private rights are being invaded, it is by force of an agreement
made pursuant to federal law which expressly declares that state
law is superseded .... In other words, the federal statute is the
source of the power and authority by which any private rights are
lost or sacrificed .... The enactment of the federal statute authorizing [agency] shop agreements is the governmental action on
which the Constitution operates, though it takes a private agreement to invoke the federal sanction. 3
On the merits, however, the Hanson Court held the congressional
decision to authorize compulsory unionism agreements, notwithstanding contrary state law, to be a "question .. .of policy with
which the judiciary has no concern," and to be in no way repugnant
32
to the First or Fifth Amendments.
Of course, once one identifies the private rights which the federal
statute allegedly invaded, he can readily concur in the Hanson hold-

29. Compare Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 897-98 (1961) with
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 357-61 (1976) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.); Pickering v.
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06
(1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 379-80 (1964); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruc., 368
U.S. 278, 288 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1960); Slochower v. Board of
Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 555 (1956). The appellants in Abood pressed this distinction upon
the Court, while the appellees and their amici carefully refrained from any reference to these
"'unconstitutional conditions" cases. Compare Brief for Appellants at 23-28 with Reply Brief for
Appellants at 23-24, 27-29.
30. Railway Labor Act § 2, Eleventh, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1970).
31. 351 U.S. at 232 (footnote omitted).
32. Id. at 234, 238.
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ing, if not in its equivocal explanation of that result. 33 In the absence of either a state right-to-work law or the federal authorization of
private union security arrangements, a nonunion employee in the
private sector has no common law or constitutional immunity against,
or right to complain of, an agreement negotiated between his
employer and a union which conditions his employment upon payment of fees to the union. 34 Enactment of a state right-to-work law
may provide him with a statutory immunity and right, but that is all.
If, under those circunstances, Congress preempts the state's power
to intervene in labor relations affecting interstate commerce (as it did
in the Railway Labor Act), of what immunity or right has it deprived
the dissenting employee? Certainly not an immunity or right guaranteed by the First Amendment; and, if the congressional action satisfies the standards of the rational basis test as a proper exertion of
commerce clause authority, certainly not an immunity or right
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, either. In fact, the overall effect of federal preemption of a state's right-to-work law is merely to
return the parties essentially to the common law status quo ante,
under which a dissenting private-sector employee has no immunity or
right against compulsory unionism, by hypothesis.3 5 This being the
case, in the Hanson situation it is more correct to say that no violation of the First Amendment can occur, than that one has not occurred. But if, in the Hanson situation, no violation of the First
Amendment can occur, Hanson and its private-sector progeny are
necessarily irrelevant to the totally different constitutional context of
public-sector employment, where First Amendment principles are
fully applicable ab initio.
33. See 351 U.S. at 232 n.4, where the Hanson Court said, apropos of nothing involved in
the case, that "[o]nce courts enforce the agreement the sanction of government is, of course, put
behind them." The Abood plurality seized upon this obscure dictum without explaining what
relevance it had to the legal issues actually tried in Hanson. Abood, 431 U.S. at 218-19 n1.12.
34. The leading case on the subject remains Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245
U.S. 229, 250-52, 270-72 (1917) (employers privileged at common law to condition employment
on nonassociation with labor union). On the common law privilege to condition employment on
compulsory unionism, see, e.g., Shinsky v. O'Neil, 232 Mass. 99, 121 N.E. 790 (1919); Pierce v.
Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal. 70, 103 P. 324 (1909); James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal.2d 721,
155 P.2d 329 (1944) (closed shop limited to "open" unions).
35. Actually, under federal law employers and unions operating in interstate commerce have
statutory authorization only to exercise less than their full common law powers and privileges,
since at common law the full closed shop is legal, whereas under the Railway Labor and National Labor Relations Acts it is an impermissible form of compulsory unionism. See Railway
Labor Act § 2, Eleventh, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1970); National Labor Relations Act §
8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970). Rather than suffering deprivations of rights as compared to
common law, then, nonunion employees enjoy an expansion of their rights against employers
and unions otherwise amenable to compulsory unionism arrangements more stringent than
those now allowed under the federal statutes.
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Thus, the Abood plurality's reliance on Hanson is without rational
support. To be sure, the plurality purported to find in Hanson the
same sort of governmental action which inheres in the typical publicsector unconstitutional conditions case.3 6 The obvious error here is
that, while all legislative, executive, and judicial action is governmental action in the vulgar sense of the term, it is not and cannot
be governmental action subject to constitutional restraint if its only
effect with respect to a complaining party is to restore, affirm, secure,
or enforce his common law rights, powers, privileges, or immunities-or, as in Hanson, his common law absences of right, disabilities, duties, or liabilities. Justice Stewart was linguistically correct,
of course, in his observation that "[t]he plaintiffs' claims in Hanson failed, not because there was no governmental action, but because there was no First Amendment violation." Legally, however,
his comment precisely reverses constitutional cause and effect. There
was no, and could not have been any, First Amendment violation in
Hanson because that case involved no governmental action subject to
First Amendment scrutiny.37 There is and can be no governmental
action subject to constitutional restraint if, as in Hanson, a legislature
properly exercises delegated power to authorize two private parties
mutually to exercise a common law power and privilege (such as the
power and privilege of an employer and union to negotiate a compulsory unionism agreement), even though such authorization logically
recognizes as well a correlative absence of common law right in some
other private party (such as the absence of right in a nonunion applicant to secure employment unconditioned on such an arrangement).
Neither is there nor can there be governmental action subject to constitutional restraint if a court properly exercises jurisdiction to enforce
a common law right of one private party against another (such as the
right of a union to require an employer's compliance with the terms
of a valid compulsory unionism agreement), even though such enforcement logically recognizes as well a correlative common law disability in some third private party (such as the disability of a nonunion applicant to offer or accept employment unconditioned on that
provision). 38 Otherwise, a legislature or judiciary could "constitutionalize" all private, common law action simply by authorizing or

36. 431 U.S. at 218-19 n.12, 226-27 & n.23.
37. Compare Abood, 413 U.S. at 226-27 with Justice Stewart's earlier, more perceptive
opinion for the Court in Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 512-21 (1976).
38. Thus the absurdity of, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), which was irrelevantly cited with approval in Railway Employees' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 232 n.4, and in
Abood v. Detroit Bd..of Educ., 431 U.S. at 218-19 n.12 (Stewart, J.).
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enforcing it, thereby destroying the fundamental distinction between
the state and society, and replacing our system of limited government
39
with an effectively totalitarian regime.
Furthermore, even if one interprets Hanson as involving governmental action subject to First Amendment restraints, and characterizes private-sector unionism as inherently ideological (albeit not,
strictly speaking, political) in nature, he still need not accept the
Abood plurality's conclusion. The plurality, of course, explicitly
premised its argument upon these assumptions. 40 However, it was
the unarticulated assumption subtending them which posed the real
question for decision, the question the plurality begged: namely, if
federal authorization of an agency shop in private employment compels ideological conformity within the ken of the First Amendment,
on what basis could Hanson be correct in finding no constitutional
violation when the Court applied only the rational basis test? The
answer, I believe, is on no basis. 4 1 Yet nowhere did the Abood
plurality even suggest that Hanson's validity, as a First Amendment
decision, might be subject to challenge, although the appellants
raised precisely this point from the very onset of the case. 42
In any event, since Abood came to the Court on appeal of a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, it
brought with it "no evidentiary record of any kind." 4 3 There were, in
short, no facts as to what collective bargaining through exclusive representation entailed; no facts as to how the union expended agency
fees (except its admission of intent to channel some monies into partisan political activism unrelated to collective bargaining); and no facts
as to the nature of the union as an organization, its institutional purposes, or its substantial activities. 44 Therefore, the Abood plurality
39. Logically, for Justices Stewart, Brennan, White, and Marshall to have interpreted and
applied Hanson as they did in Abood implies they also believe that, if Congress enacted a law
which simply authorized private parties to exercise their pre-existing common law powers and
privileges to enter into contracts in interstate commerce, all private commercial contracts
negotiated thereafter would constitute "governmental action" in the sense those Justices attributed to compulsory union membership arrangements negotiated under the Railway Labor Act.
As governmental action, moreover, all such ostensibly private contracts would be subject to
every constitutional limitation applicable to government. But if so, they would also be subject to
congressional and judicial intervention designed to enforce those limitations of organic law.
Therefore, in effect, government would assume, by simple fiat, total power to control the substance of every commercial transaction within the United States.
40. 431 U.S. at 226-32.
41. See Syndicalism, supra note 2, at 813-16.
42. Jurisdictional Statement at 14-15.
43. 431 U.S. at 236-37.
44. Of particular importance to the last-mentioned point is Justice Stevens' comment that
[olur knowledge of the facts is limited to a bald assertion that the Union engages 'in a number
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could have done no more than to hold that the agency shop "as such"
has a rational basis: namely, that some circumstances might exist,
sometime, somewhere, and for some reason, which might justify requiring dissenting public employees to provide financial support to
some kind of employee organization engaged in some sort of activities
that involve dealing in some way with the dissenters' employer with
respect to some aspects of their terms and conditions of employment.
But, of course, no one ever seriously doubted this. Even Justice
Powell conceded the "possible" constitutionality of the agency shop
"as such." 45
The Abood plurality opinion, then, is but an empty shell. If one
were to ask, "on what activities may a union, serving as an exclusive
representative, constitutionally expend dissenting employees' agency
fees?," the plurality could respond only, "on activities 'germane to
[the union's] duties as collective bargaining representative.' "46 If one
inquired further, "what activities are 'germane' to those collectivebargaining duties?," the plurality could answer only, "whatever activities sufficiently relate to those decisions of public authorities which
'might be seen as an integral part of the bargaining process.' "47 And
if one then pressed to know, "which decisions of which public authorities might be 'an integral part of the bargaining process'?," the
plurality could say only, "we have no occasion . . . to try to define a
dividing line."48 Therefore, if the Abood plurality opinion is ever to
acquire any meaning, it will be only through further, laborious litigation over the agency shop-not the chimerical agency shop "as
such," but the agency shop as it exists in real factual records, describing the actual behavior of actual individuals and organizations
engaged in what they claim to be collective bargaining.
In fine, Abood itself tells us nothing of practical significance about
the constitutionality of the agency shop, except that the real legal
questions are yet to be addressed or answered. One is entitled to ask,
therefore, why the correct disposition of the case would not have
been to postpone any constitutional decision, other than that the appellants had alleged a valid claim for relief in the lower court. This
would have allowed the parties on remand to adduce a complete facand variety of activities which are economic, political, professional, scientific and religious in
nature of which Plaintiffs do not approve"... What, if anything, will be proved at trial is a
matter for conjecture." Id. at 244 n*.
45. Id. at 262. See also id. at 263 n.16 (agency shop possibly justified where "narrowly
defined economic issues" or "processing of individual grievances" are concerned).
46. Id. at 235-36 (footnote omitted).
47. Id. at 236.

48. Id.
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tual record, documenting with particularity both the nature and substance of the agency shop and the character of the union as a politi49
cal-action organization.
2. The assumed validity of exclusive representation
under the private-sector analogy
Abood provides even less guidance on the issue of exclusive representation than it does on the agency shop, despite the comments of
Justice Powell that, although the Court "[i]n Madison School District . . . expressly reserved judgment on the constitutional validity of
the exclusivity principle in the public sector," the Abood plurality
"decide[d] this issue summarily" and "sustain[ed] the exclusivity
principle." 50
The record establishes beyond dispute that the question of the constitutionality of the exclusive representation device under the First,
the Fourteenth, or any other Amendment or constitutional provision
did not arise, and could not have arisen. 5 1 No challenge to exclusive
representation appeared in the complaint. 52 Neither did the lower
court purport to rule on the matter. 53 Nor did any of the parties
present such a question to the Supreme Court. 54 Indeed, the parties
explicitly reserved argument on the constitutional merits of exclusivity, recognizing that the "appeal ... does not raise the question .... "55 Moreover, the Abood plurality itself defined the question for decision as the limited one of "whether an agency shop
provision in a collective-bargaining agreement covering government
49. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 220-22 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring
and dissenting); Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402, 426-27 (1974); Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 586-87 (1972); Cowgill v. California, 396 U.S. 371, 372 (1970) (Brennan and
Harlan, JJ., concurring).
50. 341 U.S. at 261, citing City of Madison, Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Rel. Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175 (1976), which was discussed with respect to this point in
Exclusive Representation, supra note 3, at 568-70, 593-94.
51. E.g., Bradstreet v. Potter, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 317 (1842) (Court will not render opinion
on "ulterior points" in case, although parties desire it, where points not properly raised).
52. Appendix to Brief for Appellants at 6-15, 39-52.
53. Id. at 94-104.
54. Jurisdictional Statement at 6, Brief for Appellants at 4; Brief for Appellees at x.
55. Brief for Appellants at 148. To like effect are the following disclaimers: "We must and
shall refrain from addressing the merits of [the exclusive representation] issue, secure in the
knowledge that they will wend their tortuous way to this Court, sooner or later." Id. "We
repeat: Our concern here is not to attack the principle of exclusive representation as such." Id.
at 149. "[T]he states are free to adopt the federal model of majority rule and exclusive represen" Brief for Appellees at 34. "In our main brief,
tation (which appellants do not challenge) ..
we recognized that the exclusive representation device is not immediately in issue in this ap" Reply Brief for Appellants at 39.
peal ..
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employees is, as such, constitutionally valid." 5 6 And the record contained no facts with respect to exclusive representation, which
prompted the plurality to reiterate that "[a]ll we decide is that the
general allegations in the complaint, if proven, establish a cause of
action under the First and Fourteenth Amendments [with respect to
57
the agency shop]."
But, while the Abood plurality opinion did not sustain the
exclusivity principle as a matter of constitutional law, it did contain
passages approbating that device as a "familiar doctrin[e" and a
"central element" in contemporary labor relations. 58 "The designation of a single representative," explained Justice Stewart at one
point.
avoids the confusion that would result from attempting to enforce
two or more agreements specifying different terms and conditions
of employment. It prevents inter-union rivalries from creating dissension within the work force and eliminating the advantages to
the employee of collectivization. It also frees the employer from
the possibility of facing conflicting demands from different unions,
and permits the employer and a single union to reach agreements
that are not subject to attack from rival labor orand settlements
59
ganizations.
Furthermore, continued the plurality at a later juncture in its opinion,
[t]he governmental interests advanced by the agency shop [in public employment] are much the same as those promoted by similar
provisions in [the private sector]. The confusion and conflict that
could arise if rival teachers' unions, holding quite different views
[as to terms and conditions of employment], each sought to obtain
the employer's agreement, are no different in kind from the evils
that the exclusivity rule in the Railway Labor Act was designed to
in
avoid .... The desirability of labor peace is no less important
60
the public sector, nor is the risk of "free riders" any smaller.
Thus the plurality expressed support for exclusive representation in
public employment by cataloguing its supposedly beneficial effects
and drawing an analogy to purportedly similar experience in the private sector.
The plurality only assumed, however, that the Supreme Court had
sanctioned exclusive representation in private employment and that a
private-sector analogy is applicable to public, employment. Nowhere
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

431
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

U.S. at 217 (emphasis added).
at 237.
at 220.
at 220-21.
at 224.
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did it refer to any previous Court decisions sustaining exclusivity
under the First Amendment or any other provision of the Constitution. Indeed, three of the four decisions Justice Stewart cited dealt
only with statutory interpretation and application; and the fourth,
while it dealt with constitutional issues under the Fifth Amendment,
did so on the basis of a construction of exclusivity which avoids significant First Amendment problems altogether. 6 1 Neither did the
plurality provide judicial or scholarly support for the notion that the
public and private sectors are indistinguishable in terms of the constitutional considerations that must inform labor relations policy. Nor
could it have done so. For, in both instances, the plurality's gratuitons assumptions are without support.
The constitutionality of exclusive representation in the private sector is an open question. 62 Moreover, the case history indicates that
61. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975);
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB,
321 U.S. 678 (1944); Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937). See note 62
infra.
62. When the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act was first in issue, the
Labor Board selected its test cases so as "intentionally [to] avoi[d] presenting the Court with the
'touchy' and . .. doubtful questio[n]" of the constitutionality of exclusive representation. 1.
J.
GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 187 (1974). Thus, when in
Jones & Laughlin a private employer challenged the act on various constitutional theories, the
Court avoided the issue of exclusive representation by interpreting the statute as "not prevent[ing] the employer 'from refusing to make a collective contract and hiring individuals on
whatever terms' the employer 'may by unilateral action determine.'' NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937) (footnote omitted). Similarly, in a contemporaneous
employer challenge, in Virginian By., to the constitutionality of the Railway Labor Act, the
Court held that exclusive representation under that statute did not preclude individual contracts
between the employer and dissenting employees. Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300
U.S. 515, 548-49 (1937). The Abood plurality referred to these very pages in support of
exclusivity, without explaining what exclusivity meant under Virginian Ry. 431 U.S. at 220-21.
Only seven years later, in two cases raising issues of statutory construction alone, did the Court
re-interpret these private-sector acts so as to preclude individual contracts. J.I. Case Co. v.
NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 334-39 (1944) (National Labor Relations Act); Order of R.R. Telegraphers
v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 346-47 (1944) (Railway Labor Act). Neither of
these decisions, however, reconsidered the constitutional questions raised in Jones & Laughlin
or Virginian By., although the statutory constructions adopted in the latter cases formed the
necessary predicates for their constitutional holdings. See Comment, The Mechanics of Collective Bargaining, 53 HABv. L. REV. 754, 789-91 (1940).
The contemporaneous Steele decision also failed to pass on the constitutionality of exclusive
representation. There, the Court created the duty of fair representation precisely in order to
avoid serious constitutional questions of due process and equal protection surrounding exclusivity. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 198 (1944). The Abood plurality expanded on
the importance of this duty, again without explaining its constitutional significance. 431 U.S. at
221-22. No other case arose after Steele that implicated the constitutionality of exclusive representation until Madison School District, which recently declared that the device could not
preempt the First Amendment privilege of a dissenting public school teacher to address his
employer at a public meeting on a matter then the subject of collective bargaining between the
teacher's exclusive representative and employer. City of Madison, Joint School Dist. No. 8 v.
Wisconsin Employment Rel. Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
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"exclusive representation" can mean radically different things to different people: from a system which permits individual employment
contracts to one which proscribes them. Therefore, a detailed factual
record describing with minute specificity what exclusive representation entails in a particular case is an absolute prerequisite to meaningful adjudication of its constitutionality.
Similarly, the reality and applicability of the private-sector analogy
are hardly matters settled beyond dispute. Indeed, contrary to the
loose implications of the Abood plurality, judicial decisions for more
than a generation have consistently held that there is no private-sector analogy properly applicable to government which will sustain an
extension of every practice accepted in private-sector collective bargaining to public-sector employment. 63 And those commentators
who have investigated the subject agree that the private-sector analogy is without substance. 64 Moreover, even the plurality inadvertently conceded the incompetence of the analogy where exclusive
representation is concerned. At one point in his opinion, Justice
Stewart invoked the authority of Professor Clyde Summers for the
proposition that "[t]he uniqueness of public employment is not in the
employees nor in the work performed; the uniqueness is in the special
65
character of the employer."
Yet, having admitted that very real differences exist between collective bargaining in the public and private sectors, Justice Stewart
failed to draw the obvious conclusion. The private-sector analogy
might be applicable to the agency shop, the primary burden of which
falls upon supposedly indistinguishable employees in both the private
and public sectors. But on its face, the analogy is inapplicable to exclusive representation, which primarily burdens employers, because
the constitutionally relevant attributes of employers are totally dissimilar in the public and private sectors.
The failure to refer to any judicial decision upholding the constitutionality of exclusive representation in private-sector labor relations,

63. Compare Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Unit, Educators Ass'n v. Phillips, 381 F.
Supp. 644 (M.D.N.C. 1974), with Norwalk Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269,
83 A.2d 482 (1951); City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947);
Hagerman v. Dayton, 147 Ohio St. 313, 71 N.E.2d 246 (1947).
64. Petro, Sovereignty and Compulsory Public-Sector Bargaining, 10 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 25 (1974), is devoted entirely to the subject. See also C. SUMMERS, COLLECTIVE BAR-

N.Y. State School
of Indus. Rel., Inst. of Pub. Employment Monograph No. 7 (Nov. 1976); Syndicalism, supra
note 2, at 543-625.
65. 431 U.S. at 230, quoting Summers, Public Sector Bargaining:Problems of Governmental Decisionmaking, 44 CINN. L. REV. 669, 670 (1976) (emphasis added by the Court).
GAINING AND PUBLIC BENEFIT CONFERRAL: A JURISPRUDENTIAL CRITIQUE,
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and to adduce a rational basis for applying a private-sector analogy to
the public sector, is not the sole or most serious demerit of the
Abood plurality's comments on exclusive representation. In addition
to this, the comments themselves are either irrelevant, question-begging in nature, or based upon misconceptions or misrepresentations
of the realities of public-sector employment. For instance, the supposed governmental interest in eliminating "free riders" relates only
to the agency shop. If exclusive representation did not exist, majority
unions would be under no duty to represent dissenting employees in
collective bargaining, and therefore could rationally claim no corresponding right to financial reimbursement for their alleged services.
Again, the supposed governmental interest in securing labor peace
does not establish the validity of exclusive representation, but simply
raises a further constitutional problem-namely, what is labor peace,
and can government attain it without the serious restrictions upon
individual employee freedom which exclusivity unavoidably occasions? 66
Finally, the other points raised by Justice Stewart rest upon errors
of fact and law that even neophytes in the area of labor relations can
easily expose, but which I shall treat more circumspectly for the
reader's full enlightenment. Let us begin by considering some basic
facts about the alleged necessity for exclusive representation in public
and private employment. First, and perhaps conclusive of the whole
issue, there is no empirically demonstrable necessity for the exclusive
representation device in either public or private employment. Indeed, fully three-quarters of the total private labor force, and more
than two-thirds of America's nonagricultural employees, do not belong to unions; and, in recent years, private-sector unions have suffered an absolute decline in membership. 67 The minority position of
66. Elsewhere, I have shown that the "labor-peace" apology for exclusive representation is
actually a transparent euphemism for labor-union extortion, and therefore absolutely disqualified
as a basis for the constitutionality of majority rule. Syndicalism, supra note 2, at 712-23; Exclusive Representation, supra note 3, at 530-47. The Abood plurality was not unaware of the
realities of the "labor-peace" theory but, in keeping with Wittgenstein's dictum, "Wovon man
nicht sprechen kann, darube muss man schweigen," chose to ignore them. See Brief for Appellants at 137-47.
67. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor, Handbook of Labor Statistics 366
(1974); id., Bull. No. 1750, Directory of National Unions and Employee Associations, 1971,
Appendix E (1972); "Decline in Union Membership, 1974-76," 96 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 34

(September 12, 1977). The increasingly hostile attitude of traditionally independent American
wage-earners towards unions is one of the major reasons organized labor has pressed for reforms
of the National Labor Relations Act calculated to enhance the ability of unions to achieve exclu-

sive-representative status. See, e.g., DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Special Supp. at 13 (Aug. 17,
1977) (remarks of vice president of International Ass'n of Machinists to House Labor Subcommittee on Labor Management Relations): "The gradual decline of union members, as a percen-
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unions thus rebuts any presumption, arising out of their politically
preeminent and legally privileged status, that somehow the market
system would collapse into chaos were it not for their intermediation
with employers through collective bargaining.6 8 In addition, in public-sector employment, history teaches that for over three centuries
no one seriously considered exclusive representation or other forms of
compulsory unionism necessary, desirable, or even permissible. Prior
to the 1950's, government generally proscribed public-employee
unions as incompatible with the public's interest in undivided loyalty
among its workers. 6 9 Yet during this period the public service
functioned quite adequately, without constant interruptions by union
strike threat pressure made possible in large part by the exclusivity
device. The alleged need for exclusive representation, then, has no
basis in experience, and finds a convincing refutation there.
Second, there is no logical necessity for the exclusive representation device in public employment. It is quite possible for a public
employer to deal with each of its employees as an individual, or with
each similarly situated group of employees as a class, without confusion. Indeed, the very assumption of exclusivity is that appropriate
bargaining units exist because employees are so similarly situated and
sufficiently individualized by their circumstances that it is proper to
require them to deal with their employer through a single representative. But, if that is the reality of labor relations, public employers
suffer from no inherent disability to discover and act rationally upon
it. They are perfectly capable of differentiating among individuals and
groups, of categorizing them according to rational work-related
criteria, and of establishing terms and conditions of employment
which respond to and reflect these differences. Therefore, the need
for a union to intervene in this process is not one which logic dictates.
tage of the work force, . ..is directly attributable to the weakness in the law. . . .If we cannot
replenish our ranks through organizing, the labor movement will lose ... strength and vitality .. ..
68. Actually, contemporary unions are and must be committed enemies of the market system, their protestations to the contrary notwithstanding. See Syndicalism, supra note 2, at
576-78. For one important example of how contemporary private-sector unions are in the vanguard of the forces responsible for injecting ever-increasing chaos into the American economy,
compare Petro, Unemployment, Unions and Inflation: Of Causation and Necessity, 26 THE
FREEMAN 387 (1976), with O'Driscoll & Shenoy, Inflation, Recession, and Stagflation, in THE
FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 185 (E. Dolan ed. 1976).

69. E.g., Perez v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 78 Cal. App.2d 638, 650-51, 178 P.2d 537, 545
(1947). Contemporary support for this view appears in Petro, supra note 64, at 146-60 (arguing
that government may constitutionally proscribe union membership for public employees where
the organization threatens to press for collective bargaining or to promote strikes).
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Third, there is no legal necessity for the exclusive representation
device in public-sector employment. The Constitution imposes no
duty on private employers to treat all similarly situated employees
equally. It is legally possible, therefore, for private employers discriminatorily to penalize their.employees for their (the employees')
beliefs, associations, and so on. For example, a private employer
might offer better terms and conditions of employment to nonunion
employees than to their union member co-workers, or better terms to
members of one union than to adherents of another. If we assume
that this power to discriminate is invidious, and that the Constitution
authorizes government to intervene to limit it, we can sympathize
with the statutory scheme of the National Labor Relations Act, which
requires employers to deal with their employees in a nondiscriminatory fashion, through a single representative. 70 But this possible
rationale for exclusivity in the private sector has no relevance to public employment, where employers have no license to deny their
employees equal protection. 7 1 The Constitution already serves as
each public employee's "exclusive representative," in that it denies
his employer any power to discriminate against him unless some rational, work-related basis exists for the distinction. 72 The supposed
need for a union to fill the role of exclusive representative, then, is
not one born of legal considerations.
Last, there is no administrative necessity for the exclusive representation device in public-sector employment. In the absence of a
statutory duty to negotiate in good faith, inter-union rivalry in the
public service poses few problems for public employers. There can be
no legally binding demands, relative to terms and conditions of
employment, because no union is in a position to make such demands. A fortiori, there can be no conflicting demands, because the
Constitution requires the employer in any event to offer all similarly
situated employees equivalent employment benefits, regardless of
their union affiliations or lack thereof. Practical problems could arise,
70. National Labor Relations Act §§ 8(a)(3), 8(a)(5), 9(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3), 158(a)(5),
159(a) (1970).
71. Cf., e.g., United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 274 (1947) (notion that
employees need legal protection from employers' "'interference, restraint, and coercion' . . . obviously do[es] not apply to the Government as employer or to relations between the
Government and its employees") (refusing to apply Norris-La Guardia Act to United States as
operator of certain mine's).
72. E.g., Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314-17 (1976); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 248-52 (1976); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). See 13 WEST'S
MOD. FED. PRAc. Dic., Constitutional Law, X (2d ed. 1976). See also Bishop v. Wood, 426
U.S. 341, 349-50 (1976) (discharge based, albeit erroneously, on violation of valid job-related
rules does not offend due process clause).
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of course, if a legislature imposed a duty on public employers to
negotiate in good faith with all individual employees, or with all
employee unions. Under those circumstances, an employer might indeed face the dilemma of bargaining with different unions over terms
and conditions of employment applicable to the same employees, or
with different unions each demanding different terms and conditions
for distinct groups of otherwise similarly situated employees. Exclusive representation is not necessary to remedy this absurd and
nonexistent situation, however. For the legislature merely to revoke
the multilateral bargaining duty would suffice. The alleged need for
exclusivity, therefore, is not a matter of the public employer's administrative convenience.
With this background, we can now evaluate the arguments the
Abood plurality advanced on behalf of exclusivity. The claim that
exclusive representation "frees the [public] employer from the possibility of facing conflicting demands from different unions, and permits
the employer and a single union to reach agreements . . . not subject
to attack from rival labor organizations" is triply defective. First, legally enforceable conflicting demands from different unions cannot
exist absent a statutory duty in the employer to negotiate in good
faith with more than one union. But no jurisdiction enforces such a
multilateral duty; nor has any sensible person ever suggested that any
jurisdiction do so. Legally allowable conflicting demands cannot exist
either, since the Constitution prohibits public employers fiom acceding to demands that they discriminate invidiously among
employees by arbitrarily favoring some over others. And if the
demand for discrimination is not invidious, because based on a
reasonable work-related distinction which the employer has
discretionary authority to take into account, then it is not, rightly
understood, conflicting at all. Of course, conflicting demands can and
always will exist in the metaphorical sense that different employees,
with different values, will attempt to inform their employer of the
particular terms and conditions of employment they believe will best
serve the public welfare by most effectively harmonizing the varied
interests of everyone concerned. Exclusivity cannot remove these
conflicts, however. It can only suppress them, thereby depriving the
employer of sources of information vital to the performance of its
duties on behalf of the public, 73 and generating alienation and frus73. As the Court noted in Madison School District, "[tleachers not only constitute the overwhelming bulk of employees of the school system, but they are the very core of that system;
restraining teachers' expressions to . . . [their employer] on matters involving the operation of
the schools would seriously impair the . . . [employer's] ability to govern the [school] district."
429 U.S. at 177.
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tration among those employees whose voices cannot filter through the
heavy insulation of union hostility, indifference, or plain bureaucratic
74
inefficiency.
Second, exclusive representation does permit single agreements,
but so does the process of common law contract between employers
and individuals or distinct groups of similarly situated employees.
Furthermore, absent exclusivity, how as a practical matter could
there be, and why would any sensible employer ever enter into,
more than one agreement establishing different terms and conditions
of employment for the same employees? Who has ever seriously contended that such a situation would prevail without exclusive representation? 75
Third, agreements which exclusive representatives negotiate are no
less subject to attack than those negotiated through common law contractual offer and acceptance. Moreover, that a public employer may
adopt the view of one union over that of another, or of one individual
over that of the entire remaining work force, as to which terms and
conditions of employment best fulfill its needs is always possible, but
usually irrelevant. I say "usually," because there may be occasions
where the employer's choice is the product, not of intellectual conviction, but of illegal influence. But if, as I suggest, exclusive representation is precisely a means for certain unions to exert unconstitutional
influence over the process of governmental decision-making, it hardly
merits approbation because it renders the effects of that pernicious
influence-peddling less subject to attack than common law contract.
The Abood plurality's further claim that exclusivity "prevents inter-union rivalries from creating dissension within the work force and
eliminating the advantages to the employee of collectivization" 76 has
two basic demerits. First, legitimate rivalry and dissension could arise
only if the law permitted, or required, a public employer to discriminate invidiously among similarly situated employees; but no such constitutional permission or statutory requirement exists. Absent such
law, of course, various unions and their members may still disagree
among themselves over what terms and conditions of employment are
best for all concerned. But exclusivity cannot eliminate such differences of opinion among employees. As is typical of every form of
74. For a classic illustration from the private sector, see Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western
Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50 (1975), another case the real import of which
the Abood plurality did not comprehend.
75. Does there now exist such chaos, for example, in North Carolina, a state which
explicitly proscribes public-sector collective bargaining? N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-97 to 95-100
(1975).
76. 431 U.S. at 220-21.
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collectivism, it can only transform potentially soluble disagreements
at one level into uncompromisable hostilities at another, primarily by
shifting employees' attention from efforts to communicate and cooperate with their employer to efforts to attack and destroy each other's
unions. Experience proves that exclusive representation is hardly a
foolproof formula for eliminating dissension among public employees,
if, in fact, it is not a major cause of a large measure of such dissension
77
as now exists.
Second, the Abood plurality talked of the advantages to the
employee of collectivization, but did not explain what these advantages are. If Justice Stewart believes that public employees gain advantages from participation in inter-union warfare for exclusive representative status, his conception of benefit is one which even union
leaders admit to be false. 78 If, on the other hand, he meant to refer
only to the enhanced bargaining power which exclusivity provides,
his commonplace insight does not support the implicit conclusion that
exclusive representation is therefore constitutional. For whether government, consistently with the Constitution, may enhance the political bargaining power of any group within society79 is precisely the
question which the Court eventually must answer.
The plurality's next claim that "designation of a single representative avoids the confusion that would result from attempting to enforce
two or more agreements specifying different terms and conditions of
employment" 80 is intellectually valueless for three reasons. First, the
Constitution precludes the problem in any event. A public employer
may not apply different terms and conditions of employment to
employees without a rational, work-related basis for doing so. But, if
the employer has such a basis, those employees form a distinct group,

77. A classic example is the decade-long struggle between the NEA and AFT for domination
of the New York schools, a pitiless campaign of internecine guerrilla warfare waged without
concern for the costs to teachers, students, parents, or taxpayers. For an excellent study of the
AFT which elaborates on these points, see R. BRAUN, TEACHERS AND POWER: THE STORY OF
THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS (1972). As Braun demonstrates, among AFT "war-

riors" "there is a distinct . . . lack of . . . concern for the values of education, the principles of
popular participation in the operation of social institutions or the lofty reliance we like to place
in the schools as transmitters of knowledge and all that is best in American culture." Id. at 16.
78. See, e.g., Transcript, Options in Education, National Pub. Radio Program No. 91, "The
Great Debate III," Sept. 12, 1977, at 16: Moderator - "This open warfare in New York State
between the NEA and the AFT, and the competition around the country raises a question: who
benefits, who benefits from it?" Albert Shanker, AFT President - "It's not the teachers, I'll tell
you that."

79. I analyze the "bargaining-power" argument in detail in Syndicalism, supra note 2, at
723-33.
80. 431 U.S. at 220.
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for which representation by the spokesman from another distinct
group, with arguably distinct interests and problems, hardly appears a
reasonable means to avoid confusion. Second, administrative practicalities also preclude this problem. It strains credulity to conceive of
large numbers of public administrators so lacking in sense that they
willingly assume the administrative burden of applying conflicting
labor agreements to various segments of an identical work force.
Third, abolition of exclusivity would not create the problem. Absent
exclusive representation, all public employees would have a common
law power and privilege to offer appropriately individualized contracts
to, and to accept such contracts offered by, their employer, if those
contracts reflected rational, work-related differences among
employees or groups of employees. Such individualized contracts, furthermore, could not be the source of confusion-since each
employee's contract, where there is a rational, work-related distinction between him and another individual, is a unique agreement with
no necessary connection to or effect upon any other such agreement.
The plurality's final claim that "the evils . .. the exclusivity rule in
the Railway Labor Act was designed to avoid" "are no different in
kind" 81 from those present in public employment is simply a restatement of the question-begging private-sector analogy. It is a restatement, moreover, which carefully refrained from revealing that
the Railway Labor Act, as originally construed in Virginian Railway,
did not prohibit employers and individual employees from contracting
for terms and conditions of employment different from those
negotiated collectively through the exclusive representation device.
This restatement even more carefully avoided admitting that for
seven years-from Virginian Railway and Jones & Laughlin in 1937,
to J.I. Case Co. and Order of Railroad Telegraphers in 1944-courts
enforced the rule of "limited exclusivity" without perceptibly evil results. 8 2 And most carefully of all, the plurality shunned any suggestion that the evils that the exclusivity rule may cause in the public
sector are significantly different in kind from those it occasions in
private employment, and therefore invalidate the private-sector analogy.

81. Id. at 224.
82. Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); J.1. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944); Order of R.R.
Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342 (1944). On enforcement of the
limited exclusivity rule, see Peninsular & O.S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 98 F.2d 411, 415 (5th Cir.
1938); NLRB v. Superior Tanning Co., 117 F.2d 881 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 559
(1941).
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I have guided the reader through this meticulous analysis to prove
beyond cavil that the Abood plurality's arguments for exclusive representation in public employment establish no case whatsoever for
that device. That being so, we may turn our attention to more important matters.
B. The Constitutional Implications of the Political
Nature of Public-Sector Collective Bargaining and
the Political Activism of Public-Sector Unions
Central to a correct decision of the exclusivity issue is recognition
that public- and private-sector collective bargaining (and unionism)
differ in at least one critical factor: namely, the political nature of the
former and the non-political nature of the latter. In the public sector,
government, the embodiment of the political process, is the
employer; and public-sector unions such as the NEA, AFT, and
AFSCME are deeply involved in political activism in an attempt to
control the actions of government. Furthermore, as distinguished
from employees in the private sector, public employees enjoy a constitutional privilege and right as against their employers, the First
Amendment freedom of petition, that great political freedom which
"the very idea of a government, republican in form, implies." 83
Therefore, it is true (as I have shown elsewhere) that the differences
between public- and private-sector collective bargaining translate into
differences in First Amendment rights, and in many other legal relations as well. 8 4 And these differences turn on the political nature of
public-sector bargaining, and the political activism of public-sector
unions.
1. Recognition of the issues by the Abood Court
Every member of the Abood Court concurred, to some extent or
other, in these views and their implications. First, no one denied that
public-sector collective bargaining is inherently political in nature. On
the basis of a wide-ranging survey of the literature, the plurality conceded that "decisionmaking by a public employer is above all a political process." 85 Justice Powell also spoke forthrightly of public-sector
collective bargaining, especially in public education, as "political in
83. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875).
84. I deal with freedom of petition in public-sector employment in Exclusive Representation, supra note 3, at 574-603.
85. 431 U.S. at 228. The plurality's sources appear at 227 n.24. For a more complete discussion, see Brief for Appellants at 62-76
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any meaningful sense of the word." 86 And even the nonconformist
87
Justice Rehnquist explicitly agreed with these judgments.
Second, all of the Justices noted as a commonplace that publicemployee unions regularly engage in political activism as an adjunct
of collective bargaining and otherwise. Justice Powell seized upon the
key issue when he asked "whether a union in the public sector
is

.distinguishable from a political candidate or committee," and

. .

answered that, in his view,
no principled distinction exists.
The ultimate objective of a union in the public sector, like that
of a political party, is to influence public decisionmaking in accordance with the views and perceived interests of its membership.
•. .[The] objective [of a teachers' union] is to bring school board
policy and decisions into harmony with its own views .. . to obtain
favorable decisions-and to place persons in positions of power
who will be receptive to the union's viewpoint. In these respects,
the public sector union is indistinguishable
from the traditional
political party in this country. 88
The plurality, too, spoke with natural ease of how "public-employee
unions attempt to influence governmental policy-making," and
suggested that both lobbying and partisan political campaigning for
the election of candidates to public office are part and parcel of their
normal collective-bargaining activities. 8 9 And Justice Rehnquist
likened public-sector unions and their necessary activities to political
parties or political campaigning and management. 90
Third, everyone agreed that one unavoidable effect of compulsory
public-sector collective bargaining is to enable and encourage publicemployee unions to exercise extraordinary political influence. As Justice Rehnquist recognized, "[s]uccess in pursuit of a particular collective-bargaining goal will cause a public program or a public agency to
be administered in one way; failure will result in it being administered in another way." 9 ' From this observation readily followed Justice Stewart's concession, for the plurality, that public-sector bargaining "gives the employees more influence in the decision-making
process than is possessed by employees similarly organized in the
private sector." 9 2 Justice Stewart might also have said: more potential
86. 431 U.S. at 257-58 (footnote omitted).
87. Id. at 243-44.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 256-57 (footnote omitted).
at 231, 234, 236.
at 242-43, quoting but refusing to follow Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 372 (1976).
at 243.
at 229.
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political power, specially sanctioned by law, than any other group in
the political process enjoys. But Justice Powell sufficiently emphasized this point when he noted that,
[i]f power to determine school policy were shifted in part from officials elected by the population of the school district to officials
elected by the school board's employees, the voters of the district
could complain with force and reason that their voting power and
influence on the decisionmaking process had been unconstitutionally diluted. 93
Finally, no one challenged the applicability of Elrod v. Burns 94 to
the type of situation present in Abood. The plurality referred to
Elrod as a leading freedom of association case, and explicitly reaffirmed its holding that requiring an individual "to associate with a
political party" as a condition of "holding a job as a public school
teacher" is unconstitutional per se. 9 5 To be sure, the plurality did
not invoke Elrod to strike down the agency shop "as such," because
Abood offered no record characterizing the AFT and its affiliates as a
kind of political party. But Justice Rehnquist had no difficulty in judicially noticing what the record failed to show, although he refused to
follow the teaching of Elrod.9 6 And Justice Powell drew the logically
and legally necessary conclusion from his observation that "no principled [constitutional] distinction exists" between a public-sector union
such as the AFT and "a political candidate or committee" or "the
traditional political party in this country." 97 In short, all of the Jus-

93. Id. at 261-62 n.15, citing Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969);
Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
94. Elrod held that government could not constitutionally require nonpolicymaking public
employees, as a condition of their employment, "to pledge their political allegiance to the
Democratic Party, work for the election of other candidates of the Democratic Party, contribute
a portion of their wages to the Party, or obtain the sponsorship of a member of the Party." 427
U.S. 347, 355 (1976).
95. 431 U.S. at 233-34.
96. See id. at 242-44.
97. Id. at 256-57 (footnote omitted). "What distinguishes the public sector union from the
political party," Justice Powell continued,
- and the distinction is a limited one - is that most of its members are employees
who share similar economic interests and who may have a common professional
perspective on some issues of public policy. . . . But I am unable to see why the
likelihood of an area of consensus in the group should remove the protection of the
First Amendment for the disagreements that inevitably will occur. Certainly, if individual teachers are ideologically opposed to public sector unionism itself, one
would think that compelling them to affiliate with [a] union by contributing to it
infringes their First Amendment rights to the same degree as compelling them to
contribute to a political party."
Id. (emphasis added).
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tices agreed, directly or indirectly, that a state statute would be unconstitutional per se under the First and Fourteenth Amendments
which required public employees, as a condition of employment, to
associate with an organization substantially enough involved in political activism to be likened to a political committee or party.
Summarizing, the Abood Court recognized four vital points: (1)
public-sector collective bargaining is inherently and unavoidably
political in nature, because it is part of the process of governmental
decision-making; (2) because of their participation in the inherently
political process of public-sector collective bargaining and in other
forms of political activism, public employee unions are themselves
political organizations not unlike traditional political parties; (3) because of the special privilege of compulsory collective bargaining,
public-sector unions have an opportunity to exercise political influence and power not available to any other segment of the community;
and (4) because of Elrod inter alia, the foregoing facts strongly
suggest the per se unconstitutionality of collective bargaining through
the exclusive representation device in public employment.
2. Fundamental questions of fact and law not sufficiently investigated
in Abood
Although I consider Justice Powell's insights on the nature of public-sector unions irrefutable, I choose not to rely on judicial notice to
establish the political character of organizations such as the NEA,
AFT, or AFSCME. The Abood plurality made no attempt to challenge Justice Powell's sweeping factual conclusions; but neither did it
explicitly concur in them. Therefore, I shall pose and answer in detail
the questions which Justice Powell more or less took for granted:
Are the NEA, AFT, and AFSCME "political-action organizations,"
as the courts have defined that term? And are they, as a necessary

consequence of the logic of compulsory public-sector collective
bargaining itself, the peculiarly virulent form of political-action organizations that I denote as "special interest political parties"?

II.

PUBLIC-SECTOR UNIONS AS POLITICAL-ACTION
ORGANIZATIONS IN FACT AND LAW

My initial task is to consider political-action organizations in terms
of their factual characteristics and their legal implications, and to determine whether public-sector unions are a special category of such
organizations. To accomplish this task, I shall: (a) establish a
methodology of analysis: (b) review the law of political-action organi-
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zations as it now stands, applying it to a typical public-sector union;
(c) transcend the mechanical application of legal principles to facts
and consider whether, as a matter of logic, public-sector unions must
be militant political-action organizations; and (d) demonstrate that
such unions as the NEA, AFT and AFSCME are not only political-action organizations, but, more importantly, "special interest political
parties." 98
A. The Nature of the Problem and the
Methodology for its Solution
Although as a matter of constitutional law there is undeniable merit
in his comment that "no principled distinction exists" between a public-sector union and a political committee, Justice Powell was not
strictly correct in concluding that "the public sector union is indistinguishable fiom the traditional political party in this country."99 It is
true that the ultimate objective of a union in the public sector, like
that of a political party, is to influence public decision-making in accordance with the views and perceived interests of its membership.
But in an era in which government intervention in economic and social affairs has increasingly politicized and fragmented the community,
many groups and organizations share this same objective, without
thereby becoming political parties. On the other hand, what Justice
Powell felt distinguishes public-sector unions fiom political parties is
that union members are employees who share similar economic interests, while members of traditional parties such as the Republicans
and Democrats often come from many different and mutually antagonistic groups. This suggests, in my view, that public-sector unions
are particularly intense manifestations of "party," in the sense that
they are "a number of persons united in opinion or action, as distinguished from, or opposed to, the rest of [the] community." 100 Evidently, mere analogies are not enough. Rather, we must recognize
that public-sector unions are organizations sui generis, and must pro98. 1 shall focus primarily on the NEA with only limited adversions to the AFT and
AFSCME, because material in the public record is more available from the NEA than from any
other public-sector union with which I am familiar. Not only does the NEA itself boldly publish
masses of documents describing in tiresome detail its tendentious aims and activities, but also
its spokesmen regularly receive detailed media coverage. And, as the largest and most militant
public-sector union, it is the subject of continuous comment and debate by friends and foes
alike in various public forums. All of this information, then, is sufficiently notorious to be judicially noticeable.
99. 431 U.S. at 257.
100. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1784 (2d unabr. ed. 1934) [hereinafter
cited as WEBSTER'S].
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ceed on that basis with a detailed analysis of them and of their special
environment, compulsory public-sector collective bargaining.
Two mutually complementary methods suggest themselves. 10 1 To
establish a background against which to view a union such as the
NEA, we can first evaluate the purposes and activities of other groups
and associations which the law deems political-action' organizations.
Then, to sharpen our focus, we can consider the peculiar logic and
necessities of compulsory public-sector collective bargaining and the
role that public-sector unions play in it. Together, these investigations should provide us with a factual and legal picture of high resolution, which will emphasize the unique aspects of our subject.
B.

The Law of Political-Action Organizations

Generally speaking, a political-action organization is one which,
through its officials, staff personnel, and members, engages in certain
types of political activities to a "substantial" extent-or, even more
compellingly, for which those activities are "essential" to its institutional purposes and goals. Therefore, the specific, practical problem
in determining whether a public-sector union such as the NEA is a
political-action organization involves definitions and criteria. The tasks
at hand are to: (1) define the adjective "political," and related terms;
(2) catalogue the "political" activities characteristic of common political-action organizations; (3) establish criteria of "substantiality" and
"essentiality;" and (4) determine what kind, quality, and quantity
of
evidence is necessary to prove substantiality and essentiality, and who
has the burden of proof with respect to facts in dispute.
1. The problems of definitions, criteria, and sources
The nature of this article compels me repetitively to employ an
adjective which is as protean in its denotations and as subjective in its
connotations as it is common in usage and liable to abuse. To avoid
ambiguity and equivocation, therefore, I shall use a narrow and precise definition of the term "political." 102 Moreover, throughout this
101. See Hammerstein v. Kelley, 235 F. Supp. 60, 61 (E.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd, 349 F.2d 928
(8th Cir. 1965).
102. I shall limit the term "political" to a set of objective definitions drawn from relevant and
responsible sources either unimpeachable for their accuracy in general, or distinguished by the
particular authority they bring to bear on the question here. The first category comprises popular and legal dictionaries. From literally dozens of competent reference works, I have chosen
two standard volumes: BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (rev. 4th ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as
BLACK'S] and WEBSTER'S.
The second category includes judicial opinions, statutes, and administrative regulations (together with decisions thereunder). The judicial opinions I have found are not uniform in nature.
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Article I shall consider only what activities would suffice to characterize an organization as a "political-action organization" in a sense
cognizable under constitutional law.

One set deals with the term 'political" as specifically (and narrowly) defined in various statutes,
regulations, or precedents-for the purpose of applying it to record evidence in the context of a
familiar regulatory scheme. Another set deals with the term under circumstances in which no
statute, regulation, or precedent defines it-leaving to the court the task of performing that
exegesis in harmony with some legislative, executive, or judicial policy. And a third set deals
with the term where it is least amenable to narrow definition-namely, the expansive field of
constitutional law, especially First Amendment jurisprudence. Cf. Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252, 263 (1941) (First Amendment "must be taken as a command of the broadest scope
that explicit language, read in the context of a liberty-loving society, will allow"). Accord, Wood
v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 383-85 (1962).
The statutes, administrative regulations and decisions thereunder to which I shall refer generally address two particular and familiar types of political activity: support for the partisan political campaigns of candidates for election to public office; and lobbying and like activities to
influence governmental action, usually of the legislative branch. One such statute is the Hatch
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501-08, 7324 (1970). This statute prohibits public employees, in either the
federal or the state governments, from "tak[ing] an active part in political management or in
political campaigns." Working on a case-by-case basis, since 1907 the Civil Service Commission
has promulgated a body of law defining the phrase quoted above, most of which appears in a
little-known service entitled POLITICAL ACTIVITY REPORTER [hereinafter cited as P.A.R.]. The
Supreme Court recently upheld the Commission's definition, when it was attacked for its overbreadth and vagueness. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,
571-80 (1973) (federal employees); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 607-08 (1973) (state
employees). As these decisions emphasize, however, the Commission's definition does not purport to be all-inclusive. See id. at 609-18.
Another statute is the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) (Supp. 1977), reenacting the repealed Corrupt Practices Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 610-17 (1970). This statute regulates
financial contributions and expenditures to partisan political campaigns of candidates for election
to national office. The Supreme Court described the earlier act as one which "involved . .. the
integrity of our electoral process, and, not less, the responsibility of the individual citizen for
the successful functioning of that process." United States v. United Auto Workers, 352 U.S.
567, 570 (1957).
A third is the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-70 (1970). This statute
regulates lobbying in its most commonly accepted sense: direct communication with members of
a legislature on pending or proposed legislation. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 620
(1954); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 47 (1953).
A fourth statute is the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. The Code exempts certain religious,
charitable, scientific, literary, and educational organizations from federal income taxation. I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3). Moreover, contributions to these organizations are deductible from the contributor's
taxable income, taxable estate, and gift tax. I.R.C. §§ 170(a)(1), 170(c)(2), 2055(a)(2), 2522(a)(2).
Both the organization's exemption and the contributor's deduction continue only so long as "no
substantial part of [the organization's] activities .. . is carrying on propaganda or otherwise
attempting to influence legislation." I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(2), 501(c)(3), 2055(a)(2), 2522(a)(2). I.R.C. §
501(c)(3) also requires the organization not to "participate in, or intervene in (including the
publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of a candidate for
public office." Although, prior to the 1976 amendments, other sections did not recite this restriction on partisan political activism, the Internal Revenue Service inserted it throughout the
Code. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.170-1(t)(2)(ii) with Treas. Reg. § 1.501-1(c)(3)(iii) (1976). The Tax
Reform Act of 1976 codified the Service's interpretation by adding the § 501(c)(3) restriction to
the other provisions.
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2. The logical anatomy of a political-action organization
Using a deductive approach, I shall begin with Webster's definition
of "political" as:
[o]f or pertaining to .. .the conduct of government, referring in
the widest application to the judicial, executive, and legislative
branches . . . , or incidental to, the exercise of the functions vested
in those charged with the conduct of government[;] 103

and as
[o]f or pertaining to the exercise of the rights and privileges or the
influence by which the individuals of a state seek to determine or
control its public policy; having to do with the organization or action of individuals, parties, or interests that seek to control the
appointment or action of those who manage the affairs of a
state .. .104

Given this, one needs no extraordinary insight or imagination to provide the following tentative but self-evidently correct general definition:
A political-action organization is a formal group of individuals
sharing certain common interests that attempts to a substantial degree, or the essential purpose of which is, to determine, control,
intervene or participate in, or influence: (i) the selection of, or the
exercise of the functions vested in, those executive, legislative,
administrative, or judicial officials charged with the conduct, operation, or management of government; or (ii) the formulation or implementation of public policy.

Note that the standard for decision relates to intention, not capability
or competence. That an organization may be led by, or composed of,
fools or blunderers who inevitably fail to achieve their political goals
is irrelevant to its nature as a political-action organization. The test is
05
one of political action, not success. 1
103. WEBSTER'S, supra note 100, at 1909, applied in Akio Kuwahara v. Acheson, 96 F. Supp.
38, 41 (S.D. Cal. 1951); Sorenson v. Superior Court, 31 Ariz. 421, 424, 254 P. 230, 231 (1927);
State ex rel. Maley v. Civic Action Comm., 238 Iowa 851, 857, 28 N.W.2d 467, 470 (1947);
Norton v. Letton, 271 Ky. 353, 360, 111 S.W.2d 1053, 1057 (1937).
104. WEBSTER'S, supra note 100, at 1909, applied in Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior
Court, 28 Cal.2d 481, 484-85, 171 P.2d 21, 24 (1946); Maley v. Civic Action Comm., 238 Iowa
851, 857, 28 N.W.2d 467, 470 (1947). Accord, BLACK'S, supra note 100, at 1319, citing Maley,
238 Iowa at 857, 28 N.W.2d at 470.
105. See, e.g., NEA REP., Oct., 1977, at 11, in which the NEA claimed sweeping political
success in the 1976 elections, including a "critical role played by [NEA members] in the Carter
victory." (statement by NEA President John Ryor). But the fruits of victory have apparently
rotted on the vine. See, e.g., NEA REP., May-June, 1977, at 5 (meeting with Carter to emphasize the NEA's "concern about statements by some of Carter's appointees in opposition to
cabinet status for education"); NEA ADVOCATE 4 (Sept. 1977) (urging NEA affiliates "to gener-
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A political-action organization, then, attempts to exercise those
political rights that "consist in the power to participate, directly or
indirectly, in establishment or management of government." 106
While it would be premature to develop fully the consequences of
this observation, it is not too soon to alert the reader to one of them:
that his or its legal ability to participate in the political process defines the political rights of an individual or association; and, to the
extent a political-action organization exercises an extraordinary legal
ability to participate in the political process, its political rights are
presumptively superior to those of all other citizens.
But I anticipate what comes later. Here, on the basis of my tentative definition of a political-action organization, I shall only deduce
the general types of activity that such an organization must logically
employ to determine, control, intervene or participate in, or influence the selection of government officials, and the exercise of their
functions. First, consider the selection of government officials. The
people choose public officers either directly, through political elections, or indirectly, through appointment by those who are
elected. 10 7 A political-action organization, therefore, may be one
which intervenes or participates to a substantial degree in the partisan political campaigns of candidates for election to public office at
the local, state, or national level. Or it may be one for which such
activism is essential to the achievement of its institutional goals.108
The income tax regulations, for example, define an "action" organization (in part) as one which "participates or intervenes, directly or indirectly, in any political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to any
candidate for public office." 109 As is common, participation in partisan political campaigns can include endorsement of a candidate by the
organization itself; financial contributions to his political war chest by
ate letters and telegrams reminding President Carter of his campaign pledge to support creation
of a separate cabinet-level department of education"); NEA REP., Sept., 1977, at 1-3 ("'NEA is
not going to be lulled into complacency by Presidential promises and fireside chats. . . .We're
much more interested in collecting chits than chats"').
106. BouvIER's LAW DICTIONARY 597 (2d ed. 1934), applied in Caven v. Clark, 78 F. Supp.
1936);
295, 298, 303 (W.D. Ark. 1948); Blackman v. Stone, 17 F. Supp. 102, 107 (S.D. I11.
People v. Washington, 36 Cal. 658, 662 (1869); Litzelman v. Town of Fox, 285 Ill. App. 7, 11, 1
N.E.2d 915, 917 (4th Dist. 1935); Herken v. Glynn, 151 Kan. 855, 867, 101 P.2d 946, 954
(1940); Winnett v. Adams, 71 Neb. 817, 824, 99 N.W. 681, 684 (1904).
107. A "political election" is "the act of choosing by vote a person to fill an office ... pertainting] to the conduct of government." Akio Kuwahara v. Acheson, 96 F. Supp. 38, 41 (S.D.
Cal. 1951).
108. I say may rather than is because the sources indicate, and I consider it obvious, that a
political-action organization need not engage in every form of political activity to merit the
designation as such.
109. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(3)(iii) (1977).
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its members, often through an affiliated political-action committee;
and personal services donated to the campaign by the organizations'

officials, staff personnel, or members. But the partisanship vel non of
the organization, in terms of its connection to a particular party label,
is not the controlling factor. "[Ojne may be a partisan for a person, an
issue, a candidate without feeling an identification with one political
party or the other." 110 It is enough that the organization urges or
aids in the election to public office of persons who it believes will
adopt or execute in governmental affairs those political principles or
practices which it seeks to promote. This is partisan political activism,
howsoever neutral the organization may be with respect to formal
affiliation or de facto identification with one traditional political party
or another. 111
Second, consider the exercise of the functions vested in government officials. These functions are either mandatory or discretionary
in nature. Either some constitutional provision, statute, administrative regulation, or judicial decision prescribes their fulfillment; or
their satisfaction remains a "political question" in the broad sense of
the term. 1 2 Where mandatory duties are concerned, the persons
seeking their exercise can proceed either by way of request or by way
of command. Any request for governmental action, even if that action
is mandatory, is a species of petition, whether its import be great or
petty, its content political or nonpolitical, or its motivation selfish or
unselfish. 113 Procedurally, the interested party and its agents may
contact officials or fonctionnaires directly or, through propaganda and
agitation, may convince members of the public to apply indirect pressure on its behalf. 114 Substantively, in the case of mandatory duties,

110. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 596 (1973) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
111. Thus, in 1976, although it did not identify itself directly with the Democratic Party, the
NEA did operate in a partisan manner as part of what I might style "the Carter-Mondale party."
Compare Rogers v. Republican State Comm., 96 N.J. Super. 265, 272, 232 A.2d 852, 855-56
(1967), with NEA REP., Sept., 1977, at 3, 5-6 (NEA endorsement of Carter-Mondale ticket
"made a critical difference"); NEA REP., Dec., 1976, at 3; and NEA News Release, Nov. 5,
1976.
112. See, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1,42 (1849) ("political questions" involve
matters where "the right to decide is placed [in the legislature]"); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) ("political questions" involve "how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion").
113. WEBSTER'S, supra note 100, at 1832 defines petition as "[a] formal written request addressed to an official person or organized body having power to grant it." On its all-encompassing nature, see, e.g., Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1342-43 (7th Cir.
1977).
114. As used herein, "propaganda" means the "dissemination of ideas [and] information ...
for the purpose of helping ... an institution [or] cause." WEBSTER'S, supra note 100, at 1983.
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petitions are requests that government officials conform their behavior to legal (or perhaps moral) standards. Where they have not
done so, one of three causes is possible: the officials abstractly know
and respect the law, but have inadvertently failed to implement it.
Or they would respect and implement the law if they knew it, but
are ignorant of it. Or they know, or have reason to know, the law,
but both disrespect and have some other motive for disregarding it.
Petition, therefore, may be an appeal to conscience (that is, to the
good faith of officials or fonctionnaires), an appeal to reason (that is,
to the merits of a legal issue), or an appeal to consequences (that is,
to the threat of sanctions, in the form either of commands from
superior authority or, ultimately, of censure by the public through
electoral defeat and removal from office). 115 But, if these appeals
fail, the petitioner must seek a command for governmental action,
usually through judicial intervention in the form of litigation to define, enforce, or protect legal rights, powers, privileges, or immunities. 1 16 A political-action organization, therefore, may be one
which engages in litigation to a substantial degree, or for which litiga117
tion is essential to the realization of its programs or policies.
Conversely, where discretionary governmental authority is concerned, the persons seeking its exercise can proceed only by way of
request. Again, such requests are a species of petition-specifically,
lobbying, which I shall define as all legal attempts by interested parties to influence discretionary action on the part of legislative, executive, administrative, or other governmental officials or bodies. 1 8
"Agitation" means "the [e]xcitement of public feeling by discussion." Id. at 50. To me, the term
propaganda connotes reasoned (although not necessarily correct) arguments directed to the intellects of a relatively limited group, whereas agitation suggests ais appeal to mass emotion or
passion, especially of the base variety-vulgar envy, greed, or revenge. Both terms may, but
need not, have sinister overtones of "public address with selfish or ulterior purpose" and be
"characterized by the coloring or distortion of the facts." Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227
F.2d 907, 910-11 (6th Cir. 1955). Anyone who has performed the distasteful labor of studying
the NEA's, AFT's, and AFSCME's major publications will have no compunction about applying
these terms to them.
115. On the last mentioned point, see Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. S.F. Loc. joint
Exec. Bd., 542 F.2d 1076, 1078, 1080 (9th Cir. 1976) (to "threaten [members of city board with]
lack of political support" is an "attempt to ... petition a governmental body").
116. Litigation, of course, is a form of petition. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963).
117. "The NAACP is not a conventional political party; but the litigation it assists, while
serving to vindicate the legal rights of members of the American Negro community, at the same
time . . ., makes possible the distinctive contribution of a minority group to the ideas and
beliefs of our society. For such a group, assbciation for litigation may be the most effective form
of political association." Id. at 431.
118. This definition is more expansive than the usual one: "the total of all communicated
influences upon legislators with respect to legislation." Cellar, Pressure Groups in Congress,
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Procedurally, lobbying involves either direct contacts between the interested party or its agents and public officials, or indirect contacts by
members of the public responding to the interested party's propaganda or agitation. 1 19 Substantively, lobbying consists of requests
that government officials conform their exercises of discretion to a
particular policy line. Three distinct situations may confront the lobbyists: the officials are not disposed to further any identifiably private
interests at the expense of their conception of the public interest, or
are suspicious of or antagonistic to the particular interests the lobbyists represent, which the officials perceive as private interests. Or
the officials may conceive of any private interest of which they approve as a public interest, or are willing to promote such ideologically
congenial interests despite their private character on the theory that
the public interest is merely a myth in any event. Or the officials may
further whatever interest best serves to perpetuate them in office,
power, prestige, and so on. Lobbying, therefore, may be an appeal to
the public good-that is, to the generally beneficial nature of the
policy proposed. 120 Or it may be an appeal to some private ideology-that is, to the creation or exploitation of narrow political blocs
with which government officials identify. Or it may be an appeal to
personal profit-that is, to the officials' avoidance of public censure
through the electoral process and replacement in office by individuals
who will promote the policy line in question, or to their amalgamation of electoral support from special interest groups, through endorsements, financial contributions, or the provision of campaign services. A political-action organization, therefore, may be one which
engages in such lobbying to a substantial degree, or for which lobbying is essential to its institutional purposes. The income tax regulations, for instance, define an "action" organization (in part) as one "a

319 ANNALS

1, 3 (1958); accord, WEBSTER'S, supra note 100, at 1448. But it will further

simplify discussion to use a single familiar term to refer to all forms of petition of non-judicial
governmental officials and bodies.
119. Lobbying also includes such ancillary tasks as the solicitation, collection, or receipt of
monies for lobbying purposes. See 2 U.S.C. § 266 (1970).
120. An organization such as the National Rifle Association, which opposes legislation extending federal encroachments upon fundamental Second Amendment guarantees, is involved in
lobbying for what I perceive as a generally beneficial policy: the maintenance of constitutional
liberty in this country, for which the Second Amendment is the last line of defense. Conversely,
an organization such as NEA, which promotes legislation establishing a federal right to compul-

sory public-sector collective bargaining through the exclusive representation device, is involved
in lobbying for what I consider an anti-social purpose: the subversion of republican, representative government. The merits of their positions on these issues are irrelevant, however, to the
status of both NRA and NEA as political-action organizations insofar as attempts to influence
legislative action are concerned.
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substantial part of [the] activities [of which involve] attempting to influence legislation by propaganda or otherwise," and which either
"[c]ontacts, or urges the public to contact, members of a legislative
body for the purpose of proposing, supporting, or opposing legislation," or "[a]dvocates the adoption or rejection of legislation." 121
Before drawing a conclusion from this analysis, though, I should
advert briefly to a further definitional issue implicit in it throughout.
At several points in the discussion, I have referred to the need for a
political-action organization to reach the public. But the term "public," as the term "political," is protean in denotation and connotation.
Webster's, for example, defines it both as "[the general body .. .of a
nation, state, or community" and as "a particular body or aggregation
of people." 122 In the case of membership organizations built on special economic, professional, social, or ideological interests, there are
three distinct "publics" to consider: (1) the institutional public, which
constitutes the set of all members and potential members of the organization; (2) the allied-interest public, which constitutes the set of
all groups, associations, organizations, or unaffiliated individuals who
share one or more of the objectives, programs, policies, priorities, or
values of the organization; and (3) the general public, which includes
everyone else. With respect to the first, an organization such as the
NEA must attempt to maximize the size of its membership through
aggressive recruitment (what unions call organizing). A union must
also enhance its members' personal understanding of, and intensify
their commitment to, organizational aims through constant indoctrination (internal propaganda and agitation). And, it must increase the
level of participation and quality of performance of its members in
institutional activities through encouragement, solicitation, training,
assistance, and direction (which cumulatively I shall call mobilization).
With respect to the allied-interest public, the organization must attempt to form coalitions for cooperative and coordinated action with
other groups. And with respect to the general public, it must attempt
to create or exploit a favorable climate of opinion towards itself and
its goals, and an unfavorable one towards its opponents, through
public relations (external propaganda and agitation). A political-action
membership organization, moreover, will likely engage in each of
121. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii) (1977). See also I.R.C. § 4945(e)(1)-(2), which denies
tax exemption with respect to expenditures for "any attempt to influence any legislation through
an attempt to affect the opinion of the general public or any segment thereof," or for "any

attempt to influence legislation through communication with any member or employee of a
legislative body, or with any other government official or employee who may participate in the
formulation of the legislation... "
122. WEBSTEr'S, supra note 100, at 2005.
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these activities as an adjunct to whatever forms of political activism it
finds necessary or useful.
The logical analysis thus completed, I conclude that:
A political-action organization is a formal group of individuals
sharing certain common interests that attempts to a substantial degree, or the essential purpose of which is, to determine, control,
intervene-or participate in, or influence: (i) the selection of, or the
exercise of the functions vested in, those executive, legislative,
administrative, or judicial officials charged with the conduct, operation, or management of government; or (ii) the formulation or im-

plementation of public policy, by means of any of the following
activities -partisan-political campaigning, lobbying, propaganda
and agitation, or litigation.
Moreover, if it is a membership organization, it will also employ
the ancillary means of membership recruitment, indoctrination,
and mobilization; form coalitions with other groups; and utilize
general public relations.
In any particular case, of course, the exact structure and operation of
a political-action membership organization will depend upon several
contingent factors, including its financial and human resources, the
opportunities it perceives to employ those resources, the tactical and
strategic appreciations which counsel it to seize or to let pass such
opportunities, and the visibility and identifiability of its actions to
observers. Therefore, one might expect that a political-action organization with wide-ranging interests and sophisticated capabilities will
appear in various garbs at different points in time, with respect to
different issues, and from the distinct perspectives of different observers. Now, it may function as a traditional political party; now, as a
lobbying organization; now, as a font of propaganda and agitation.
Nonetheless, despite these chameleon-like changes in institutional
coloration, emphasis, and approach from time to time, the organization will retain and continuously display the essential quality of a
movement: namely, its goals or actions require or constitute mobilization of large numbers of individuals to participate in political activism
on a continuous basis. A uniquely qualified practitioner in this field
once observed that
the strength of a movement and its right to existence can be developed only as long as it remains true to the principle that struggle
is a necessary condition of its progress. . . . Therefore a movement must not strive to obtain successes that will be only immediate and transitory, but . . . must show a spirit of uncompromising perseverance in carrying through a long
struggle which
23
will secure for it a long period of inner growth.'

123. A. HITLER, MEIN KAMPF 294 (unexpurgated, J. Murphy transl. 1939).
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We shall see hereinafter that this is a peculiarly apt description of the
essentially aggressive character of such militant political-action membership organizations as the NEA, AFT, and AFSCME.
With these conclusions in mind, let *us now leave the realm of a
prioristic reasoning and undertake a semi-empirical investigation of
1 24
this problem.
3. Activities characteristicof political-action organizations
Reference to the various sources I described earlier both confirms
my logical deductions with respect to the general categories of activity which characterize political-action organizations, and supplies a
further detailed compendium of specific activities with which to
evaluate the operations of the NEA, AFT, or AFSCME. Unfortunately, this survey will tend in many particulars to be somewhat impressionistic rather than definitive. Subject to this caveat, let us now
consider the five major categories of political activism-partisan politics, lobbying, propaganda and agitation, litigation, and organizing.
First, we shall consider partisan politics. The ultimate goal of partisan political activism is to gain political power through the electoral
process, by changing the composition of government as a result of the
election or defeat of certain political leaders. 125 In general terms,
partisian politics involves "becom[ing] prominently identified with
political movements, parties, or factions or with the success or failure
of. . . any candidate for public office." 126 According to one familiar
phrase, it imports "participat[ing] or interven[ing], directly or indirectly, in any political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to any
candidate for public office." 127 This may involve, for example, serving

124. In the sphere of human action, the validity of purely empirical analysis is questionable,
if such analysis is possible at all. See, e.g., L. VON MISES, THE ULTIMATE FOUNDATION OF
ECONOMIC SCIENCE: AN ESSAY ON METHOD (1962). What follows, however, will not be purely

empirical, since the judicial decisions, statutes, and so on presuppose and apply to the facts a
body of knowledge on political action which they do not draw immediately from them. See,
e.g., Hammerstein v. Kelley, 235 F. Supp. 60, 61 (E.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd, 349 F.2d 928 (8th
Cir. 1965).
125. See National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010, 1017 (4th Cir.
1973); Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 856 (10th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
126. Civil Serv. Comn'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564 n.18 (1973).
Accord, Doster, 3 P.A.R. 94 (1972) ("intimately involved" and "played a key role"); Gaylord, 3
P.A.R. 26 (1969); Crawford, 1 P.A.R. 262, 263 (1946); Sullivan, 1 P.A.R. 1 (1941).
127. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iii) (1977). A "candidate for public office" is "an individual who offers himself, or is proposed by others, as a contestant for an elective public office,
whether such office be national, state, or local." Id. Accord, Osheim, 2 P.A.R. 734, 738 (1966).
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as a delegate to a party convention; 128 "evaluating the qualifications
of all potential candidates [for particular offices] and then selecting
and supporting a particular slate;" 129 "rating candidates for public office on a nonpartisan basis" and "disseminating these ratings to the
public;" 130 or "[using] its publications and broadcasts to attack candidates and incumbents," even though "not formally endors Ling] specific
candidates for office." 131 According to another popular description, it
means "taking an active part in the management or affairs of any
political party's partisan political campaign" 13 2 -for instance, by
serving as a delegate to a party convention; 133 by acting as an officer
of a party committee; 134 by "[s]oliciting support for and advancing the
aims of a political party and distributing literature designed to favor
[it]"; 135 by acting in any way on behalf of a candidate for elective
office affiliated with, or sponsored or endorsed by, a party organization; 136 or by soliciting or collecting financial contributions for the
1 37
benefit of a political party, committee, or candidate.
More specifically, partisan political activism includes participation
in two major areas: internal political party affairs and political campaigns. To be sure, a political-action organization can engage in partisan politics without attempting to control, influence, or intervene in
party matters. But, because control or influence over party platforms,
nominations, and activities magnifies and focuses the effect of a political-action organization's participation in the electoral process, one
would expect to find serious, and certainly militant, organizations of
128. E.g., Harkness, 3 P.A.R. 215 (1973) ("uncommitted" delegate to Democratic Nat'l Convention); Kennedy, 2 P.A.R. 280 (1946).
129. Rev. Rul. 67-71, 1967-1 C.B. 125. This is so "even though ... [the] process of selection
[is] completely objective and [is] intended primarily to educate and inform the public about the
candidates."
130. Rev. Rul. 67-368, 1967-2 C.B. 194 (candidates analyzed on basis of "'education and experience").
131. Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 856 (10th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
132. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 617 (1973).
133. E.g., Murray, 1 P.A.R. 995 (1967) (Minnesota Democratic Farmer-Labor Party Convention).

134. Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 142-43 (1947). Accord, e.g., Robertson,
2 P.A.R. 266 (1945).
135. Turner, 1 P.A. R. 614, 615 (1951). This is so even if "a specific election campaign [is] not
pending at the time."
136. E.g., Rogers, 1 P.A.R. 555 (1949).
137. Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 132, 142-43 (1947); accord, Mayfield, 1
P.A.R. 1001, 1003 (1967); Roschke, 1 P.A.R. 954, 958 (1967); Williams, 2 P.A.R. 244, 248-49
(1945); Stewart, 2 P.A.R. 78, 81-82 (1942) ("[i]f organizing extensive solicitation of political
funds, taking control of the money and expending it . . . does not constitute political management[,] the term baffles definition").
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that kind involved in party affairs to the limits of their capabilities.
This involvement-on the part of their officials, staff personnel, and
members-would include such typical activities as serving as an official or member of a political party, committee, or club;138 seeking
candidacy for the position of or serving as a delegate or alternate to,
participating in the official business of, or soliciting individuals to attend a party caucus or convention; 139 or in some other way "taking
an active part in the affairs of a political club." 140
On the other hand, whether or not it intervenes in formal party
functions, a political-action organization cannot operate effectively in
the arena of partisan politics unless it takes an active part in political
campaigns of one sort or another.141 Familiar campaign activities include, most obviously: becoming a candidate for election to public
office at the local, state, or national level; 142 nominating a candidate
for such office by petition; 143 promoting a candidate by a traditional
public endorsement, or by an "objective and unbiased" or "nonpartisan" evaluation or rating; 144 or supporting a candidate in various
ways.
138. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 551 n.3, 572 n.18
(1973); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608, 617 (1973); Oklahoma v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 132, 142-43 (1947); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 82
n.il,92 n.24, 94 (1947); accord, Smith, I P.A.R. 2 (1941).
139. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 551 n.3, 554 n.3
(1973); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 617 (1973); accord, Harkness, 3 P.A.R. 215
(1973); Barr/Carey, 3 P.A.R. 219 (1973); Hansen, 3 P.A.R. 53 (1970); Hoeh, 3 P.A.R. 4 (1969);
Morgan, 1 P.A.R. 1027 (1969); Tilton, 1 P.A.R. 934 (1966); Hilburn, 2 P.A.R. 701 (1964); Hood,
1 P.A.R. 835 (1961); Drake, 1 P.A.R. 777 (1955); Smith, I P.A.R. 772 (1955); De Garcia, 1
P.A.R. 741 (1954); Izcoa, I P.A.R. 741 (1954); Godinez, 1 P.A.R. 740 (1954); Deweese, 1 P.A.R.
655 (1953); LaFavers, 1 P.A.R. 658 (1952); Beck, 1 P.A.R. 576 (1952); O'Toole, 1 P.A.R. 590
(1951); Grover, 2 P.A.R. 328 (1947); Kennedy, 2 P.A.R. 280 (1946).
140. Northern Va. Regional Park Auth. v.Civil Serv. Comm'n, 437 F.2d 1346, 1349 n.3 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 936 (1971).
141. I place the term in quotation marks because, although popular lexicographers define it
as "an organized series of operations or a systematic effort to influence voters," it is not a legal
term of art with any precise, limited meaning. WEBSTER'S, supra note 100, at 386. Rather, if
the question is what acts, in nature and number, are necessary to constitute a "campaign," no
answer is possible; for there are no standards "as to the nature, number, quantity, or quality of
things done, which would enable us to say that on one side a campaign exists, and on the other
side there is none." Norris v. United States, 86 F.2d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1936). The word simply
refers to the actual behavior of a candidate or his adherents, whether or not directly connected
with an electoral contest. Mulhair, 1 P.A.R. 607, 608 (1952).
142. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 551 n.3, 572 n.18
(1973); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608, 617 (1973); Northern Va. Regional Park
Auth. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 437 F.2d 1346, 1349 n.3 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 936
(1971); Hammerstein v. Kelley, 235 F. Supp. 60, 64 (E.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd, 349 F.2d 928 (8th
Cir. 1965).
143. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 617 (1973); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75, 82 n.l (1947).
144. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 551 n.3 (1973);
Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 856 (10th Cir. 1972), cert.
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Among these ways of providing support, none is more important
than the solicitation, receipt, or expenditure of political contributions-money being the necessary lubricant for the wheels of political
power.1 4 5 This may involve inter alia establishing or implementing a
plan for the systematic collection of political contributions; 146 organizing or supervising their solicitation; 147 instructing employees in
methods of solicitation and receipt; 148 soliciting, or attempting to influence individuals to make contributions; 149 or receiving monies destined for a political campaign. 150 But, in whatever form they may
appear, the systematic solicitation and expenditure of campaign contributions are perhaps conclusive criteria of the importance of partisan
denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973); Hammerstein v. Kelley, 235 F. Supp. 60, 63-64 (E.D. Mo. 1964),
aff'd, 349 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1965); Conley, 1 P.A.R. 769 (1955); Kanemori, I P.A.R. 682 (1954)
(circular letter signed in capacity as secretary of Honolulu Central Labor Council); Christensen,
2 P.A.R. 396, 400 (1951); Raburn, 1 P.A.R. 333, 334 (1948); Rev. Rul. 67-71, 1967-1 C.B. 125;
Rev. Rul. 67-368, 1967-2 C.B. 194.
145. E.g., Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 551 n.3 (1973);
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608, 617 (1973).
146. Jackson, 2 P.A.R. 491 (1955); Fleming, 2 P.A.R. 1, 2 (1943) (systematic collection of 2%
of employees' salaries for benefit of political party central committee).
147. E.g., Bragg, 1 P.A.R. 701 (1954); Clarke, 1 P.A.R. 706 (1954); Cook, 1 P.A.R. 702
(1954); Dabbs, I' P.A.R. 701 (1954); Garrard, I P.A.R. 694 (1954); Glenn, 1 P.A.R. 702 (1954);
Hall, 1 P.A.R. 703 (1954); Haynes, 1 P.A.R. 700 (1954); Hubbell, 1 P.A.R. 695 (1954); Jackson,
2 P.A.R. 491 (1955); Loar, 1 P.A.R. 698 (1954); Ludvigsen, 1 P.A.R. 699 (1954); Nowotny, 1
P.A.R. 696 (1954); Park, 1 P.A.R. 695 (1954); Patrick, 1 P.A.R. 699 (1954); Richards, 1 P.A.R.
697 (1954).
148. Bragg, 1 P.A.R. 701 (1954); Loar, 1 P.A.R. 698 (1954).
149. E.g., Labold, 3 P.A.R. 137, 142 (1972) (distribution of schedules of suggested contributions); Wild, 2 P.A.R. 721, 722 (1964) (distributing contribution cards); Bobbitt, 1 P.A.R. 697
(1954); Bragg, I P.A.R. 701 (1954); Clarke, 1 P.A.R. 706 (1954); Cook, 1 P.A.R. 702 (1954);
Dabbs, I P.A.R. 701 (1954); De Garcia, 1 P.A.R. 741 (1954); Garrard, 1 P.A.R. 694 (1954);
Glenn, 1 P.A.R. 702 (1954); Godinez, 1 P.A.R. 740 (1954); Hall, 1 P.A.R. 703 (1954); Haynes, 1
P.A.R. 700 (1954); Hubbell, 1 P.A.R. 695 (1954); Izcoa, 1 P.A.R. 741 (1954); Loar, 1 P.A.R. 698
(1954); Ludvigsen, 1 P.A.R. 699 (1954); Nowotny, 1 P.A.R. 696 (1954); Patrick, 1 P.A.R. 699
(1954); Richards, 1 P.A.R. 697 (1954).
150. E.g., Bragg, 1 P.A.R. 701 (1954); Clarke, 1 P.A.R. 706 (1954); Cook, 1 P.A.R. 702
(1954); Dabbs, I P.A.R. 701 (1954); De Garcia, I P.A.R. 741 (1954); Glenn, 1 P.A.R. 702 (1954);
Godinez, 1 P.A.R. 740 (1954); Hall, 1 P.A.R. 703 (1954); Haynes, 1 P.A.R. 700 (1954); Izcoa, 1
P.A.R. 741 (1954); Loar, 1 P.A.R. 698 (1954); Ludvigsen, 1 P.A.R. 699 (1954); Nowotny, 1
P.A.R. 696 (1954); Park, 1 P.A.R. 695 (1954); Patrick, 1 P.A.R. 699 (1954); Richards, 1 P.A.R.
697 (1954).
An individual is engaged in a campaign to solicit political contributions when he participates
in the initial request for those contributions, serves as a conduit for the funds, or transmits
them to a political party. Bates, 2 P.A.R. 690 (1963); Stone, 2 P.A.R. 690 (1963); Jackson, 2
P.A.R. 491 (1955) (setting amounts of contributions, designating an employee as recipient, and
transmitting to political party); Murphy, 1 P.A.R. 572 (1951) (planned and systematic activity). It
is, of course, irrelevant that those solicited made no actual contributions. Melrose, 2 P.A.R.
346, 354 (1949). Neither does it matter how the ultimate recipient actually expended the
monies, if the donors subjectively believed at the time of their donation that the monies were
destined for partisan political purposes. Flood, 1 P.A.R. 531, 532 (1951).
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political activism to any group, and of the intensity with which it
engages in such activism. Indeed, the income tax regulations actually
define the term "political party" as
any committee, association, or organization . . . which accepts contributions . . . or makes expenditures . . . for the purpose of influencing or attempting to influence the . . . selection, nomination,
or election of any individual to any Federal, State, or local elective
public office, whether or not such individual . . . [is] selected,
nominated, or elected.' 51
Thus, a political-action organization could scarcely reveal its character
in a more convincing fashion than by developing and implementing
a scheme for the systematic solicitation, receipt, and expenditure
of partisan political contributions, especially if it is a membership
organization which directs such solicitations to its own captive
audience. 152
A second and vital means of assisting the partisan political campaigns of candidates for elective office is through the provision of personal services. This may involve an individual in a leadership or advisory capacity, such as plotting strategy, managing a campaign, or
establishing and operating a campaign headquarters. 153 In a supervisory capacity it may include recruiting other individuals to participate as campaign workers, instructing them in their duties, or paying
them for their services. 1 5 4 And in a rank-and-file capacity, it may
mean soliciting votes or engaging in various "get-out-the-vote" activities, serving at the polls, or performing other "nuts-and-bolts"
campaign duties and chores.' 55 Whatever the exact nature of these
services, though, a political-action membership organization will usually be uniquely situated and qualified, as well as motivated, to
mobilize its officials, staff personnel, and members to perform them.
And, in many instances, it may be capable of levels of performance
151. Treas. Reg. § 1.271-1(b)(1) (1977). For definitions of "contributions, expenditures, political candidate, and political contributions," see Treas. Regs. §§ 1.271-(b)(1)-(3), 1.276-1(f)(2)-(3)
(1977).
152. See Martin, 2 P.A.R. 726, 733 (1965) ("in the hierarchy of offenses arising under . . . the
Hatch Act . . ., there is no more pernicious practice than the exaction of contributions from
co-workers for political purposes").
153. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 572-74 n.18 (1973);
Adams, 1 P.A.R. 857 (1963); Nicholson, 1 P.A.R. 16 (1944).
154. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 92 n.24, 94 (1947); Alfred, 1 P.A.R. 9
(1941); Pelone, 1 P.A.R. 10 (1941); Smith,- 1 P.A.R. 2 (1941).
155. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 551 n.3 (1973);
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 617 (1973); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S.
75, 82 n.l, 92 n.24, 94 (1947); Rankin, 2 P.A.R. 629, 629-30 (1960); Young, 1 P.A.R. 3 (1941);
Smith, 1 P.A.R. 2 (1941); Branch, 1 P.A.R. 707 (1954); Barnes, 1 P.A.R. 396 (1948) (furnishing
list of names and addresses to campaign committee).
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which far exceed the best efforts of traditional political parties because a membership organization maintains its structure (including
mobilization programs) on a continuous basis while a political party
traditionally demobilizes to some extent between elections.
A third important way to participate in partisan political campaigns
is by soliciting popular support for, or opposition to, particular candidates.1 5 6 In general, this involves familiar types and mechanisms of
propaganda, agitation, and public relations. 157 Probably most effective is use of the mass media. 158 Publication and distribution of various campaign materials may also prove useful, especially if they appear in regular organizational newspapers or magazines which can
saturate a definite audience with political position statements on parties, candidates, or issues. This is true even if they take the less effective form of irregular literature such as letters, postcards, pamphlets,
circulars, posters, handbills, buttons, or emblems. 159 Finally, tradi156. United States v. U.A.W., 352 U.S. 567, 585 (1957); Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry,
Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 856 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973);
Warnhuis, 1 P.A.R. 893 (1965); Cavanagh, 1 P.A.R. 743 (1954); Godinez, 1 P.A.R. 740 (1954);
Turner, 1 P.A.R. 614, 615 (1951) ("literature ... seeks to build up a strong Socialist ballot in
order to repudiate at the polls the other political parties of this country"; "immaterial that a
specific election campaign was not pending at the time of its distribution"); Nicholson, 1 P.A.R.
16 (1944).
157. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 769 n.17 (1961); Gaylord, 3 P.A.R. 26
(1969); Haley, I P.A.R. 692 (1953).
158. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 551 n.3, 572-74 n.18
(1973); United States v. U.A.W., 352 U.S. 567, 584-85 (1957); Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry,
Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 856 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973);
Northern Va. Regional Park Auth. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 437 F.2d 1346, 1349 n.3 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 936 (1971); Johnson, 1 P.A.R. 989 (1967); Dees, I P.A.R. 878 (1965);
Mason, 1 P.A.R. 848 (1963); Villines, 1 P.A.R. 859 (1962); Massingham, 1 P.A.R. 792 (1959);
Evans, 1 P.A.R. 679 (1953); Shaw, 1 P.A.R. 672 (1953); McClaren, 1 P.A.R. 236, 240-41 (1946).
159. "Campaign" material is literature which seeks to persuade readers to promote or oppose
party aims or candidates for elective office. Brooks, 1 P.A.R. 901, 905 (1966). Of the voluminous
sources on this issue, see Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,
551 n.3, 572 n.18 (1973); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 617 (1973); United States v.
U.A.W., 352 U.S. 567, 585 (1957); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 82 n.ll
(1947); Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 856 (10th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iii) (1977); Rev. Rul.
67-71, 1967-1 C.B. 125; Durick, 1 P.A.R. 898 (1966); Warnshuis, 1 P.A.R. 893 (1965); Adams, 1
P.A.R. 857 (1963); Mason, 1 P.A.R. 848 (1963); Sotelo, 1 P.A.R. 853 (1963); Stemcosky, 1
P.A.R. 781 (1958); McArdle, 1 P.A.R. 767 (1955); Cavanagh, 1 P.A.R. 743 (1954); De Garcia, 1
P.A.R. 741 (1954); Flanagan, 1 P.A.R. 685 (1954); Stickey, 1 P.A.R 756 (1954); Slade, 1 P.A.R.
666 (1953); Jones, 1 P.A.R. 640 (1952); Turner, 1 P.A.R. 614 (1951) (defense rejected that "the
Socialist Labor Party never conducts a membership drive or asks anyone to become a party
member but merely encourages people to study its program"); Sanders, 1 P.A.R. 525 (1948);
Tinstman, 2 P.A.R. 313 (1948) (mailing 1500-2000 circulars, with cover letter, using mailing list
of veterans' organization); Tugwell, 1 P.A.R. 291 (1948); Evans, 1 P.A.R. 331 (1947); McClaren,
1 P.A.R. 236, 237-38 (1946); Emery, 2 P.A.R. 53 (1943); Impson, 1 P.A.R. 15 (1943); Patterson,
2 P.A.R. 10 (1941).
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tional political meetings, rallies, parades, and demonstrations are valuable too.' 60 Here again, a political-action membership organization
will enjoy unique advantages, primarily in its ability to reach large
numbers of people with its particular political message, and possibly
as well to predict the effect of that message on those people and
others whom one could reasonably expect them to influence. 16 1
Second, let us consider the major aspects of lobbying. The ultimate
goal of lobbying is to control or influence, directly or indirectly, the
discretionary action of legislative, executive, administrative, or other
government officials. This usually involves the passage or defeat of
legislation. 16 2 Of course, lobbying is a form of political activism,
whatever the type or character of the particular legislation involved.
It is irrelevant that the legislation is arguably beneficial to the community or in the public interest, as opposed to serving private interests only;163 or that its subject matter is an appropriation of funds
(rather than a regulation), civil rights, unionism, or even foreign
law. 164
In general terms, lobbying involves contacting a legislative body,
its committees, or its individual members for the purpose of proposing, supporting or opposing legislation. This may be done either directly "by the lobbyists themselves or through their hirelings," or
indirectly by the members of some public whom the lobbyists have
mobilized for that purpose. 165 And with respect to indirect contacts,
lobbying also includes general "propaganda (including advertising)
related to [the promotion or defeat of legislation]." 166
160. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 617 (1973); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75, 82 n.ll (1947); Strong, I P.A.R. 893 (1965); Henry, 1 P.A.R. 856 (1963); Arvin, 1
P.A.R. 549 (1949); Sanders, 1 P.A.R. 525 (1948); Kennedy, 2 P.A.R. 280 (1946). See also Bilick
v. Dudley, 356 F. Supp. 945, 946, 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (social gathering held, in part, for
discussion of campaigning in favor of issue subject to referendum had a "political purpose").
161. See, e.g., NEA Rep., Oct., 1975 at 12-1.3; Transcript, Options in Education, Nat'l Pub.
Radio Program No. 43, "The Great Debate," Sept. 6, 1976, at 17.
162. One federal statute defines "lobbying" in terms of influence on legislation. 2 U.S.C. §
266 (1970).
163. Kuper v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 562, 563 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 920 (1964);
Rev. Rul. 67-293, 1967-2 C.B. 185.
164. Marshall v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 75, 76-78 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 872,
rehearing denied, 326 U.S. 804 (1945); Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. United States, 312
F.2d 437, 446 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (Jones, C.J., concurring in part in the result); Rev. Rul. 73-440,
1973-2 C.B. 1977.
165. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 620 (1954); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S.
41, 47 (1953); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii, iv) (1977); Rev. Rul. 67-163, 1967-1 C.B. 43 (if
substantial part of activities of organization consists of attempt to influence legislation by urging
public to contact members of legislative body, normal tax deduction for membership dues will
be proportionately disallowed).
166. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 769 n.17 (1961); Treas. Reg. §
1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii(a), iv(b)) (1977).
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More specifically, where a political-action membership organization
is concerned, lobbying consists of internal preparation and external
presentation. The former has two aspects: (1) evaluation and development of a legislative position or program may involve informal
organizational means, such as "discussing and agreeing upon the positions . . .to be taken with respect to advocating or opposing various
legislative measures;" 167 formal organizational means, such as establishing a separate legislative committee or like body to study and
undertake other tasks with respect to legislative matters;168 or recourse to outside assistance, such as soliciting "[attorneys'] advice on
the construction and effect of proposed and pending legislation"; 169 and
(2) internal preparation for lobbying often includes embodiment of
the final legislative policy in formal organizational resolutions, statements, objectives, or programs. 170 This is followed by indoctrination
of the membership and allied-interest public with the organization's
goals, through such internal channels of communication as newspap171
ers, magazines, or speeches of officials or staff personnel.
A political-action organization's external lobbying presentation also
has two aspects: (1) to reach and influence government officials, the
organization may employ direct contacts. To influence legislative action, it may hire professional lobbyists; 172 draft legislation or amendments thereto; 173 offer testimony or written submissions to legislative
bodies; 174 approach legislators and their staff personnel in other
167. Kuper v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 562, 562 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 920 (1964);
accord, Hammerstein v. Kelley, 235 F. Supp. 60, 64 (E.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd, 349 F.2d 928 (8th
Cir. 1965).
168. American Hardware & Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 202 F.2d 126, 128 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 814 (1953). Krohn v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 341, 345 (D. Colo. 1965)
(local medical society has "legislative committee which works with the State Society Legislative
Committee, the members of which are at times also the members of the State Society Legislative Committee"); Hammerstein v. Kelley, 235 F. Supp. 60, 64 (E.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd, 349
F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1965).
169. Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. United States, 368 F.2d 233, 245-46 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
170. Krohn v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 341, 345 (D. Colo. 1965); Hammerstein v. Kelley,
235 F. Supp. 60, 64 (E.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd, 349 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1965).
171. Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 855 (10th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
172. Krohn v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 341, 345 (D. Colo. 1965); Haswell v. United
States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1137-38, 1144-45 (Ct. Cl. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975);
Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. United States, 368 F.2d 233, 245-46 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
173. Marshall v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 75, 76, 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 872
(1945); Vanderbilt v. Commissioner, 93 F.2d 360, 362 (1st Cir. 1937); Connecticut Light &
Power Co. v. United States, 368 F.2d 233, 245-46 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
174. Vanderbilt v. Commissioner, 93 F.2d 360, 362 (Ist Cir. 1937); Krohn v. United States,
246 F. Supp. 341, 345 (D. Colo. 1965); Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1138 (Ct. Cl.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. United States, 368
F.2d 233, 245-47 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
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ways; 175 or engage in special projects, such as a signature drive for a
legislative referendum. 1 76 To influence executive or administrative
action, the organization may screen applicants for appointive office; 177
aid executive officials in preparing a legislative program; 178 present
testimony, or solicit the testimony of others, before administrative
boards; 17 or make partisan political promises or threats. 180 On the
other hand, where the organization employs an indirect lobbying approach, it may request its various sub-units or members,' 8 ' readers of
its publications, 1 82 or the general public to contact legislators with
regard to some issue. 183 (2) An organization may also aim its external
lobbying presentation at the general public, through propaganda and
agitation designed to create or exploit a climate of opinion favorable
to its legislative goals. Here, publicity campaigns,' 4 advertising in
mass media, 185 and articles in organizational publications with a wide
circulation are the most familiar means employed.' 8 6
Moreover, in all of these instances, where a political-action membership organization is involved whose members belong to a particu175. Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907, 909 (6th Cir. 1955) (undefined "contacts");
Hammerstein v. Kelley, 235 F. Supp. 60, 64 (E.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd, 349 F.2d 928 (8th Cir.
1965) (undefined "communications"); Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1139 (Ct. Cl.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975) (cocktail parties and lunches).
176. Washburn v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 839, 843 (8th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
844 (1961).
177. Rev. Rul. 74-117, 1974-1 C.B. 128.
178. Id.
179. Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Loc. Joint Exec. Bd., 542 F.2d 1076,
1078, 1080 (9th Cir. 1976).
180. Id.
181. Krohn v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 341, 344, 345 (D. Colo. 1965); Hammerstein v.
Kelley, 235 F. Supp. 60, 64-65 (E.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd, 349 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1965); League of
Women Voters v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 379, 382 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 822
(1960). In Hammerstein in particular, the court noted that the "regular practice of urging the
membership to contact their legislators in support of or opposition to specific legislation" was
enough in and of itself to make the organization "virtually ... a political action organization."
235 F. Supp. at 64-65.
182. Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 855 (10th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
183. Consumers Power Co. v. United States, 427 F.2d 78, 79 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970). See also United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 620 (1954).
184. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 140-41
(1961); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 499-500 (1959).
185. Consumers Power Co. v. United States, 427 F.2d 78, 79 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970); Hammerstein v. Kelley, 235 F. Supp. 60, 64 (E.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd, 349 F.2d
928 (8th Cir. 1965); Revere Racing Ass'n v. Scanlon, 137 F. Supp. 293, 294 (D. Mass. 1955),
aff'd on this point, 232 F.2d 816, 818-19 (1st Cir. 1956); Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v.
United States, 312 F.2d 437, 440-42 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
186. Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 855 (10th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973); American Hardware & Equip. Co. v. Commissioner,
202 F.2d 126, 128-29 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 814 (1953).
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lar economic group or profession, such as medical doctors or teachers,
the organization will likely represent itself as the spokesman, not only
for its actual members, but also for all members of the group or profession whatever their organizational affiliations vel non: it speaks as7
8
the "doctors' voice" or the "teachers' voice" in legislative matters.1
This (mis)representation, of course, may tend to increase the organization's prestige among vote-conscious public officials and those in the
general public who accept uncritically the opinions of professional
groups as imbued with a special expertise in certain legislative matters.
Third, let us review what the sources teach with respect to propaganda and agitation. The ultimate goal of political propaganda and
agitation is to educate and inform the public with respect to the circumstances and interests of an organization. The objective is to create
or exploit public understanding and acceptance of the organization's
political claims, a climate of opinion favorable to those claims, and a
propensity for action or forbearance in regard to their realization. 18
In general terms, all propaganda and agitation is a form of advocacy, or the partisan espousal or defense of a cause, as opposed to an
objective exposition of a particular subject matter. Indeed, the income tax regulations define an "action" organization (in part) as one
that "advocates, or campaigns for" its political objectives, "as distinguished from engaging in nonpartisan analysis, study or research and
making the results thereof available to the public." 189
More specifically, we can arrange activities properly describable as
propaganda and agitation in a spectrum extending from a "pure" to
several "applied" forms. Pure propaganda attempts merely to indoctrinate the public with a "line" about a group's economic or social
situation, interests, or goals. 1 90 The next logical step is to relate the
organization's goals and claims to the political process by reference to
some current issue of public policy. 1 9 1 Going further, propaganda
187. E.g., Hammerstein v. Kelley, 235 F. Supp. 60. 64 (E.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd, 349 F.2d 928
(8th Cir. 1965). See, e.g., NEA CONST. preamble, 1976-77 NEA Handbook 152 (NEA "serve[s]
as the national voice for education").
188. Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162, 164 (4th Cir. 1976); Gay Students
Org. of Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 660 (1st Cir. 1974); WEBSTER'S, supra note
100, at 39; BLACK'S, supra note 102, at 75; Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1143-44
(Ct. Cl. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975).
189. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iv) (1977).
190. See, e.g., Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162, 163, 164 (4th Cir. 1976);
Gay Students Org. of Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 660 (1st Cir. 1974).
191. Consumers Power Co. v. United States, 427 F.2d 78, 79 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970); American Hardware & Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 202 F.2d 126, 128-29 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 814 (1953); Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. United States, 312
F.2d 437, 440-42 (Ct. Cl. 1963).

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:293

may identify particular legal rights for the organization, or its members, as an appropriate response to the group's claims. Or it may
suggest some other course or doctrine of redress, which only legislation or other political action can accomplish. 192 At this point, it may
connect the latter rights, or theory of redress, with existing or proposed national, state, or local laws, and disseminate information with
respect to those laws. 1 93 Where the relevant laws exist, propagandists may demand their enforcement. Otherwise they may encourage
the passage, defeat, or amendment of legislation to suit their purposes. 19 4 Finally, political propaganda and agitation may provide
immediate rationalizations for direct action, the classic example being
the "protest demonstration." 195 A political-action organization,
therefore, may engage in everything from abstract advocacy to illegal
direct action, in pursuit of goals separate from or related to any other
species of political activism.
Fourth, let us consider the phenomenon of political litigation. For
a political-action organization, the primary goal of litigation is to assert group rights. It does not strive merely to settle private disputes
between individuals, although such disputes almost invariably form
the context in which more general goals are pursued. Rather, it seeks
to secure or enforce collective rights, powers, privileges, or immunities for members of the organization generally. Litigation,
therefore, is a substitute for partisan politics and lobbying, and is an
embodiment of the realization that propaganda and agitation may not
suffice in situations where the group is an extreme minority or its
claims are highly unpopular. As the Supreme Court explained in
Button, a political-action organization may not be
a conventional political party; but the litigation it assists, while
serving to vindicate the legal rights of members of the, [group], at
the same time and more importantly, makes possible the distinc192. Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162, 164 (4th Cir. 1976); Acanfora v.
Board of Educ., 351 F. Supp. 843, 856 (D. Md. 1973) ("the promotion of legal rights for [an
identified group] is a political undertaking"), aff'd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974); Rev. Rul. 62-71, 1962-1 C.B. 85.
193. Roberts Dairy Co. v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 948, 949-50 (8th Cir. 1952) (organization
involved in "carrying on propaganda," even though it "did not engage in lobbying activities, had
no congressmen on its mailing list and did not request to appear before congressional committees"); accord, American Hardware & Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 202 F.2d 126, 127-29 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 814 (1953).
194. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 769 n.17 (1961); Sunset
Scavenger Co. v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 453, 456-57 (9th Cir. 1936); Hammerstein v. Kelley,
235 F. Supp. 60, 64 (E.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd, 349 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1965); S. 1362, 2 C.B. 152
(1920).
195. Rev. Rul. 75-384, 1975-2 C.B. 204.
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tive contribution of [the] group to the ideas and beliefs of our society. For such a group, association for litigation may be the most
effective form of political association. 196
Whether a political-action organization, through litigation, advances
legitimate claims of a group or simply makes a nuisance of itself, the
litigation it supports is a form of political activism.
Finally, we should give some thought to organizing (in the tradeunion sense of the term). The ultimate goal of all organizing activities
is to bring together for concerted action of one sort or another individuals who share a common goal. 19 7 Operationally, organizing includes: the establishment of a formal institutional structure, first for
the group as a whole and then for sub-units such as chapters or affiliates; maintenance of or increases in membership through recruitment or raiding of rival organizations; mobilization of members to
implement and support organizational programs and policies; and
cooperation with other groups in ad hoc coalitions or alliances. Legally, to the extent an organization is a political-action organization,
all of its organizing activities necessarily assume an indelibly political
coloration. An organization cannot engage in any kind of activity until
it has sufficient means to do so. Organizing supplies those means'in
terms of funds from membership dues, energy from members' services, and potential power from the group's collective commitment to
its goals. If the organization intends or employs those means for
political ends, they become political means. Therefore, the organizing
which provides them becomes a derivative form of political activism.
This review of the literature permits me at last to offer a comprehensive definition:
A political-action organization is a formal group of individuals
sharing certain common interests that attempts to a substantial degree, or the essential purpose of which is, to determine, control,
intervene or participate in, or influence: (i) the selection of, or the
exercise of the functions vested in, those executive, legislative,
administrative, or judicial officials charged with the conduct, operation, or management of government; or (ii) the formulation or implementation of public policy, by means of any of the following

activities 1. participating in the internal affairs of partisan political parties,
or endorsing or providing financial or other support or services to
partisan political campaigns of candidates for election to public office at the local, state, or national level;

196. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963).
197. Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162, 163, 164 (4th Cir. 1976); Gay
Students Org. of Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 660 (1st Cir. 1974).
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2. engaging directly or indirectly in lobbying or like activities to
influence legislative, executive, administrative, or other governmental action at the local, state, or national level;
3. endeavoring through propaganda and agitation employing any
means or channel of communication to mold or exploit public
opinion in ways favorable to any of its objectives, programs,
policies, priorities, or values;
4. seeking to establish, maintain, or enforce through litigation or
other judicial or administrative process legal rights, powers,
privileges, or immunities for itself, its chartered affiliates, its members, or other individuals, groups, associations, or organizations
which share any of its objectives, programs, policies, priorities, or
values; or
5. recruiting, indoctrinating, encouraging, soliciting, training, assisting, or directing members to participate in any of the above-described activities.
4. Criteria for and sources of evidence of the substantiality and essentiality of an organization's political activism
The preceding definition still includes two undefined terms: "substantial" and "essential." But, again, the sources establish criteria of
substantiality and essentiality, and identify the kinds of evidence
which are relevant to factual inquiry.
First, "substantial" involvement in political activism generally
means "important" or "material" involvement, "[c]onsiderable in
amount, value, or the like." 198 Evidently, the organization itself may
admit as much, either by explicit statements or implicitly in its publications and documents. 199 Absent an admission, the task devolves
upon the trier of fact to compare the magnitude of the organization's
political to its nonpolitical activities, in terms of some accounting
standard such as monies or time expended on each category of activity. 200 Here lies a crucial distinction between substantial and essential involvement: if political activism is essential to the achievement of
an organization's objectives, the amount of nonpolitical activity in
which it also engages is irrelevant, even if that amount is substantial.
In any event, for determining substantiality, a mere comparison of
percentages of monies expended is inappropriate, since it "obscures
the complexity of balancing the organization's activities in relation to
its objectives and circumstances in the context of the totality of the
198. WEBSTER'S, supra note 100, at 2514; accord, BLACK'S, supra note 102, at 1597.
199. Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1147 (Ct. CI. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1107 (1975). See Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 856 (10th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
200. Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1142-43 (Ct. C1. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1107 (1975).
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organization." 20 1 Nevertheless, the amount of monies an organization
devotes to each category of its operations remains one important measure of its substantial involvement in political activism. 20 2 To adduce
this requires a careful imputation of purpose to each part of the organization's budget,2 0 3 objective accounting standards and methodology for allocating its expenditures among various political and nonpolitical categories of activity 2 04 and proper placement of the burden
of proof with respect to disputed facts. 2 0 5 Several courts have
employed such an approach. One held that more than fifteen percent
of an organization's total budget devoted to political activities was
substantial, even though the actual dollar amounts were "minuscule
when compared to legislative expenditures of many [other] organizations." 20 6 Conversely, another court ruled that less than five percent
of the "time and effort" of an organization devoted to political activities was not substantial. 20 7 And the income tax code now employs
a sliding-scale test of substantiality in terms of percentages of an or20 8
ganization's budget.
Another, albeit more subjective, technique for evaluating the substantial nature of an organization's political activities is to estimate
their relative importance in the context of all its endeavors. For
example, one may consider whether the organization's political activism is "not secondary or incidental" to its nonpolitical goals, is "a
primary objective in [its] total operations," or "is on an equal footing
201. Id. at 1142; accord, Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d
849, 855 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
202. Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1145 (Ct. CL. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1107 (1975).
203. See Washburn v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 839, 841, 843 (8th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 844 (1961).
204. Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1145 (Ct. Cl. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1107 (1975).
205. See Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. United States, 368 F.2d 233, 246 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
If a dissenting public employee challenges under the First Amendment the exercise of the
special privilege of exclusive representation by a public-sector union which he claims is a political-action membership organization, the burden of disproving the substantiality of its political
activism with clear and convincing evidence would seem fairly to rest upon the union. See
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 403 U.S. 29, 50-52 (1971) (Brennan, J.)
206. Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1146 (Ct. Cl. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1107 (1975).
207. Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907, 912 (6th Cir. 1955). Note, though, that the
organization's "evidence was not successfully challenged either by adversary witnesses or destructive analysis." Id. This decision, then, establishes only a prima facie lower limit on substantiality, implicitly subject to rebuttal by competent evidence.
208. I.R.C. § 501(h)(1976) limits lobbying activities of certain tax-exempt organizations to 20%
of the first $500,000 of an organization's expenditures for exempt purposes, 15% of the second
$500,000, 10% of the third, and 5% of any remaining expenditures-with the total permitted
amount not to exceed $1,000,000 per annum in any event.
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with its [nonpolitical] efforts." 209 A final method (which, however,
tends to implicate the separate issue of essentiality) is to determine
whether political action is within a power delegated to, or constitutes
a responsibility of, the organization or one of its important subunits-and, if so, whether that is because the organization perceives
2 10
a continuing need to engage in such action to achieve its goals.
"Essential" involvement in political activism, on the other hand, is
not a matter of sums and percentages, but of nature and logic: of
"'forming [or] belonging to . . the inner or constituent character of"
an organization, or of being "indispensable" or logically "necessary" to
its existence or operation. 2 1 ' The character of an organization is
political if its founders established it for the purpose of engaging in
political activism; 212 its principal purpose or primary object is to engage in such activism; 213 or its officials, staff personnel or members
operate it primarily for political objectives. 2 14 Similarly, political activism is indispensable or necessary to an organization when, in the
organization's (subjective) view, its goals require political action; 215
when, in an observer's (objective) view, it can attain its goals or become effective only through politics; 216 or when political means alone are
practicable for attaining its ends.2 17 And in some cases the essentiality of
218
politics to an organization's program is simply self-evident.
209. Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1137, 1147 (Ct. Cl. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1107 (1975). See Dulles v. Johnson, 273 F.2d 362, 367 (2d Cir. 1959) (dicta), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 834 (1960).
210. Hammerstein v. Kelley, 235 F. Supp. 60, 64 (E.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd, 349 F.2d 928 (8th
Cir. 1965); Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1137 (Ct. CI. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1107 (1975).
C
211. WEBSTER'S, supra note 100, at 874; accord, BLACK'S, supra note 102, at 642.
212. American Hardware & Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 202 F.2d 126, 129 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 814 (1953); Roberts Dairy Co. v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 948, 950 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 865 (1952); Rev. Rul. 62-71, 1962-1 C.B. 85; O.D. 704, 3 C.B. 240
(1920).
213. League of Women Voters v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 379, 382 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 822 (1960); Rev. Rul. 62-71, 1962-1 C.B. 85.
214. American Hardware & Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 202 F.2d 126, 129 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 814 (1953); Roberts Dairy Co. v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 948, 950 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 865 (1952); Rev. Rul. 62-71, 1962-1 C.B. 85; O.D. 704, 3 C.B. 240
(1920).
215. Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1137 (Ct. Cl. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1107 (1975).
216. League of Women Voters v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 379, 382 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 822 (1960); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(3)(iv)(a) (1970); Rev. Rul. 62-71, 1962-1
C.B. 85.
217. Marshall v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 75, 77-78 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 872
(1945).
218. See Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 855-56 (10th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973); Kuper v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 562, 563 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 920 (1964).
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Second, the sources also indicate what evidence is relevant to a
determination of substantiality or essentiality. Foremost are admissions by the organization, either in legal proceedings or in publications it produces, crediting itself with political successes. 2 19 Next, if
not equal, in importance are the organization's organic documents,
including its certificate of incorporation, charter, constitution or bylaws; 220 its stated objects or purposes;221 its rules;222 or its formal
resolutions. 2 23 Indeed, it seems reasonable to conclude that its
founders have established an organization to engage in political activism if its organic documents expressly empower it to have objectives and to engage in activities which characterize a political-action
organization. 22 4 Under such circumstances, even an outright dis225
claimer of those stated powers should receive little credence.
Official minutes or transcripts of meetings of the governing bodies
of an organization are also dispositive, 2 26 as are its financial records
and those of its sub-units and affiliates. 227 Public speeches and addresses by officials, staff personnel and other spokesmen are often

219. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 551 n.3 (1973);
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 82 n.ll, 91 n.23 (1947); Roberts Dairy Co. v.
Commissioner, 195 F.2d 948, 950 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 865 (1952); Hammerstein v.
Kelley, 235 F. Supp. 60, 64 (E.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd, 349 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1965).
220. Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 851-52 (10th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973); Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907, 909 (6th
Cir. 1955); American Hardware & Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 202 F.2d 126, 127 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 814 (1953); Roberts Dairy Co. v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 948, 949 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 865 (1952); Vanderbilt v. Commissioner, 93 F.2d 360, 362 (1st Cir.
1937); Slee v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 184, 185-86 (2d Cir. 1930); Haswell v. United States, 500
F.2d 1133, 1136 n.3 (Ct. Cl. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975); League of Women
Voters v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 379, 380-81 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 822 (1960);
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iv) (1977).
221. Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162, 163 (4th Cir. 1976); Marshall v.
Commissioner, 147 F.2d 75, 77-78 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 872 (1945); Krohn v. United
States, 246 F. Supp. 341, 342-43 (D. Colo. 1965).
222. Cornelius v. Benevolent Protection Order, 382 F. Supp. 1182, 1195 & n.21 (D. Conn.
1974).
223. Hammerstein v. Kelley, 235 F. Supp. 60, 64 (E.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd, 349 F.2d 928 (8th
Cir. 1965).
224. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(3), 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(3)(ii-iv) (1977).
225. Slee v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 184, 185-86 (2d Cir. 1930) (trier of fact "not obliged to
conclude that the abandonment of what had been so formally declared was final").
226. Hammerstein v. Kelley, 235 F. Supp. 60, 64 (E.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd, 349 F.2d 928 (8th
Cir. 1965).
227. Krohn v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 341, 343 (D. Colo. 1965); Hammerstein v. Kelley,
235 F. Supp. 60, 65 (E.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd, 349 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1965); Haswell v. United
States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1145-47 (Ct. Cl. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975); Connecticut
Light & Power Co. v. United States, 368 F.2d 233, 245 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
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equivalently useful indicators of organizational purposes, intent or
programs.2 28 Perhaps more reliable in the general case, however,
are private organizational files containing copies of correspondence
with sub-units of the organization, 22 9 its members, 230 its agents and
2 32
consultants 23 1 or government officials.
The organization's various publications frequently present a broadranging survey of those activities which it considers most important or
valuable, and cumulatively can provide material for a composite picture which in effect bears its "stamp of approval." 233 Similarly, "the
language, and its import, contained in the [organization's] advertising"
may afford compelling evidence, if the trier of fact pays close attention to the intended "impact of the adroitly worded presentations"
2 34
that often characterize such material.
Study of the policies of the organization, and of the routine activities and work-products of its officials, staff personnel and members
is time-consuming, if an absence of appropriate records does not preclude it to a large extent. But it may prove the most rewarding
source of all for an exhaustive analysis of what the organization and
individuals connected with it actually do from day to day, month to
228. Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 855 (10th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973); Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1137, 1138
(Ct. Cl. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975).
229. League of Women Voters v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 379, 382 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 822 (1960) ("request for action" to state and local affiliates, setting forth organization's position on pending legislation and soliciting lobbying campaign).
230. Hammerstein v. Kelley, 235 F. Supp. 60, 64 (E.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd, 349 F.2d 928 (8th
Cir. 1965) (letter from organization's legislative committee urging support of and opposition to
named candidates in election).
231. Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1137-38 (Ct. Cl. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1107 (1975).
232. Id.
233. Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 855 (10th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973). E.g., id. (monthly magazine, weekly "intelligence
report," newspaper column, pamphlets, leaflets, transcripts of radio. broadcasts, tapes, records);
American Hardware & Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 202 F.2d 126, 128 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 814 (1953) (unidentified "publications" including "printed pamphlets"); Roberts Dairy
Co. v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 948, 949 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 865 (1952) (bulletins
and unidentified "literature"); Krohn v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 341, 344 (D. Colo. 1965)
(bulletin); Hammerstein v. Kelley, 235 F. Supp. 60, 64 (E.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd, 349 F.2d 828
(8th Cir. 1965) (bulletin); Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1137 (Ct. Cl. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975) (report, brochure, survey, press releases); League of Women Voters v, United States, 180 F. Supp. 379, 381-82 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 822 (1960)
(organization's "official publication"); Rev. Rul. 62-71, 1962-1 C.B. 85 (books, pamphlets).
234. Consumers Power Co. v. United States, 299 F. Supp. 1180, 1183 (E.D. Mich. 1969),
aff'd, 427 F.2d 78 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). Accord, Cammarano v. United
States, 358 U.S. 498, 501, 502 (1959); Consumers Power Co., 427 F.2d at 79; Southwestern
Elec. Power Co. v. United States, 312 F.2d 437, 440, 442 (Ct. Cl. 1963); Hammerstein v.
Kelley, 235 F. Supp. 60, 64 (E.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd, 349 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1965).
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month, and year to year. 235 Moreover, recorded patterns of individual behavior tend to support conclusions more objective than those
which rest upon interpretations of vague or purposefully equivocal
language in documents intended for consumption by the membership-at-large or the general public. In sum, a political-action organization itself provides the best evidence of its substantial activities and
essential nature.
5. The NEA as a political-action organization
The NEA is the largest and most militant of contemporary publicsector unions, and therefore is a fit subject for analysis according to
the criteria of political action, substantiality and essentiality I have
defined. Furthermore, abundant evidence in the public record establishes beyond peradventure that the NEA is engaged in every variety
and form of political activism which we have heretofore surveyed, and
that its involvement is both substantial and essential.
This result is not accidental. For at least the last decade, the NEA
has systematically attempted to increase and intensify its involvement
in activism under the banner of so-called "teacher power." Even as
early as 1973, for example, NEA President Helen Wise was able to
remark enthusiastically that"[t]he thrill of leading the NEA" derived
from knowing
that the teacher activist movement is under way in varying degrees
in every state in the nation, and knowing that the NEA is really in
motion. 236When this gigantic machine starts to move, nothing will
stop it.

And only two years later, her eventual successor in office, John Ryor,
could report exultantly that
[t]he question of NEA's ability to achieve 'teacher power' has been
answered definitively in the past several years. In that time, the
term has grown from a wistful cliche to an unchallengeable reality.
We've learned the components of power ... and we've tested ourselves in every important battlefield: the halls of Congress, state
legislatures, the courts of the nation, and, when necessary, on the
pavements in front of school buildings. NEA is teacher power in
1975.237
235. See, e.g., Krohn v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 341, 345, 349 (D. Colo. 1965); Kuper v.
Commissioner, 332 F.2d 562, 562-63 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 920 (1964); American
Hardware & Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 202 F.2d 126, 128 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
814 (1953); Roberts Dairy Co. v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 948, 950 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 865 (1952); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. United States, 368 F.2d 233, 245 (Ct. CI.
1966).
236. NEA REP., Aug., 1973, at 3.

237.

TODAY'S EDUCATION,

Nov.-Dec., 1975, at 5.

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:293

NEA spokesmen have been no less vocal and candid in describing the
components of teacher power-the means to the NEA's "acquisition
and consolidation of a power base" in American society, in such
familiar terms as "plans of political action," "the expansion and extension of ... lobbying," "improving the public image of teachers,"
"legal-aid funds," and "organizing for the concentration of teacher
energy behind a goal and a single strategy"-that is, in terms of
partisan politics, lobbying, propaganda and agitation, litigation and
organizing.238 Moreover, the NEA has confined neither its pronouncements nor its programs to glittering generalities or halfhearted endeavors.
In the realm of partisan politics, the organization has worked indefatigably to construct a political machine of which even the most successful of American political bosses would be envious. In 1973, NEA
President Wise described with excitement
the tremendous ground swell of teacher activism that is making
NEA a potent force in the political arena. Teachers everywhere are
contributing their time, talents, and money to achieve the political
clout we must have to elect candidates who will support [NEA
policies]. 239
The very next year, NEA President James Harris announced that this
"ground swell of teacher activism" was no ephemeral phenomenon.
"Education is in the political arena," he declared,
and I intend to keep it there. Every politician in the country now
knows that teacher power is necessary for 24a 0successful campaign.
This will be even more true in the future.
And by 1975, the future had arrived. "Teachers," said Harris,
are now recognized as one of the most formidable forces in national
politics. We are rivaling-and in some cases even surpassing-in
have
political influence other major national organizations 2which
41
been in this business a lot longer than teachers have.

If the comprehensive nature of, and the NEA's commitment to, its
program of intervention and participation in partisan political campaigns of candidates for election to public office at the local, state and
national levels are any indication, Harris was indisputably correct.
238. NEA REP., Jan., 1976, at 3; id., Aug., 1973, at 2; 1975 NEA Representative Assembly
Proceedings 12.
239. NEA REP., Oct., 1973, at 3.
240. 1974-75 NEA Handbook 6 (emphasis retained).
241. TODAY AT THE NEA, July 9, 1975, at 1. Accord, 1975 NEA Representative Assembly
Proceedings 8-9; NEA Now, Nov. 24, 1975, at 4; NEA REP., Dec., 1974, at 8.
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For example, the NEA and its chartered affiliates regularly collect,
organize, analyze and publish political data, such as tallies of votes by
individual members of Congress and state legislatures on legislative
issues related to NEA objectives or policies. 24 2 The organization also
"maintain[s] liaison with" and intervenes in the internal affairs
of
traditional political parties. 243 In 1975 and 1976, for an important
instance, the NEA and its affiliates conducted a massive nationwide
campaign to mobilize their members to seek selection as "delegates to
both major political party conventions in an effort to have a voice in
party platforms as well as in helping to select party nominees." 244 As
a result of this effort, NEA members constituted "the largest bloc of
delegates and alternates of any single organization in the nation" at
the Democratic National Convention. 245 And NEA officials addressed party platform committees, while members won election to
party governing bodies. 246 Perhaps most impressive, though, was
the NEA's participation in the Labor Coalition Clearinghouse, an ad
hoc alliance of nine organizations, one goal of which was "to influence
the candidates' positions on issues of concern to [the organizations']
2 47
members."
Endorsement of candidates and solicitation of votes are important
aspects of the NEA's partisan political program. Since 1970, the organization has endorsed candidates for election to Congress, including
310 individuals in 48 states in 1974, and 349 in 49 states in 1976.248
In 1976, it made its first presidential endorsement as well, through an
extraordinarily comprehensive procedure. 249 Indeed, before 1976,
no national membership organization other than the traditionally rec242. E.g., NEA REP., Oct., 1976, at 7-9; id., Mar., 1976, at 9-11; id., Oct., 1974, at 8-10.
243. 1975 NEA Representative Assembly Proceedings 8-9.
244. NEA REP., Feb., 1976, at 2. Descriptive articles appear in id., Oct., 1976, at 4-5; id.,

Sept., 1976, at 8-9; id., Apr., 1976, at 2; id., Dec., 1975, at 8; NEA Now, Jan. 12, 1976, at 2.
245. E.g., NEA News Release, Sept. 24, 1976, at 1-2 (265 NEA delegates and alternates at
Democratic Convention, 55 at Republican).
246. On testimony, see NEA REP., Sept., 1976, at 5 (NEA President John Ryor addresses
Republican Platform Committee); id., June, 1976, at 2 (NEA Executive Director Terry Herndon
addresses Democratic Platform Committee). On party offices, see id., May-June, 1977, at 4
(NEA member on executive committee of Democratic National Committee). The last-mentioned
article also refers to the election to a party post of "an NEA political consultant [who] maintains
relationships with the White House and both major political parties and aids teachers in their
efforts to be full partners in the political process, as voters, campaigners, and candidates" -thus
emphasizing the integrated nature of the NEA's partisan political activities.
247. NEA REP., Sept., 1976, at 6; NEA Now, Mar. 22, 1976, at 1.
248. NEA REP., Dec., 1976, at 1-3; id., Apr., 1976, at 3; id., Dec., 1974, at 8-9; NEA News
Release, Nov. 5, 1976; NEA Now, Mar. 22, 1976, at 1.
249. The evolution of the NEA endorsement procedure appears in NEA REP., Oct., 1976, at
1-6; id., June, 1976, at 8; id., Mar., 1976, at 2; id., Jan., 1976, at 2; TODAY'S EDUCATION,
Mar.-Apr., 1976, at 3.
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ognized political parties had ever implemented a process for involving
its members in the endorsement of a presidential candidate as
thorough as that the NEA created. 250 The immense effort, however,
seemed worthwhile in light of an NEA survey which suggested that
the organization's action would favorably influence over ninety percent of its almost two million members. 251 NEA Executive Director
Terry Herndon also expressed his belief that the NEA endorsement
would "impres[s]" its members, the "individuals ... they contact"
and "many other people" among the general public. 252 In any event,
the NEA has decided to "'re-embrace' the concept of endorsing a
253
presidential candidate" in future years.
Neither the NEA nor its affiliates have been lax in implementing
schemes for the solicitation, receipt and distribution of monies for
partisan political purposes. The NEA-PAC, the NEA's "independent
political-action arm" and self-styled "teachers' voice in politics,"
serves as a conduit for funds destined to support the campaigns of
candidates for election to national office. 25 4 "NEA policy calls for
state affiliates to devise a plan to collect a $1 voluntary contribution
from all members each membership year for NEA-PAC," and the
NEA offers special incentives for affiliates to pursue this objective
diligently.255 One of the most effective collection devices utilized, to
date is the "reverse check-off," under which an automatic payroll
deduction siphons the one-dollar voluntary contribution to the
NEA-PAC absent an explicit dissent and request for refund by the
aggrieved member.2 56 NEA partisans predictably rationalize the reverse check-off as an efficacious means "to participate in our democratic society" and to fulfill the purported "duty [of every citizen] to
contribute to political campaigns," 25 7 but the courts disagree as to its
258
legality under federal election campaign laws.
250. See NEA REP., Apr., 1975, at 5.

251. Id., Oct., 1975, at 12-13.
252. Transcript, supra note 161, at 17.

253. Education Daily, July 21. 1977, at 4.
254. "NEA-PAC" stands for the National Education Association Political Action Committee, a
general description of which appears in NEA REP., Oct., 1977, at 11-12; id., Dec., 1974, at 11.
NEA regularly publishes detailed tables of NEA-PAC endorsements and contributions. E.g.,
id., Dec., 1976, at 3; id., Dec., 1974, at 8-9,
255. Id., May, 1976, at 3; id., Apr., 1975, at 5.
256. Id., May, 1975, at 6-7.
257. Id. at 6 (remarks of secretary of local NEA affiliate). See also NEA Resolution G-1, "The
Educator as a Citizen," which affirms "the duty and responsibility of educators to involve themselves in the selection, election, and reelection of qualified, committed candidates who support
the established goals [of the NEA]." 1976-77 NEA Handbook 228.
258. See the consolidated cases National Right to Work Comm. v. Thomson and Chamberlain
v. Thomson, Nos. 77-387 & 77-435 (D.D.C., opinion filed Aug. 31, 1977) (ordering Federal
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Most campaign laws, however, do not reach personal campaign
services, another area in which the NEA is extremely active.2 59 Indeed, the NEA views the personal services its officials, staff personnel
and members can contribute to campaigns as its greatest partisan
political resource. 2 60 To exploit this resource fully, the
NEA and [its] state and local affiliates ... cooperat[e] through

shared staffing and other programs to provide training and organizing assistance to the growing army of teachers now2 6perma1
nently hooked on the excitement of political involvement.
At leadership training programs throughout the country, the NEA
and its affiliates continuously instruct their members in such campaign techniques as political organization, public relations, direct
mail, telephone banks, door-to-door solicitation, voter registration and
get-out-the-vote activities. 262 That this instruction has more than a
merely academic purpose is notorious.2 6 3 During election years,
highly skilled NEA staff personnel, acting as "election pros," manage,
direct, advise, assist or serve as liaison to campaigns at the local, state
and national levels.2 64 Meanwhile, "[i]n storefront campaign headquarters, in education association offices, in their homes, NEA
teacher-volunteers by the thousands became part-time politicians" by
performing the necessary nuts-and-bolts duties of campaign work-

Election Commission to expedite proceedings on the "reverse check-off'); Federal Election
Comm'n v. NEA, No. 77-1705 (D.D.C., complaint filed Sept. 28, 1977) (enforcement action
against the "reverse check-off').
259. NEA Now, Mar. 22, 1976, at 1 reports that:
[T]he new Federal election law limits NEA [financial] contributions .... But
what teachers can really deliver to their favorites at all levels is not money power,
but people power.
Teachers-articulate, respected, persuasive individuals, perfectly distributed in
every town and hamlet in America-make uniquely effective block captains, phone
bank organizers, get-out-the-vote workers, canvassers. Teachers who volunteer for
these and the many other nuts-and-bolts political chores that need to be done provide their candidate with a service money can't buy.
260. NEA REP., Apr., 1975, at 4. This attitude is amazing in view of the NEA-PAC's estimate that NEA and its state and local affiliates "made available to candidates" somewhere between $2.5 and 3.0 million in monetary contributions in 1974. Id. What enormous sum must its
(unreported) members' campaign services be worth?
261. NEA Now, Mar. 22, 1976, at 1.
262. E.g., NEA REP., Dec., 1974, at 12-13. NEA Political Action Series (NEA Gov't Rel'ns,
n.d.).
263. E.g., National Observer, Oct. 23, 1976, at 3, cols. 1-5.
264. COMMON SENSE, Mar. 22, 1976, at 1 (identifying three such "election pros"); NEA
REP., Dec., 1976, at 2; id., Nov. 1976, at 6; id., Apr., 1976, at 2; id., Nov., 1975, at 2; id.,
Dec., 1974, at 11; NEA News Release, Sept. 24, 1976, at 2; TODAY AT THE NEA, July 29,
1975, at 2.
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ers.2 65 Year after year, NEA members have "beat their brains
out" 266 to deliver "massive support" 267 to political candidates
through direct-mail campaigns, 268 telephone contacts, 269 door-to-door
2 72
canvasses, 270 get-out-the-vote drives 271 and in other ways.
Moreover, their successes have reflected this level of commitment.
In 1976, for instance, the "NEA-PAC scored the highest winning percentage among the large labor, liberal, and conservative interest
groups in support of successful candidates ...
But not only the
figures testify to the NEA's effectiveness as a political-action movement; the successful recipients of its aid are even more vocal in their
praise and thanks. No comment that I have seen has attributed less
than "an important role in [the candidate's] victory" to the NEA
machine. 274 Some have said simply that NEA assistance "figured
very largely," "played a major role," provided "one of the real keys
to ... success," was "the backbone of [the candidate's] organization"
or "probably made the difference." 2 75 But an equal number identified NEA intervention in their campaigns as "critical," "crucial,"
"essential" or (in some other language) decisive. 27 6 Little wonder,
then, that one of the major purposes of the 1975 increase in NEA
membership dues was to maintain, if not to enhance, the organiza277
tion's ability to support partisan political campaigns.
The ultimate purpose of this activism is not merely to elect just any
candidates, however, but rather to elect candidates friendly to the
NEA's objectives in sufficient numbers to guarantee indirect NEA
*"273

265. NEA REP., Nov., 1976, at 1. The AFT operates similarly: "We've mobilized hundreds of
thousands who will be very active in politics at every level," boasted AFT President Albert
Shanker. Transcript, supra note 161, at 17-18.
266. NEA REP., Nov., 1976, at 4 (remarks of Rep. Harold E. Ford, D-Tenn., after his election).
267. Id., Dec., 1976, at 2 (remarks of Hamilton Jordan, Carter campaign director).
268. E.g., TODAY AT THE NEA, Sept. 19, 1975, at 1; NEA REP., Dec., 1974, at 10-11.

269. E.g., id. at 11.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. E.g., id., Nov., 1976, at 7; id., Dec., 1974, at 10; NEA Now, Mar. 22, 1976, at 1.
273. NEA REP., Oct., 1977, at 12 (83%). Indeed, in 22 states, all of the candidates whom the
NEA or its affiliates endorsed were victorious. NEA News Release, Nov. 9, 1976, at 4. In 1974,
the NEA-PAC's winning percentage was equally high. 1975-76 NEA Handbook 45; 1975 NEA
Representative Assembly Proceedings 8-9 (81%).
274. NEA REP., Nov., 1976, at 2; id., Nov., 1975, at 2; TODAY AT THE NEA, Sept. 19, 1975,

at 1.
275. NEA News Release, Nov. 9, 1976, at 6, 4-5, 6, 6, 1; NEA REP., Nov., 1976, at 4.
276. NEA REP., Dec., 1976, at 1-2; NEA News Release, Nov. 9, 1976, at 7, 3, 5, 6; NEA
REP., Apr., 1976, at 2.

277. NEA REP., May, 1975, at 3.
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control over the direction of public policy at the local, state and national levels. Partisan politics, in short, is an adjunct of lobbying.
In the lobbying field, there is hardly any type or category of governmental action which does not come within the NEA's legislative
interests. 278 Therefore the NEA's lobbying activities at the state and
national levels encompass a broad range of subjects, including: appropriations for public education, 2 79 compulsory collective-bargaining
privileges for public employees, 2 0 a cabinet-level department of education, 2 8 1 government-subsidized tuition in colleges and universities, 282 school lunch programs, 28 3 vocational education,28 4 teacher
centers, 2 85 child development, 28 6 affirmative action, 2 8 7 crime and
violence in the public schools, 28 8 copyright laws, 28 9 aid to handicapped children, 2 90 aid to refugees from Indochina, 29 1 revenue shar278. As its legislative committee reported in 1975:
NEA is committed to the maintenance and expansion of civil and human rights
for all Americans, and to the reasonable use of resources to meet critical human
needs. Only when our national priority is justice and dignity for all citizens will
America live up to its ideals and its potential. To this end, NEA will continue to
support legislation which enforces civil, human, and political rights of all citizens,
and to oppose any abridgement of these rights.
. . . NEA also believes that a significant part of the education process takes place
outside the traditional school structure, and that NEA has a responsibility to see
that the other influences experienced by students of all ages are conducive to the
healthy development of the individual within a just and humane society.
Under the broad mantle of this general philosophy, NEA seeks progress on or
achievement of . . . legislation to advance these aims.
Minutes of the NEA Board of Directors' Meeting of May 2-4, 1975, at 704.
279. Federal: NEA REP., Nov., 1976, at 8; id., Apr., 1975, at 2; TODAY AT THE NEA, Mar.
23, 1976, at 1; NEA ADVOCATE, Mar., 1976, at 8; NEA Now, Oct. 20, 1975, at 2'. State: NEA
REP., Mar., 1976, at 8; TODAY AT THE NEA, Feb. 6, 1976, at 2; NEA ADVOCATE, Apr., 1975,
at 8.
280. Federal: NEA REP., Sept., 1977, at 3; id., May-June,. 1977, at 2, 5; id., May, 1976, at 2;
id., Mar., 1976, at 3; id., Dec., 1975, at 4-5; id., Dec., 1974, at 7; id., Dec., 1973, at 11; NEA
News Release, Mar. 15, 1972. State: NEA REP., Oct., 1977, at 14; id., Mar., 1977, at 2; id.,
Nov., 1975, at 4-6; Des Moines Tribune, Jan. 13, 1977, at 1, 4; NEA Now, Sept. 29, 1975, at
I; id., May 27, 1975, at 2.
281. NEA REP., Oct., 1977, at 8-10; id., Sept., 1977, at 11; NEA ADVOCATE, Sept., 1977, at
3.
282. NEA REP., June, 1975, at 2.
283. Id., Nov., 1975, at 2; NEA Now, Oct. 14, 1975, at 1; TODAY AT THE NEA, Oct., 10,
1975, at 1.
284. NEA REP., Nov., 1976, at 8-9; NEA Now, Oct. 11, 1976, at 1.
285. NEA REP., Oct., 1977, at 12-13.
286. TODAY AT THE NEA, Feb. 3, 1976, at 1; id., June 10, 1975, at 1.
287. Id., Dec. 5, 1975, at 2; NEA ADVOCATE, Nov., 1975, at 2.
288. TODAY AT THE NEA, July 9, 1975, at 1.
289. NEA REP., Dec., 1976, at 12; NEA ADVOCATE, June, 1975, at 5.
290. NEA REP., Oct., 1977, at 4-5; id., Jan., 1976, at 2.
291. TODAY AT THE NEA, Nov. 14, 1975, at 2; id., Sept. 19, 1975, at 1; NEA Now, Sept.
22, 1975, at 2.
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ing,2 9 2 retirement and social security, 293 adoption of the metric system, 294 race and sex discrimination, 295 confiscation of privately owned
298 national health insurance, 299
firearms, 296 public works, 29 7 taxation,
price controls on oil, 3 0 0 voting rights, 30 1 housing,30 2 the national
economy, 3 0 3 and the Equal Rights Amendment 3 04 -to name only
30 5
those which the public record highlights.
Such an ambitious program reflects the organization's supreme
confidence in its ability to mobilize powerful resources, in the form of
its officials, staff personnel and members, to exert influence on the
legislative, executive and administrative branches of the local, state
and national governments. 3 0 6 It reflects as well the NEA's ability to
commit considerable sums of money to lobbying efforts. 3 0 7 But,
most importantly, it reflects an intent on the part of NEA leaders to
maximize their political influence. As NEA President George Fischer
said in 1970,
This year, the NEA was identified during a congressional debate as
the second most powerful lobby in Washington, D.C. While this is
I will not be
the highest ranking ever given to our effectiveness,
308
satisfied until we are the most powerful lobby.
Whether the NEA is now the nation's most powerful lobby, I cannot
say. But legislators and the public press, who should be knowledge292. NEA Now, Mar. 15, 1976, at 2; NEA ADVOCATE, Apr., 1975, at 3.
293. NEA REP., Sept., 1977, at 5-6; NEA ADVOCATE, Sept., 1977, at 3.
294. Id., Nov., 1975, at 2; NEA REP., Dec., 1974, at 3.
295. NEA ADVOCATE, Sept., 1977, at 3; TODAY AT THE NEA, Nov. 14, 1975, at 1.
296. NEA REP., Feb., 1977, at 9; TODAY AT THE NEA, Oct. 10, 1975, at 2.
297. NEA REP., Feb., 1977, at 11; id., Sept., 1976, at 12.
298. Id., Dec., 1974, at 3.
299. Id., Jan., 1976, at 2; Minutes of the NEA Executive Committee Meeting of Feb. 9-10 &
24 and Mar. 8, 1976, at 443-44; NEA Now, Nov. 17, 1975, at 2.
300. NEA REP., Nov., 1977, at 3; Minutes of the NEA Board of Directors Meeting of Nov.
15-16, 1974, at 490.
301. NEA News Release, Sept. 24, 1976, at 2.
302. Minutes of the NEA Executive Committee Meeting of Feb. 10-12 & 24, 1975, at 346.
303. Minutes of the NEA Board of Directors Meeting of June 30 & July 2 & 5, 1975, at 746;
Minutes of the NEA Executive Committee Meeting of Sept. 16-17, 1974, at 278.
304. Education Daily, Aug. 30, 1977, at 1-2; NEA REP., Mar., 1977, at 8-11; id., Apr., 1976,
at 4.
305. NEA regularly publishes synopses and descriptions of its legislative programs. E.g., 95th
Congress: NEA ADVOCATE, Sept., 1977, at 3; 94th Congress: NEA REP., June, 1976, at 12-13;
id., May, 1976, at 2; id., Feb., 1976, at 10; 93rd Congress: id., Oct., 1973, at 14-15.
306. E.g., NEA ADVOCATE, Nov., 1977, at 3, reports as follows on an override of a presidential veto of an educational appropriations bill: "NEA Governmental Relations staff credited the
victory to two factors: NEA's major effort to elect a pro-education Congress in the 1974 elections and NEA's ability to call upon a well-organized army of teacher lobbyists in the 50 states."
307. NEA REP., Sept., 1977, at 6; id., May, 1975, at 3; Education Daily, July 2, 1976, at 2;
NEA Now, Mar. 1, 1976, at 1.
308. Report of the President to the 108th Annual NEA Convention (July 3, 1970).
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able in these matters, regularly credit it and its affiliates with a substantial, oft-times decisive, role in the passage or defeat of various
309
pieces of legislation.
Operationally, the NEA establishes and implements its lobbying
goals through the following general procedure: the NEA Representative Assembly sets basic organizational policy. Staff personnel then
prepare a legislative program designed to further this policy, and the
organization conducts regional hearings nationwide to solicit comments from its membership on the program.3 10 Thereafter, the NEA
Board of Directors adopts the finalized program, and NEA officials,
staff personnel and members perform assorted lobbying tasks in support of the program. Typical activities include collecting, compiling,
analyzing, summarizing and distributing information relating to the
NEA's legislative objectives or policies; drafting or aiding in the preparation of legislation; cooperating with legislative committees or staff
personnel as they make bills ready for floor action; preparing and
presenting testimony on pending or recommended legislation; maintaining continuous contact with legislative committees and individual
legislators; and mobilizing NEA members to participate in demonstrations, rallies, marches and similar direct action, in campaigns of propaganda and agitation, and in grassroots lobbying. 3 11 The NEA also
attempts in sundry ways to influence decisions of executive officials. 312 And, in 1976, establishment of its federal-agency-relations
office "complete[d] full circle NEA's involvement with the federal
313
government."
In light of this massive lobbying effort, an observer might well concede that NEA President Fischer was correct in his prediction, seven
years ago, that
[t]he world has never seen an organization of this magnitude. We
will use our influence ....
I believe the President of the United

309. NEA REP., Oct., 1975, at 1-5; id., Oct., 1974, at 6-7; COMMON SENSE, Sept. 30, 1975,
at 1; NEA Now, Sept. 22, 1975, at 1; Minutes of the NEA Board of Directors Meeting of Sept.
20-21, 1974, at 462-63.
310. E.g., NEA REP. Jan., 1977, at 13.
311. E.g., NEA REP., Mar., 1976, at 8; id., May, 1975, at 2; NEA Now, Sept. 15, 1975, at
3; TODAY AT THE NEA, Sept. 3, 1975; Minutes of the NEA Executive Committee Meeting of
Feb. 10-12 & 24, 1975, at 354.
312. E.g., NEA REP., May-June, 1977, at 4-5; id., Feb., 1977, at 14; id., Oct., 1974, at 4;
NEA ADVOCATE, June, 1975, at 3; Minutes of the NEA Executive Committee Meeting of June
27-28, 1975, at 416; NEA News Release, May 27, 1975; NEA Now, May 12, 1975, at 1; Minutes of the NEA Executive Committee Meeting of Feb. 10-12 & 24, 1975, at 349.
313. NEA News Release, Sept. 24, 1976, at 1 (remarks of NEA government-relations director). See, e.g., NEA Now, Jan. 12, 1976, at 2; TODAY AT THE NEA, Jan. 16, 1976, at 1.
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States will consult with the officers of the [NEA] on all issues of
national importance.3 14
In any event, as a lobbying organization the NEA has few peers.
Third, the NEA also is involved deeply in political propaganda and
agitation. Of course, propaganda and agitation are not unusual adjuncts of the NEA's lobbying efforts. 3 15 But they also may serve the
independent goal of "good public relations." It was not for nothing,
after all, that NEA Executive Director Terry Herndon justified the
organization's 1975 increase in membership dues as necessary in part
to finance "[a]n expanded communications program, one that will take
[the NEA's] story to the general public."-3 16 This program may gain
recognition for an NEA affiliate "as a powerful force in its community," and "increase [its] visibility." 3 17 It may enhance the image of
NEA members and their organization "in the eyes of the public-atlarge and in the eyes of the media which .. .are the shapers of pub-

lic opinion to a great extent." 318 Or the program may establish and
maintain communications between the NEA and "the news media,
service and civic organizations, . . . and other interested groups and

citizens." 3 19 Or it may counter "community animosity" arising as a
result of NEA strikes and other anti-social activities with the
rationalization that "teacher militance is simply an arm of our professionalism." 320
Whatever their purposes, propaganda and agitation are central to
the NEA's program. The organization encourages and assists its state
and local affiliates to engage in campaigns of propaganda and agitation
to promote its objectives and policies. 3 21 And in cooperation with
those affiliates, it mobilizes their officials, staff personnel and mem-

314. Report of the President to the 108th Annual NEA Convention (July 3, 1970).
315. E.g., NEA REP., Jan., 1977, at 11. A good example is the NEA's participation in the
self-styled "Americans for a Working Economy," a coalition of "labor, consumer, environmental,
and civic groups" the apparent purpose of which is to promote some sort of fascist-syndicalist
"national planning" in the United States. See, e.g., NEA REP., Nov., 1976, at 13; NEA Now,
Oct. 4, 1976, at 1; The Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 21, 1976, at 4, cols. 1-3.
316. NEA REP., May, 1975, at 3.

317. NEA Div.

OF AFFILIATE SERVICES,

How

TO NEGOTIATE: A HANDBOOK FOR LOCAL

12 (1969).
318. NEA Now, Feb. 9, 1976, at 3. For examples, see NEA REP., May-June, 1977, at 6-9;
id., Aug., 1973, at 11; TODAY AT THE NEA, Mar. 23, 1976, at 2; NEA Now, Mar. 8,
1976, at 2; id., Nov. 24, 1975, at 2; id., Nov. 17, 1975, at 2-3; id., Oct. 28, 1975, at 4 (Minnesota Educ. Ass'n also uses television commercials in filmstrip form to indoctrinate its own
members).
319. Supra note 317.
320. TODAY AT THE NEA, Jan. 16, 1976, at 1; NEA Now, Nov. 17, 1975, at 1.
321. E.g., NEA Now, Nov. 17, 1975, at 1, 2-3; id., Oct. 20, 1975, at 4.
TEACHER ASSOCIATIONS
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bers to participate in these campaigns. 3 22 Indeed, public relations
perform such a vital role for the NEA that they constitute a separate
"support system" within the organization-a "[c]ornmunications plan"
established "so that members, potential members, and the public will
know, understand, and respect the voice of the teaching profes32 3
sion."
Fourth, litigation is also a vital component of the NEA's program of
political activism. 3 24 The organization has supported lawsuits involving course content, 3 2 5 dress codes for teachers, 32 6 corporal
punishment in public schools, 3 2 7 reverse discrimination in institutions
of higher learning,3 2 8 sex bias, 3 2 9 denial of state financial aid to
parochial schools, 330 support for the NAACP, 331 war resistance 332 and
the power of unions to deny nonunion employees access to the
courts. 333 It is unnecessary to investigate the merits of these numerous cases in detail, however, to conclude that, for the NEA, litigation
is merely another proficuous means to political ends. Much of this
litigation has involved the DuShane Emergency Fund, which an NEA
pamphlet has eloquently and inextricably connected to NEA political
endeavors. 334 Evidently, each of the "citizens activities" involved in
322. E.g., TODAY AT THE NEA, Mar. 23, 1976; NEA Now, Mar. 8, 1976, at 2; id., Feb. 22,
1976, at 4; id., Feb. 9, 1976, at 3; id., Feb. 2, 1976, at 4; id., Nov. 24, 1975, at 2; id., Nov. 17,
1975, at 2, 3; id., Oct. 28, 1975, at 4; id., Oct. 6, 1975, at 3; id., Sept. 22, 1975, at 3; id., May
5, 1975, at 2; NEA REP., Aug., 1973, at 11.
323. 1976-77 NEA Handbook 47. NEA "'support services exist to facilitate and support programs for the achievement of NEA goals and objectives." "Communications" is one of three
such services. Id.
324. For an historical analysis of the NEA's socio-political activism in the courts, see generally
M. DONLEY, JR., POWER TO THE TEACHER 178-90 (1976).
325. NEA REP., Oct., 1977, at 14; id., Sept., 1977, at 11.
326. NEA REP., Sept., 1977, at 11.
327. Id., May-June, 1977, at 4; NEA ADVOCATE, June-July, 1977, at 2.
328. NEA REP., Oct., 1977, at 3.
329. Id., May, 1976, at 5; id., Dec., 1974, at 6; NEA Now, Jan. 26, 1976, at 2; id., Nov. 24,
1975, at 1; NEA ADVOCATE, Apr., 1975, at 8.

330. Through the National Coalition for Public Education and Religious Liberty (PEARL).
TODAY AT THE NEA, Feb. 13, 1976, at 2; id., June 17, 1975, at 1; NEA ADVOCATE, Sept.,
1975, at 2.
331. NEA REP., Nov., 1976, at 12; NEA Now, Oct. 11, 1976, at 3.
332. NEA REP., May, 1976, at 5.
333. COMMON SENSE, Feb. 9, 1976, at 1.

334. The NEA, says this diminutive document,
strongly advocates participation by educators in political and legislative activities as
well as advocacy of social, economic, and political reform. DuShane-supported lawsuits are initiated to ensure broader constitutional protection for educators as they
pursue the following kinds of citizen activities:
Organizing associations and political groups
Negotiating collective bargaining agreements
Petitioning officials for redress of grievances
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DuShane litigation is political in nature, all of them being aspects of
petition, partisan politics, lobbying or organizing.3 3 5
Finally, there are the NEA's organizing activities. The NEA is
deeply involved in establishing new state and local affiliates, and in
increasing the membership of those that now exist. 3 36 The practical
political purpose of this, as NEA President James Harris said in 1973,
is to "create a force which will be so effective politically and legislatively that no politician in his right mind would dare to put [the NEA]
3 37
on his enemy list."
For years, to the NEA "lt]he purpose of organizing" has been "not
merely to exert an influence on a particular campus, but to exert an
influence at the state and federal level as well." 338 "Organize for bargaining," advised NEA President John Ryor in 1975. "Then, simultaneously use your collective power to jump into politics with both
feet."- 3 39 But even before Ryor's election, NEA members had taken
such advice to heart. Indeed, his predecessor concluded in the very
same year that, because the NEA had a "unique network of 10,000
state and local affiliates that reach into every corner of the country;'
because it has "an unequalled body of educated, sophisticated, articulate, and concerned personnel;" and because it is "increasingly
becoming a well-oiled, smooth-functioning, integrated organization
operating cooperatively at ... local, state, and national [levels]"-in
short, because of its prowess in organizing, it already had "awesome
potential power." 3 40 And, most recently, NEA Executive Director
Terry Herndon echoed this confident view when he called on NEA

Campaigning for election to public office
Participating in campaigns

Assuming public office
Working in voter registration drives and other civil rights activities
Taking independent positions which may not agree with those of school
boards or administrators on educational matters, including tax levies,
fiscal policies, or the status of an educational institution
Writing and speaking on matters of public concern
NEA DuShane Emergency Fund Pamphlet, stock no. 6668-5 (n.d.). See NEA REP., Oct., 1977,
at 14; id., Mar., 1977, at 12; NEA ADVOCATE, June-July, 1977, at 1, 3.
335. Consider, e.g., NEA's participation as amicus curiae in a case that involved no NEA
members but that allegedly affected "the civil rights of all teachers," NEA REP., Feb., 1977, at
11.
336. Id., Jan., 1977, at 11-12, 13; NEA ADVOCATE, Sept., 1977, at 7-8; id., Nov., 1975, at 2,
5, 8; Minutes of the NEA Executive Committee Meeting of Sept. 16-18, 1974, at 278, 282.
337. NEA REP., Aug., 1973, at 13.
338. NEA ADVOCATE, Nov., 1975, at 5 (remarks of former chairman of NEA higher education council).
339. Id., Sept., 1975, at 4.
340. NEA REP., Sept., 1975, at 14.
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members to "organize, mobilize, and demand political responses by
the Congress and the legislatures" to NEA demands, "organize and
mobilize two million teachers to carry the fight into every community,
every political campaign, every party meeting, every legislative session, and every school board meeting in the United States." 34 1
The NEA's organizing activities extend as well to coalitions with
other groups. With the AFSCME, for example, the NEA has established a policy of "[r]eciprocal support ... in organizing and concerted collective activities such as strikes or political campaigns,"
which calls for "[c]oordinated legal activity," "[c]oordinated political
activity," and "cooperative public information programs." 342 More
ambitiously, the NEA was a moving force behind formation of the
Coalition of American Public Employees (CAPE), an alliance of public-sector unions whose purpose is "to provide a means of marshalling
and coordinating the legislative, legal, financial, and public relations
resources of the member organizations in matters of common concern." 343 "We have seen firsthand," explained the CAPE's Executive
Director,
the intensified clout, at both the national and state levels, that
comes from pooling our legal, legislative, economic, and public relations resources behind a common cause through an organized,
formalized arrangement. 3 4
And NEA Executive Director Herndon concurred, boasting that
"each new Coalition partner boosts our strength manyfold." '3 45
Not
surprisingly, CAPE faithfully reflects, as well as magnifies, the political activism of its member-organizations.346 And, to advance particular political goals on an ad hoc basis, the NEA regularly instigates
the formation of or joins existing groups, such as Common Cause, the
Citizens Committee for a Cabinet Department of Education, the
Council on National Priorities, and the Project on Budget Priorities
34 7
for the United States.

341. Id., Sept., 1977, at 5 (remarks at 1977 NEA Representative Assembly).
342. Minutes of the NEA Executive Committee Meeting of Apr. 28-29 & May 2, 1975, at
389, 405. See, e.g., NEA REP., Jan., 1977, at 13; Education Daily, Dec. 3, 1976, at 1-2.
343. 1976-77 NEA Handbook 60.
344. NEA REP., Dec., 1974, at 2.
345. Id., Apr., 1975, at 18.
346. Id., Nov., 1976, at 12 (CAPE endorsement of Carter-Mondale ticket); id., Dec., 1974,
at 7 (CAPE testimony before Congress on behalf of federal collective-bargaining law).
347. Minutes of the NEA Executive Committee Meeting of Sept. 16-18, 1974, at 281; NEA
REP., Oct., 1977, at 8; id., Apr., 1975, at 2; Minutes of the NEA Executive Committee Meeting of Dec. 16, 1974 & Jan. 19, 1975, at 342.
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In sum, the NEA engages extensively in each and every activity
which characterizes a political-action organization even when pursued
in isolation. If the NEA is a political-action organization, then, it is
one of the most virulent forms yet examined in any literature I have
seen. The ultimate conclusion depends, of course, on the substantiality or essentiality of its political activism. But these matters require
little further discussion. It would not be appropriate here to undertake a detailed analysis of the NEA's budget to determine how much
of its nearly fifty million dollar income it expends for political activities. My purpose is not to prove according to the rules of evidence
that the NEA is a political-action organization, but only to suggest
according to the rules of inference that it may be one.
However, nothing precludes me from suggesting that the reader
peruse the NEA Resolutions 3 48 or New Business 349 for the last several years, or study the NEA Program Structure 35 0 over the same
period of time. I have done so at some length, and have convinced
myself that fully three-quarters of the NEA's activity, as the NEA
describes it there, is political in nature. Most of the rest is inadequately described, thus preventing accurate characterization. This
than what courts
amount, I need not emphasize, is significantly 3more
51
have held to be substantial in other contexts.
Furthermore, nothing precludes me from citing the NEA's own
admission that it expended approximately three percent of its 19761977 budget for the administration of the NEA-PAC, the endorsement of partisan political candidates for election to public office, and
lobbying not germane (in its view) to collective bargaining (as it
defines the term). 35 2 Since its program budget for that fiscal year
totalled approximately forty-nine million dollars, the NEA thus has
conceded political expenditures of almost one and one-half million
dollars, or nearly half again as much as the income tax regulations

348. 1976-77 NEA Handbook 194-234; 1975-76 NEA Handbook 185-219; 1974-75 NEA
Handbook 232-64; 1973-74 NEA Handbook 57-90; 1972-73 NEA Handbook 50-83; 1971-72 NEA
Handbook 67-95; 1970-71 NEA Handbook 67-88.
349. 1976-77 NEA Handbook 237-50; 1975-76 NEA Handbook 222-32; 1974-75 NEA Handbook 266-70; 1973-74 NEA Handbook 93-99; 1972-73 NEA Handbook 84-89; 1971-72 NEA
Handbook 96-100; 1970-71 NEA Handbook 89-90.
350. 1976-77 NEA Handbook 31-52; 1975-76 NEA Handbook 29-49; 1974-75 NEA Handbook
37-59; 1973-74 NEA Handbook 131-50; 1972-73 NEA Handbook 118-39; 1971-72 NEA Handbook 25-29, 101-04; 1970-71 NEA Handbook 24-29, 62-65.
351. Supra notes 206-07 & accompanying text.
352. NEA REP., Sept., 1976, at 14 ("preliminary determination" of 2.9% of budget expended
on "political activity" subject to. "rebate" to dissenters).
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hold to be substantial. 3 53 Actually, its political spending was significantly higher than this, judging from its further admission that more
than two and one-half million dollars constituted its expenditures for
all forms of lobbying and partisan-political activism, including those
not germane (in its view) to collective bargaining (as it defines the
term).35 4 And these amounts, even if they do not minimize woefully
what the NEA spent, fail to include any political costs which its state
and local affiliates incurred during the fiscal year in question.
Moreover, nothing precludes me from referring the reader to some
illuminating statements of NEA leaders which bear on this issue. For
example, NEA President George Fischer spoke of "power and influence attained through politics" as long ago as 1970:
Since every decision which we live by, teach by, is a political decision determined by elected politicians, we must begin to influence
the forces which control our functions, our finances and our futures.
Therefore, we in the [NEA] must first determine that we are no
longer just Republicans or Democrats,
but that we have only one
355
real overriding party-education.
I encourage the reader to consider the statement "we are no longer
just Republicans or Democrats ....
we have only one real overriding
party-education." By "education," Fischer could have meant only
education as the NEA sees it. Therefore, I submit, in this speech
Fischer announced the formation of a new political entity in American
life: a political party dedicated to the special interests of a single
economic group or profession, a "special interest political party" for
education. Now, for a special interest political party, political activism
is essential, by hypothesis. But we need not leave such conclusions to
mere inference. In 1975, NEA Executive Secretary Terry Herndon
justified a proposed increase in NEA membership dues by arguing
that
[i]f no dues increase is forthcoming, NEA will have no choice but
to reduce its program of membership service ...
Efforts in other areas-political action, legal defence, communications, legislation, negotiations, human and civil rights-have
taken our Association from a relatively somnolent organization in
the 1950's to the powerful, activist voice for teachers and students

353. Id. at 2 (program budget of $48.7 million for fiscal year 1976-77, of which $1.4 million
represents "non-collective-bargaining" lobbying and partisan political costs). On the income tax
standard of $1 million, see note 208, supra.
354. Id., Sept., 1976, at 2 (all lobbying and partisan political expenditures total $2.6 million).
355. Report of the President to the 108th Annual NEA Convention (July 3, 1970).
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of the Asit is today. To slice away these programs, the lifeblood
356
sociation, would be to take a giant step backward.
I encourage the reader to consider these words with care. What sort
of organization has no choice but to put political activism ahead of
nonpolitical membership services, except a political-action organization? What is the essence of an organization the lifeblood of which is
political activism, except political activism? But these questions answer themselves.
And the anwers permit us to proceed on the premise that the NEA
is a political-action organization in fact and law. Moreover, as we shall
now discover, the logic of public-sector unionism establishes an even
stronger case for this premise than does the law of political-action
organizations.
C. The Logical Necessity for Public-Sector Unions
to Function as Political-Action Organizations
As I noted earlier, the contemporary law of political-action organizations is in many respects incomplete. A complementary, and
perhaps in the long run more satisfactory, approach is to consider the
logic of the situation, in terms of the philosophy and goals of contemporary public-sector unionism, and the inherently political nature of
public-sector employment.
1. The desire of public-sector unions to attain control over public
employers
The goal of contemporary public-sector unionism is to control the
actions of public employers for the benefit of unions, their members
and their adherents. The movement aims "to exercise restraining or
directing influence over; to dominate; regulate;

. . .

overpower" in

fact, and perhaps, with the aid of the state, to acquire the legal "right
to exercise a . . . governing influence over" employers. 3 57 That control in this sense is the objective of contemporary public-sector
unions, the unions themselves brashly proclaim. An NEA handbook
on collective bargaining, for instance, disdains the "language of compromise" in an agreement between a teachers' union and a public
356. NEA REP., May, 1975, at 3. The "lifeblood" metaphor is a common one. E.g.,
GREENEBAUM, Book Review, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Nov., 1974, at 71-72 ("political clout [is]
the life blood of public unionism"). See also NEA REP., Sept., 1976, at 3 (remarks of NEA

President John Ryor, referring to certain "legislative matters which [are] indispensable" to NEA
goals).
357. WEBSTER'S, supra note 100, at 580; BLACK'S, supra note 102, at 399.
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employer. "Such language," it warns, "allows the [employer] a large
measure of unilateral discretion ... and, therefore, is nearly always
inappropriate .. "358 Indeed, employer discretion of any kind contravenes the emphatic NEA dogma that "It]eachersshould have the
right to share the authority for decision making which affects
them. "359
This "right to share the authority for decision making," however, is
not a claim to exercise merely some relatively minor and inconsequential "restraining or directing influence" over public employers.
Rather, it is an arrant demand to participate fully in "bilateral decision making." 3 60 In the words of AFSCME President Jerry Wurf,
unionized "teachers are fighting for the dignity of collectively dealing
with [their employers] as peers, rather than as supplicants." For him,
public-sector collective bargaining is "a power relationship where
public officials and policy makers respect [unions] as equals." 36 1 With
a remarkable degree of candor, one NEA staff person admitted that
organized teachers have [the same goal] all over the country-they
want control of their profession. They feel that they are the experts-that they have a right to be the determining agent in curriculum and textbook selection and in other programs.
We are looking forward to the time when we will have teams of
teachers in each school building-where it is not the principal who
looks upon himself as the master of the teachers and who tells
teachers what to do. Teachers want to share in decision-making.
S.. [W]e are moving in this direction and getting stronger all the
362
time.

Indeed, this is the openly avowed strategy of NEA teacher power:
first undermine the unilateral authority of public employers; then
demand to share their authority as equals; and, at length, assume
unchallengeable dominance over public education through a form of
fascist-syndicalist "industrial self-government." 3 63

358. NEA Div. OF AFFILIATE SERVICES, How TO NEGOTIATE: A HANDBOOK FOR LOCAL
TEACHER ASSOCIATIONS 18 (1969).

359. Id. at 6 (emphasis retained).
360. Id. at iv.
361. NEA REP., Oct., 1974, at 4; DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Current Dev. Sect. (July 5,
1973).
362. NEA REP., Jan., 1976, at 11.

363. The NEA's scheme of "teacher power" rests on the contention "that classroom teachers
can be accountable only to the degree that they share responsibility in educational decisionmaking." NEA Resolution 76-44, "Accountability and Assessment," 1976-77 NEA Handbook
223. This means first, that "[t]eachers must select instructional materials without censorship"-as, for instance, from the parents whose children the teachers will expose to these
materials; and second, that the "primary authority to make educational changes should lie with
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Moreover, this desire to attain control over public employers is no
wistful fantasy of public-sector-union leaders; nor is their ambitious
strategy merely an impotent dream. To the contrary, the desire finds
a practical means of fulfillment in militant political activism, and the
strategy, an at least partial embodiment in compulsory public-sector
collective bargaining. I emphasize the adjective "compulsory," because it is this aspect of contemporary public-sector labor relations
which should enlist our especial attention and concern. No common
law principle prevents willing parties on both sides, in either the
private or the public sector, from engaging in voluntary collective
bargaining. But voluntary bargaining, no less than full freedom of association, is antithetical to the collectivistic imperatives of the modern
trade-union movement. Coercion, not freedom, is congenial-indeed, imperative-to the fascist-syndicalist mind. And therefore the
contemporary institution of statutory collective bargaining, based as it
is upon the philosophy of fascist-syndicalism, relies upon compulsive
364
measures at every turn.
With respect to public-sector employees, the preeminent coercive
device is exclusive representation, the means by which unions and
their accomplices in government abridge the freedom of dissenters
not to associate with the organizations' programs of political activism. 365 Once a majority of employees in an appropriate bargaining
the teachers through their influence and involvement in democratic decision-making in and out
of the school" -rather than, for example, with the taxpayers who provide the financial resources
to support the public schools. NEA Resolutions D-2, "Selection of Materials and Teaching
Techniques," and B-i, "Improvement of Instruction," 1976-77 NEA Handbook 216, 199. The
NEA then demands that "the [teaching] profession must govern itself," in terms of assuming
"legal responsibility for determining policy and procedures for teacher certification," controlling
entrance into the profession and serving as the "single national non-governmental agency" for
accrediting all teachers. NEA Resolutions F-i, "Professional Autonomy," 76-35, "Teacher Education," and C-3, "Accreditation of Teacher Preparation Institutions," 1976-77 NEA Handbook
227, 213, 212. Finally, the NEA puts itself forward as fit not only "to participate in the evaluation of the quality of[teachers'] services," but also to "evaluate supervisory and administrative
personnel and [school board] members." NEA Resolution C-2, "Evaluation and Subjective Ratings," 1976-77 NEA Handbook 211. In sum, teacher power envisions a guild system of a new
and frightening kind. Not only is it to be insulated from competition, and therefore irresponsible to consumers, but also empowered by government both to require the consumers of public
education to accept whatever services the profession (that is, the NEA) deigns to provide and to
force the taxpayers to subsidize the provision of those services, no matter how shoddy in quality
or excessive in cost.
364. On fascist-syndicalism as the basis of contemporary labor law, and especially of the exclusive representation device, see Syndicalism, supra note 2, at 572-610.
365. In privare-sector employment the primary coercive tool of contemporary unions is still, I
imagine, direct action-for example, violent and intimidating strike-threat tactics. Of course,
this is not to say that much union activity in the public sector is not unadulterated gangsterism.
See, e.g., Mulcahy & Schweppe, Strikes,. Picketing and Job Actions by Public Employees, 59
MARQ. L. REv. 113, 130 (1976).
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unit designates it as such, a union assumes the status of the exclusive,
or compulsory, representative for all employees in the unit, whether
they voted for it, against it or not at all. Thus, the union represents
all employees with respect to negotiation and of the terms and conditions of their employment, prosecution of their grievances, and (if we
read the Abood plurality opinion broadly) promotion of their interests, as the union perceives them, through partisan politics, lobbying
and other political activities. 3 66 That this status confers singular
power on the union to control the destinies of employees, even the
apologists of compulsory unionism readily concede. In collective bargaining, says Professor Summers, a union is "the employee's economic
government. The union's power is the power to govern." 367
The ultimate purpose of this governing power is not merely to
tyrannize dissenting employees, but also and especially to ensconce
majority unions in a position from which they can usurp, to some
degree, the authority of employers. 36 8 For, as against employers,
the unions' status as exclusive representatives carries with it a legally
enforceable duty to bargain in good faith with respect to every matter
subject to collective bargaining. The collective agreement which determines terms and conditions of employment, then, arises from a
concurrent exercise of authority shared by unions and employers as a
consequence of coercion directed (through employees) against the latter for the benefit of the former. Or, their special privilege to act as
the employees' "economic government," to exercise as to them the
quasi-legislative power to negotiate in good faith through the exclusive representation device, enables public-sector unions derivatively
to exercise a directing or governing influence over employers as
well-in short, to control those employers to some degree.
2. The necessity for political activism if public-sector unions are to
attain control over public employers
Unfortunately for themselves, public-sector unions can exercise
only limited direct control over the nominal employers of their members through good-faith collective bargaining alone. To that extent,
the public and private sectors are similar. Now, in the private sector,
unions can employ several different mechanisms to attempt to control

366. See 431 U.S. at 233-36.
367. Summers, Union Powers and Workers' Rights, 49 MICH. L. REv. 805, 815-16 (1951)
(emphasis added).
368. On the use of the words "tyranny" and "usurpation" as legal terms of art in this context,
see Syndicalism, supra note 2, at 829.
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the ultimate employer, the consuming public, including persuasion,
direct action (such as strikes or boycotts) or state intervention of one
kind or another to curtail the operation of the market mechanism
itself. In the last-mentioned case, they must of course engage in
political activism in order to enlist the aid of government officials or
fonctionnaires in their struggle against society. Historically, however,
reliance by private-sector unions in the United States upon direct
state economic planning has been rare. One can imagine private-sector unions, therefore, which eschew politics altogether, or at least
have minimal contacts with the political process. The situation is
categorically different in public employment, however.
Public employment is unique because the relationship between
public employers and their employees is essentially political in nature.3 69 Indeed, observers characteristically define the relationship
in such terms as a "political connection between the state and a group
of citizens." 370 Even the Abood plurality, in other respects so insensitive to the real issues surrounding compulsory public-sector
unionism, explicitly recognized that decision-making by a public
employer is above all a political process. But because of the inherently political nature of public employment, contemporary public-sector unions must organize for and engage in wide-ranging political activism to the very limit of their resources, if they are to achieve any
meaningful measure of control over public employers.
The source of the uniquely political nature of public employment is
the identity and character of the employer. In the words of Professor
Summers, "[t]he employer is government; the ones who act on behalf
of the employer are public officials; and the ones to whom these officials are answerable are citizens and voters." 3 71 The most important
corollary of this is that all public employment questions are simultaneously and necessarily political questions in three senses: first,
they involve choices, and with increasing frequency critical choices,
which someone must make among competing public policies and conceptions of the general welfare. "Directly at issue," says Summers,
are "the size and allocation of the budget, the tax rates, the level of

369. D. STANLEY, MANAGING LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNDER UNION PRESSURE 24 (1972).
370. Dotson, A General Theory of Public Employment, 16 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 197, 209
(1956).
371. Summers, Public Sector Bargaining: Problems of Governmental Decisionmaking, 44
CINN. L. REV. 669, 670 (1975). In his usual style of petitio principi, however, Summers then
concludes that "[c]ollective bargaining ... must fit within the governmental structure and must
function consistently with our governmental process"-never bothering to make any serious
effort to determine whether, as a matter of principle, it can so "fit" and "function."
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public services, and the long term obligations of the government." 372
Second, elected officials and their appointees must make these
choices in the first instance. "Indeed," adds Summers, "these decisions generally are considered uniquely legislative and not subject to
delegation." 373 And third, the voters to whom those officials are
politically accountable must assume ultimate existential responsibility
for the consequences of their (the officials') choices. However, because in the final analysis all public employment questions are political questions in these three senses, the ultimate public employer with
which any public-sector union must deal is not an administrative body
such as a school board, or a legislature, but rather the public itself.
Public-sector unions, we learn from no less reliable a source than
NEA Executive Director Terry Herndon, "seek partnership with the
public in determining these matters."3 7 4 Neither can public-sector
unions rely exclusively upon compulsory collective bargaining with
administrators, or even lobbying the legislative or executive branches
of government, to achieve their objectives. They must instead develop techniques with which to control or influence the entire political process of representative government. Again, NEA spokesman
Herndon informs us that his union "perceive Is] the absolute need and
responsibility to exert maximum influence on the political system,

. .

. a need for a supportive political environment for an impor-

tant and difficult work." 375
"[P]artnership with the public," "the absoute need and responsibility to exert maximum influence on the political system," "a need
for a supportive political environment" -each of these phrases tells
the same story. As a necessary consequence of the logic of their
position, public-sector unions such as the NEA must strive to gain
political control of every level of the governmental decision-making
process. As exclusive representatives, of course, they must appeal to
the nominal employer of their members through compulsory collective bargaining where that special political privilege exists.3 76 But
they also must engage in lobbying and like activities to influence
legislative, executive, administrative and other governmental action

372. Id. at 672.
373. Id.
374. Speech to the National Press Club, Oct. 9, 1975, quoted in GOV'T EMP. REL. REP.
(BNA), at B20 (Oct. 13, 1975).
375. Id.
376. Note that "'collective-bargaining 'rights"' are generally the result of lobbying, propaganda and agitation, partisan politics, and in some cases direct action-but never of litigation.
See, e.g., Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Unit of N.C. Ass'n of Educators v. Phillips, 381 F.
Supp. 644 (M.D.N.C. 1974).
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which, in the parlance of the Abood plurality, is germane to the operations of their members' nominal employer. This is not simply because public-sector bargaining "provides a formal process for lobbying," although that is obvious enough. 377 It is also because of the
nature of the chain of political authority which most compulsory bargaining laws reflect. Legislative action often remains independent of,
but controlling upon, the results of bargaining. 378 In such a case,
apologists of compulsory public-sector unionism are quick to argue
(correctly, I submit) that public-employee unions "must necessarily
become involved in the 'political process' in order to achieve legislative ratification of negotiated benefits." 3 79 Moreover, to maximize the
effectiveness of bargaining, the unions must engage in propaganda
and agitation designed to drive a political wedge between the public
and those among their representatives who oppose union demands or
refuse to make sufficient concessions. 380 And, when bargaining and
lobbying fail, as they often do, public-sector unions must be prepared
and willing to engage in partisan political campaigns and other forms
of activism, not only to influence the ultimate decision-makers in the
legislative and executive branches of government, but also to pervert
the normally adversary process of bargaining itself by "invad [ing] the
management decision-making structure." 381
377. Simon, The School Finance Decision: Collective Bargaining and Future Finance Systems, 82 YALE L.J. 409, 430 (1973).
378. In Minnesota, for example, the statute provides that
[niothing in this act shall be construed to impair, modify or otherwise alter, or
indicate a policy contrary to the authority of the legislature . ..to establish by law
schedules of rates of pay for its employees or the retirement or other fringe benefits
related to the compensation of such employees.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.66, subd. 6 (Supp. 1977).
379. R. SMITH, H. EDWARDS, & R. CLARK, JR., LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR 1114 (1974). See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.70, subd. 2 (Supp. 1977), which requires

public employers to lobby on behalf of agreements they negotiate with majority unions.
380. Typically,
When the union believes that it will shortly obtain the maximum concessions possible at the bargaining table, it begins a campaign involving newspaper releases and
personal contact of the appropriate elected officials and legislators . . . designed to

create the impression that the government is abusing the employees. .

.

.The ulti-

mate aim . . . is to bring pressure in the form of threatened reprisals at the polls,

loss of political patronage, and outright harassment so that those officials will, in
turn, pressure the governmental bargaining team into modifying its position-thus
yielding further concessions to the union.
Siegel & Kainen, Political Forces in Public Sector Collective Bargaining, 21 CATH. L. REV. 581,
585 (1972).
NEA prides itself on its effectiveness in such propaganda and agitation. E.g., NEA Now,
May 5, 1975, at 2.
381. "Particularly in public school and junior college districts, organized teacher groups have
succeeded in electing their members ... or sympathizers to school and governing boards.
[D]emocratic government does allow almost anyone to run for office, but this tactic may make
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371

There is, however, more. If bargaining, lobbying, propaganda and
agitation, and partisan politics fail, as they often do, public-sector
unions then must rely upon an appeal either to the law of the land or
to the law of the streets; that is, they must engage in litigation or in
strikes and other forms of direct action, legal or illegal. 38 2 In sum,
collective bargaining a farce." Rehmus, Constraints on Local Governments in Public Employee
Bargaining, 67 MICH. L. REV. 919, 926 (1969). Examples of NEA activity in this area may be
found in NEA REP. May-June, 1977; id., Jan., 1976, at 13; NEA Now, Apr. 12, 1976, at 2; id.,
Jan. 12, 1976, at 3; id., Nov. 24, 1975, at 2; TODAY AT THE NEA, Nov. 18, 1975, at 1.
382. This article is not the place to deal in depth with the problem of public-sector strikes.
That issue, of course, deserves and requires detailed study. In the final analysis, the trade-union
theory and practice of direct action, especially in the public sector, is the theory and practice of
revolution. See Syndicalism, supra note 2, at 712-18.
To be sure, union leaders such as NEA's Terry Herndon may argue that:
most of [the teacher strikes] are [not] contrary to the best interests of the public.
The public has been misserved in many places for many years by the operation of
inefficient, ineffective, and inadequate educational programs. If it is impossible to
create the situations for optimal professional practice without the strike then the
strike must occur.
NEA ADVOCATE, Nov., 1975, at 8. That is to say, if NEA leaders and members disagree with
what the public has decided best serves the general welfare as far as education is concerned,
they will not hesitate to employ direct action to (as it were) force the public to be free.
Moreover, the NEA's spokesmen and publications make evident the attitude that its members'
duty to their union and its policies is "the most important thing, stronger than a legal obligation
to a new [collective-bargaining) law that was relatively weak and needs improvement." NEA
REP., Mar., 1976, at 6 (interview with Florida "teacher of the year").
These attitudes explain NEA's massive involvement in strikes over the past several years, as
one integral component part of its overall political program to attain teacher power at the public's expense.
First, NEA supports its affiliates in strikes, and specifically "denounce [s] . . . the practice of
keeping the schools open during a strike." Minutes of the NEA Board of Directors Meeting of
June 30 & July 2 & 5, 1975, at 725-26. Top NEA officials extend their personal encouragement
to striking teachers. The NEA organization, its component parts and its members provide
maximum legal, financial and other assistance to the strikers. And NEA governance organs
discipline strike-breakers. E.g., NEA REP., Jan., 1977, at 2 (appearance by NEA president at
strike in Louisville, Ky.); id., Oct., 1974, at 3 (appearance by NEA president at strike in
Tacoma, Wash.); Minutes of the NEA Executive Committee Meeting of Nov. 17-18, 1975, at
364 (NEA president expresses commitment to visit local affiliates "facing critical problems");
Minutes of the NEA Executive Committee Meeting of Dec. 8-9 & 13, 1975, at 401 (legal
assistance "for teachers incarcerated because of their commitment to bargaining rights"); NEA
REP., Jan., 1976, at 14 (soliciting NEA members to make financial contributions to striking
teachers); id., Dec., 1973, at 6-7 (over $2 million in loans made to strikers by NEA-controlled
"assistance fund"); Minutes of the NEA Board of Directors Meeting of Sept. 20-21, 1974, at 457
(pledging strike assistance to local affiliate); Minutes of the NEA Board of Directors Meeting of
Feb. 14-15, 1975, at 543-44 (NEA policy regarding strike-breakers).
Second, NEA officials, staff, and members cooperate at all levels of the organization in planning and implementing strike strategies and tactics. E.g., NEA REP., Dec., 1976, at 5 (Seattle,
Wash., strike described as "a tremendous team effort"); id., Oct., 1975, at 6-8 (NEA "staff...
had been working behind the scenes . . . in preparation for the impending crisis").
Third, the NEA cooperates with other public-sector unions in direct action against the public.
E.g., Minutes of the NEA Board of Directors Meeting of May 2-4, 1975, at 668-69 (NEA policy
on cooperation with the AFSCME); NEA Now, Oct. 20, 1975, at 1 (joint NEA-AFSCME strike
in Atlanta, Ga.).

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:293

public-employee unions do, in Herndon's words, have "an absolute
need . . . to exert maximum influence on the political system,"
through collective bargaining, lobbying, propaganda and agitation,
partisan politics, litigation and direct action. To some union administrators, this need is inherent in the process of public-sector collective
bargaining-a proposition, I suppose, with which there can be little
reason for disagreement. 383 But union leaders, and I believe corSpecific examples of massive NEA strike efforts include: Hortonville, Wis.; Timberlane,
N.H.; Garden City, Mich.; and New Bedford, Mass. See, e.g., NEA REP., Jan., 1976, at 4; id.,
Dec., 1974, at 3; NEA Now, Feb. 2, 1976, at 4; id., Dec. 22, 1975, at 4; id., Oct. 14, 1975, at
4; TODAY AT THE NEA, Oct. 31, 1975, at 1; COMMON SENSE, Dec. 5, 1975, at 1; Minutes of

the NEA Executive Committee Meeting of Nov. 17-18, 1975, at 372; id., Meeting of Nov.
11-13, 1974, at 318-19; id., Meeting of Aug. 22-23, 1974, at 262; Minutes of NEA Board of
Directors Meeting of Nov. 15-16, 1974, at 483, 485, 489-91, 526-27.
Admittedly, union leaders play down the significance of public-sector strikes by dismissing
them as an "emotional issue." Strikes, they say, are merely the predictable response of public
employees to the absence of "legislation that fully provides [them] with the right to engage in
collective bargaining." Wurf, Union Leaders and Public Sector Unions, in PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
UNIONS: A STUDY OF THE CRISIS IN PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS 165, 180 (A. Chickering ed. 1976). "If the public wants to avoid injurious confrontations with those who perform
critical services," warns NEA's Terry Herndon, "it must provide the statutory base that gives
public employees some means other than confrontation to get reasonableness and equity." NEA
REP., Oct., 1974, at 4. Indeed, "[i]f a federal law is not enacted to guarantee ... public
employees collective bargaining rights, there is a risk of labor unrest unparalleled since the
1930's." Id., May, 1975, at 17. See M. DONLEY, JR., POWER TO THE TEACHER 209 (1976) (80%

of teacher strikes
cur that "the real
both fundamental
their leaders feel

in 1974 concerned "collective-bargaining 'rights"'). And union apologists conkey to preventing disruptive strikes" is "the community's capacity for creating
relationships and auxiliary peace mechanisms adequate to make unionists and
there is no need for striking-and good reason not to." Raskin, Conclusion:

The Current Political Contest, in PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONS, supra, at 203, 220.

Of course, union leaders are never embarrassed to qualify their "labor-peace" theory with the
caveat that "strikes ... are a normal and natural and necessary part of the collective bargaining
process. They are the last resort. But it is necessary to preserve the right to that last resort."
Meany, Union Leaders and Public Sector Unions, in PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONS, supra, at 165,

171. But they claim their resort to strikes would be unnecessary if public officials would stop
"resisting .. .peaceful alternative[s]," such as binding arbitration. If public officials would only
cooperate, they say,"[i]t would eliminate the danger that communities could suffer from the
disruption of vital services;" and "once unions such as [the AFSCME] need not be preoccupied
with mere survival, we will be able to work with public officials to improve public services."
Wurf, Union Leaders and Public Sector Unions, in PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONS, supra, at 165,
180, 181.
Why the public does not recognize and condemn arguments such as these for what they
are-namely, extortion-remains a mystery. See Syndicalism, supra note 2, at 712-23. Even
more difficult to fathom is why the Abood plurality upheld the agency shop when it is common
knowledge that the "critical aspect of union security provisions-more precisely, of union
dues-is that payments made in connection with them are the principal means of financing
strikes." Lewin, Collective Bargaining and the Right to Strike, in PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONS,
supra, at 145, 160. The litigants raised the point. Brief for Appellants 176-86. But there is no
mention of the issue in any of the opinions.
383. "[Partisan] political activity may well be an integral part of the bargaining process. It is
so where it is directed toward the election of officials and legislators who are thought to more
(or less) be favorable to union demands in pending labor negotiations." City of Stamford, Case
No. MPP-3381, Decision No. 1421 (Conn. State Bd. of Lab. Rel., 1976).
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rectly so, go further. Indeed, such spokesmen as AFSCME General
Counsel A.L. Zwerdling readily advance the more expansive proposition that "[t]he recent legislative and legal activities of the AFSCME
provide an example of the inherently political nature of public
384
employee unionism."
A perfect case-study supports these general statements. In 1975,
after arbitration, the collective-bargaining agreement between the
Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges and the Minnesota
Community College Faculty Association (MCCFA), an affiliate of the
Minnesota Education Association (MEA) and the NEA, contained a
cost-of-living-allowance (COLA) clause covering teachers' salaries. In
the face of joint lobbying by the MCCFA and MEA, the Minnesota
Legislature deleted the COLA clause from the collective agreement.
The MCCFA immediately launched a lobbying campaign "aimed at
restoring the cost-of-living clause," and warned its members that "our
only recourse is through legislative action." 38 5 During the summer of
1975, MCCFA and MEA officials conferred among themselves and
with friendly legislators to plan strategies; the COLA issue "was given
much attention" at a "MEA legislative workshop;" and MCCFA representatives "met with the Community College Board to elicit their
active support in the legislature." 386 In early September, the
MCCFA President admonished the organization's members that
we must have lobbying by all MCCFA members and major efforts
from other MEA members . . .- and hopefully AFSCME as
well-if we are to have a chance of being successful. We will have
the necessary information and strategies ready for presentation at

our convention. . . . We will then carry on massive grass-roots
lobbying across the state .... Every legislator must be contacted
several times . .. 387
At the MCCFA convention, a friendly state senator spoke advising
MCCFA members
on how to get into the political system. He stated that 'many
educators would like to rise above the political process' and declared this attitude 'destructive.' It is necessary to educate the
public through press releases and letters to the editor. In addition

384. Union Security in the Public Sector, in ABA Sect. of Lab. Rel. Law, NATIONAL INSTITUTE PROGRAM: LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 156, 167 (A. Knapp ed. 1977)

(emphasis added). All of Zwerdling's remarks on this subject are worthy of study. Id. at 166-68
& nn.38-49.
385. MCCFA GREEN SHEET, May 22, 1975, at 1; id., Sept. 12, 1975.

386. Id. at 1-2.
387. Id. at 2.

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:293

[the senator] recommended that teachers be active in a political
party and come to the legislature seeking desired changes. He advised that those persons directly involved are more effective with
38 8
the legislature than any lobbyist.

Thereafter, the union began its grass-roots lobbying campaign. Across
the state, small groups of MCCFA members contacted their legislators, reporting back to MCCFA offices on the results of their
meetings. "It is extremely important," the MCCFA President emphasized, "that all of the first contacts be made immediately ...
Every [legislator] must be included in either the first group visit, or
in follow-up contacts."

38 9

Unfortunately for the union, the legislature rejected the cost-ofliving clause. But this defeat inspired the MCCFA President to reflect on the "lessons" the COLA campaign taught:
1. Members must be involved politically. Our lobbyists are only
as effective as the organization they represent, and the organizational strength is observed by legislators in their own districts.
3. The legislators who will support us the most strongly are
those who received campaign help from our members.
[MCCFA] members and others must now support those legislators
who supported us; oppose those who did not. All representatives
and senators are up for election this November; COLA must be an
issue they have to face. .

.

. [S]ome work is now expected of you.

You are not expected to give up your whole summer to campaigning; if you would work only eight-to-ten hours between now and
the election for a legislative candidate, we will have achieved
0

39
enormous influence.

During the ensuing election, the MEA's political-action arm used the
COLA vote "as a major criterion" in granting or withholding campaign contributions "in every legislative race [in Minnesota] where an
incumbent was involved." Although few anti-COLA legislators suffered defeat, the MCCFA President could nevertheless report his
belief that
these actions have greatly strengthened both MCCFA and MEA.
MCCFA is now clearly indentified to the legislature as an important and integral part of MEA. Our ties to [the MEA's political
arm] are clear. Also, it has been strongly demonstrated that legislators will be held accountable for their votes on key MEA bills.
388. Id., Nov. 5, 1975, at 1-2.
389. Id. at 1.
390. Id., May 24, 1976, at 1-2.
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This new organizational identity coupled with our increased political involvement speaks well for the future. 39 1
Later, in September of 1977, after the Minnesota legislature had
rejected another arbitrated increase negotiated by the MCCFA, the
latter and its affiliate the MEA filed a "precedent setting ... unfair
labor practice suit against the State of Minnesota . . . seek[ing] an

injunction prohibiting the State from refusing to comply with the arbitrator's [COLA] award." "We have sought legislative redress and
that was not successful," said the MCCFA President. "Now we must
3 92
turn to the courts."
Here, then, is a seemingly minor but typical incident which freezes
and preserves for posterity, in the words and deeds of union officials
and members, the essence of public-sector unionism-the full and
inextricable integration of collective bargaining, lobbying, propaganda
and agitation, partisan politics and litigation. This, in short, is the
logic of public-sector unionism embodied, as it must and will always
be embodied, in militant political activism of every major variety.
Of course, I have yet to speak, or to adduce an example, of organizing as an element of political activism. Neither shall I do so at
any great length. For it is obvious that to engage effectively in political activities, every public-sector union must organize and mobilize
its members and form working coalitions with other politically active
groups. 3 93 The logic of the situation suggests that union organization
will focus, in the first instance, on employees' economic concerns in
order to take advantage of real economic grievances or to play on the
ever-present passions of greed and vulgar envy. However, this
merely creates the necessary platform for more ambitious political
endeavors-endeavors which constitute the truly important objectives of most public-employee unions. "Organize for bargaining so
you can get into a position in which administrators must deal with
you," NEA President John Ryor encouraged NEA members. "Then,
simultaneously use your collective power to jump into politics with
both feet." 3 94 Compulsory collective bargaining, Ryor thus indicates,
is not and cannot be enough. It is merely a nucleus around which to
crystallize a structure of collective power intended by union leaders

391. Id., Nov. 5, 1976, at 2.
392. Id., Sept. 15, 1977, at 1-2.
393. Even with rival unions in some cases. E.g., Transcript, Options in Education, Nat'l Pub.
Radio Program No. 91, "The Great Debate III," Sept. 12, 1977, at 17 (remarks of Terry
Herndon on NEA-AFT collaboration).
394. NEA ADVOCATE, Sept.,

1975, at 4.
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for many purposes other than negotiating terms and conditions of
3 95

employment.
Indeed, once public-employee unions have organized and
mobilized their members and arranged coalitions with other militant
groups, they can employ their collective power to promote whatever
causes serve their members' political, economic or social interests-or, perhaps more realistically, the interests of union leaders
in seizing and exercising political power over either union members
or citizens generally. After all, its capabilities do not confine to the
narrow ambit of compulsory collective bargaining the machine of
political activism, influence, and power which the logic of their situation compels public-sector unions to create and operate. Only the
intentions or perceptions of the men who direct it could do that. But
their intentions and perceptions, I suspect, and the design of the
machine, faithfully reflect a design capable of affecting, in some significant way or other, the whole political process of representative
government.
Public-sector unions such as the NEA, AFT, and AFSCME arebecause they must be-militant political-action organizations to the
limit of their institutional resources and their members' endurance.
D. Public-Sector Unions as
Special-Interest Political Parties
In addition to being political-action organizations, public-sector
unions are-because they must be-political parties of a peculiar
sort: namely, special interest political parties, both without and (especially) with regard to their participation as exclusive representatives in
the inherently political process of compulsory public-sector collective
bargaining.
1. Without respect to their status as exclusive representatives
The facts amply demonstrate that public-sector unions are political-action organizations, at least in the case of the NEA. Logic and
facts also teach that these unions are partisan political-action organizations and, in the broad sense of the term, political parties.
All unions are partisan organizations, of course, in that with respect
to their members they perform the role of "zealous advocate[s]" who
"take the part of another." 39 6 Even private-sector unions admit that
395. Not accidentally, then, repeal of the Hatch Act has been one of the highest-priority
goals of federal public-employee unions. E.g., GOVT EMP. REL. REP. (BNA), at 5 (Jan. 24,
1977).
396. WEBSTER'S, supra note 100, at 1783.
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they are "first and foremost special interest organizations." 3 97 And
leaders of public-sector unions such as AFT President Albert Shanker
are no less adamant that "[t]he [union-nember] teacher has a right to
an advocate. [The AFT is] that advocate." 398 No one, however, approaches the NEA and its officials in their unabashed self-adulation as
an "advocate organization," 3 99 as "spokespersons for education," 40 0 as
"the national voice for education," 401 or even as "[w]e the teachers of
the United States of America." 402
The partisanship of public-sector unions such as the NEA, however, is of a special kind, because, as Justice Powell noted in Abood,
the "ultimate objective of a union in the public sector, like that of a
political party, is to influence public decision-making in accordance
with the views and perceived interests of its membership." 40 3 Public-sector unions are, in a meaningful sense, "political parties." For
their members constitute a "body of persons forming one side in a
contest . . . ; a number of persons united in opinion and action, as
distinguished from, or opposed to, the rest of the community . . . on
questions of public policy." 40 4 And, as we have seen, they must and
do function as political-action organizations, or, perhaps more precisely, political-action movements. Public-sector unions are not, to be
sure, political parties of the traditional type, such as the Republican
or Democratic Parties, which historically have attempted to appeal to
a wide spectrum of economic, social, and political interests. Rather,
they are special interest political parties: partisan organizations dedicated to advancing, through broad-ranging and militant political activism, the parochial concerns of a particular economic or social
group, class or profession such as (in the case of the NEA and AFT)
organized public school teachers.
This conclusion is not an eccentric idea of my own, but one to
which the NEA itself subscribes with evident pride. As early as 1970,
NEA President George Fischer advised the organization that "we in
the [NEA] must first determine that we are no longer just Republicans or Democrats, but that we have only one real overriding
party-education.- 40 5 Four years later, NEA Executive Director
397.
tant to
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.

AFL-CIO News, June 11, 1977, at 4, col. 3 (remarks of T.R. Donahue, Executive AssisPresident George Meany).
Transcript, supra note 393, at 11.
NEA REP., Aug., 1973, at 3 (remarks of NEA president Helen Wise).
TODAY AT THE NEA, July 9, 1975, at 1.
NEA CONST. preamble, 1976-77 NEA Handbook 152.
NEA Bill of Rights preamble, quoted in NEA REP., Oct., 1973, at 8.
431 U.S. at 256 (Powell, J., concurring).
WEBSTER'S, supra note 100, at 1784.

405. Report of the President to the 108th Annual NEA Convention (July 3, 1970).
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Terry Herndon added that the NEA does "have congressional friends
from both parties .... but unfortunately there is no sign of a great
stampede toward progress in either caucus. Therefore, we must con4 06
tinue to be partisan on behalf of education."
And in its current training materials, the NEA reminds its members: "your party is the 'education party. ' "' 40 7 Moreover, its political
allies also counsel that "[a]s an organization, the NEA must ... use
its power in the political process, not under the banner of party but
under the banner of education. " 408 In short, by its own admission,
the NEA is a special interest political party.
2. With respect to their status as exclusive representatives
But if public-sector unions such as the NEA are special interest
political parties in their own right, how much more so are they worthy of that designation in their capacities as exclusive representatives
in the process of compulsory collective bargaining? Indeed, I submit
that, simply by their participation as exclusive representatives in that
inherently political process, public-sector unions become special
interest political parties even if they are not political-action organizations on some independent ground.
The logic of the situation dictates this conclusion. First, as every
observer has recognized, public-sector collective bargaining is a
political activity. On the one hand, the bargaining process itself is
political in that it "pertain[s] to . . . the conduct of government" or
"the exercise of the functions vested in those charged with the
conduct of government." 40 9 Collective bargaining has no more obvious
or important purpose than to establish what the conduct of government will be, through negotiations aimed at controlling or influencing
the exercise of the functions vested in those persons charged with
that conduct. On the other hand, the status of an exclusive representative is equally political in that it "pertain [s] to the exercise of the
rights and privileges or the influence" by which certain individuals
"seek to determine or control public policy," and to "the organization
406. 1974-75 NEA Handbook 9.
407. NEA Instruction and Professional Development Office, SPEAKING FOR TEACHERS, Section III, "Political Persuasion," at 4 (n.d.).
408. NEA REP., Aug., 1973, at 4 (remarks of Senator Edward M. Kennedy, D-Mass., at 1973
NEA "Critical Issues in Education" Conference). See also id. at 6 (remarks of Representative
James O'Hara, D-Mich.): "If you don't get into politics with both feet, someone else is going to
make that decision for you. I don't think you ought,' as a profession, to attach yourselves to
either party. Keep us both nervous about where you are going to vote."
409. WEBSTER'S, supra note 100, at 1909.
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or action of individuals, parties, or interests that seek to control
the . . action of those who manage the affairs of a state." 410 Exclusive representation is nothing less than a system of extraordinary legal
rights, powers and privileges through which certain interests exercise
a unique form of influence to determine or control the direction of
public policy and the action of public officials. Collective bargaining
through exclusive representation, then, is a political activity in and of
itself.
Second, the scheme of compulsory collective bargaining logically
requires that public-sector unions function as partisan political organizations. As exclusive representatives, these unions are necessarily
political entities, because they are "organization [s] composed of persons holding similar beliefs on certain public questions who strive to
gain control of the government in order to put their beliefs into effect."411 That they are also partisan political entities, in the sense of
being zealous advocates for their members, we have already seen.
Moreover, the whole concept of collective bargaining through the
exclusive representation device irrebuttably presumes such partisanship in the notion that employees and employers have opposing
interests. 412 Now, public-employee unions are "representative only
4 13
of one segment of the population," not of the people as a whole,
whereas public employers presumptively represent the entire community. Therefore, if the interests of these unions and employers are
opposed, and if the unions are necessarily political entities in the bargaining process, then it follows that, simply as a consequence of the
logic of exclusive representation itself, they constitute a species of
political party. In short, the very nature of compulsory public-sector
collective bargaining compels public-sector unions, whatever their
other political attributes or activities' to operate as special interest
political parties.
I recognize, of course, that my use of the term "political party" in
reference to such organizations as the NEA is somewhat novel-although it is one in which both Justice Powell and the NEA itself

410. Id.
411. Chambers v. I. Ben Greenman Ass'n, 58 N.Y.S.2d 637, 640 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 269 A.D.
938, 58 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1945).
412. See, e.g., the interesting private-sector decision of Queen Mary Restaurants Corp. v.
NLRB, 96 L.R.R.M. 2456, 2560 (9th Cir. 1977) (employer may not refuse to compromise with
exclusive representative in regard to compulsory unionism arrangements on theory that
employer "represented those employees who had voted against the [union] and any compromise
would betray them;" this argument, says the court, "contradicts the basic tenet of collective
bargaining").
413. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. at 259 n.13 (Powell, J., concurring).
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concur without reservation. Yet, though unusual, it is not without
support in the traditional literature. Political scientists generally distinguish parties from pressure groups on the bases of the manner in
which they participate in the political process and their sources of
membership support. For example, one authority holds that parties
seek "as their primary goal the conquest of power or a share in its
exercise" by electing representatives, selecting administrators, and
"tak[ing] control of the government;" whereas pressure groups
"do not
seek to win power themselves, or to participate in the exercise of
power," instead being satisfied merely to influence those who do
wield it. 4 14 As we have seen, however, compulsory collective bargaining through the exclusive representation device is not merely a
means by which unions can somehow influence the exercise of governmental power. But, at least as the NEA, AFT, and AFSCME conceive of it, compulsory collective bargaining is a means for them to
share, and even to share equally, in that exercise. Moreover, in practice, organizations such as the NEA do attempt to elect representatives, albeit not at this time in history on an open "union label,"
whom they perceive as favorable to their collective-bargaining
goals. 4 15 And, in at least one decision, a state labor board has held
such partisan political activism to be "an integral part of the bargaining process." 416 Finally, a major NEA goal for several years has been
the creation of a cabinet-level department of education, high-level
appointments to which, presumably, the NEA intends to control on
that auspicious day when "the President of the United
States . . . consult[s] with the officers of the [NEA] on all issues of
national importance." 41 7 The manner in which public-sector unions
participate in the political process through compulsory bargaining,
414.

M. DUVERGER,

PARTY POLITICS AND PRESSURE GROUPS: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUC-

TION 1-2 (D. Wagoner transl.

1972). Accord, H. BONE, AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE PARTY
SYSTEM 571 (4th ed. 1971); L. EPSTEIN, POLITICAL PARTIES IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES 12
(1967); V. KEY, POLITICS, PARTIES & PRESSURE GROUPS 18-19 (5th ed. 1964); T. COUSENS,

(1942); R. BROOKS, POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTORAL PROBLEMS 14 (3d ed. 1933); Riggs, Comparative Politics and the Study of
Political Parties: A StructuralApproach, in APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF PARTY ORGANIZAPOLITICS AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN AMERICA 25

51 (W. Crotty ed. 1968).
415. See note 381 & accompanying text supra. It seems to me that, as a practical matter,
NEA or other union-endorsed candidates do run on a "union label," and that it is that intangi-

TION,

ble "label"--the prestige which presumably attaches to the organization's endorsement-which

union leaders expect will tend to favorably influence voters. Supra note 252 & accompanying
text.
416. City of Stamford, Case No. MPP-3381, Decision No. 1421 (Conn. State Bd. of Lab.
Rel., 1976).
417. Report of the President to the 108th Annual NEA Convention (July 3, 1970). On NEA's
desire for a national department of education, see, e.g., NEA Resolution A-5, "United States
Department of Education," 1976-77 NEA Handbook 195; NEA REP., Sept., 1977, at 1, 2.
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then, does not differ appreciably in principle from the manner in
which traditional political parties participate therein.
Again, a noted author maintains that parties "draw their support from
a broad base, whereas pressure groups represent a limited number
with a particular or private interest." 418 This, perhaps, is an irrelevant distinction here, since my primary point is that public-sector
unions are special interest political parties, by definition. But let us
put the terminological consideration to one side. Admittedly, most
private-sector pressure groups, including unions, do represent parochial interests-not only in fact, but also in the eyes of the public-at-large, which infrequently deceives itself with arguments that
concessions to one or another interest group will promote the general
welfare. Public-sector unions, conversely, are engaged in the provision of public services, with a prima facie connection to the public
interest. Therefore, they often can convincingly claim, although
perhaps not prove when challenged, that their particular interests
somehow represent or coincide with the interests of the recipients of
those services. The position of every public-employee union,
moreover, compels it to present its own objectives, no matter how
anti-social they may really be, in the guise of public interests. Thus,
the NEA continually attempts to advance its own ends by propagandistic appeals to the public couched in terms of society's supposed
interest in some NEA scheme or other. 4 19 Unlike private-sector
groups, however, public-sector unions can often succeed in this deception precisely because their position allows them, at least initially,
to take advantage of such good will as exists between the people and
their government. Public-employee unions attempt to draw their
support, then, from essentially the same broad base as do traditional
political parties.
In sum, I conclude that their participation in the inherently political process of compulsory collective bargaining through the exclusive
representation device renders public-sector unions special interest
political parties. A fortiori, if (as is the NEA) they are also militant
political-action membership organizations, the same conclusion holds
true, only more emphatically. In the latter case, as others have observed, "[i]t is no exaggeration ...to say that the public union is the
' 420
successor in many ways to the old political machine."
418. M. DUVERGER, supra note 414.

419. See, e.g., 1974-75 NEA Handbook 6; NEA Now, Nov. 17, 1975, at 2; NEA REP., Sept.,
1975, at 14; TODAY'S EDUCATION, Jan.-Feb., 1976, at 5.
420. Nisbet, Public Unions and the Decline of Social Trust, in PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONS,

supra note 382, at 13, 30.
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III. CONCLUSION

It is not my purpose, nor is it possible in a single article, to deal
exhaustively with the constitutional issues which flow from the finding
that public-sector unions such as the NEA, AFT and AFSCME are
special interest political parties. Yet such exhaustive analysis is necessary if our society is to resolve the legal and political problems which
compulsory public-sector unionism poses. In anticipation of that
analysis, therefore, I suggest two further areas of inquiry which legal
scholars should enter:
First, as special interest political parties, are the NEA, AFT and
AFSCME the very political "factions" which Madison premonished
us in The Federalist No. 10, constitute the gravest possible threat
to the integrity of our republican form of government?
Second, does compulsory public-sector collective bargaining,

through the agency of factious special interest political parties exercising the extraordinary rights, powers and privileges of exclusive
representatives, embody a danger to representative government
against which the Constitution provides any protection through
judicial process?

These questions, admittedly, are complex and controversial. But if we
are to avoid becoming the victims of Melancton Smith's prophesy, we
must address and answer them unequivocally while there remains
sufficient time to act upon our conclusions.

